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Abstract 
Broadening of the original concept of theory of mind has been necessary to 
more accurately reflect the social complexity involved in arriving at an understanding 
of others' minds. However, such expansion has primarily focused on developmental 
mechanisms, whereas the issue of what social understanding actually encompasses 
has been relatively neglected. In an effort to dispel the resulting ambiguity which 
surrounds this latter aspect, this thesis pursued clarification of the potential 
constituents to children's social understanding in typical development and autism. 
Part 1 of the thesis required methodological enterprise as a prelude to the more 
theoretically driven focus outlined in Part 2 in order to first verify the subsequent use 
of valid and comprehensive measures of social cognition. 
Part 2 delved into the issue of: "What are the constituents of children's social 
understanding?" adopting the theoretical framework offered by Tager-Flusberg and 
Joseph (2005) to guide our exploration of the constituents - social cognition, social 
perception, social attention, and language - and the possible continuity of paths 
between them. Contrary to expectation, no link was found between social-perceptual 
and social-cognitive abilities in 4- to 6-year-olds. However, a subsequent study of a 
much larger group of typically developing 4- to 5-year-olds was sufficiently broad to 
enable structural equation modelling of relationships between these constructs and 
constructs of social attention and language. These analyses revealed well-
differentiated constituents of social understanding and directed us to a new model of 
social understanding in which language abilities were integral to the relationship 
between social perception and social cognition. Also, this new model suggested that 
the continuity between these three constructs was quite distinct from a lower-level 
construct encompassing joint attention and orienting abilities. The final experimental 
l1l 
chapter then examined these findings in the context of autism - findings indicated that 
children with autism performed significantly less well than language-matched typical 
children within the domain of social attention but performed comparatively well 
within the social-perceptual construct. However, unlike typical children, neither this 
lack of a significant social-perceptual impairment nor language matching was 
sufficient to lead to social-cognitive success for children with autism. This 
substantiates the view that children with autism may only arrive at social-cognitive 
understanding by certain aspects of language, such as syntactic comprehension. The 
thesis findings underline the importance for social understanding research - in an 
ever-expanding field - to embrace apparent important distinctions between inherently 
different constituents of social understanding. Implications for future research and 
theoretical considerations are discussed. 
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Preface 
" ... there has been little work in formulating a model of theory of mind, or 
more broadly, social knowledge. What are its basic concepts, rules and 
representations? ... The absence of such a model has led to the broadening of the 
concept of theory of mind with little regard to potentially important theoretical 
distinctions that have implications for underlying mechanisms within this broad 
domain." (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000 (p. 60)). 
Though stated 7 years ago, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan's comment resonates 
today by virtue of it being both true and untrue. It is true in the sense that the concept 
of theory of mind has broadened to include social understanding - mirrored by the 
development of a number of theories addressing the nature of this social 
understanding (e.g., Carpendale & Lewis, 2004, 2006; Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 
2005). Yet it is untrue in the sense that there is still little empirical work that has tried 
to bridge across from children's low-level intentionality to their representational 
theory of mind. The aim of this thesis is to provide such a link in order to further our 
understanding of the constituents of children's social understanding. I attempt to 
bridge this gap in the field of children's theory ofmind using Tager-Flusberg and 
colleagues untested model of theory of mind as a vehicle for the theoretical 
endeavour. Accordingly, to achieve this, the thesis is divided into two parts. Part 1 
describes the development of new methodology that re-examines the distinction 
between first-order and second-order levels of social-cognitive theory of mind. Part 2 
incorporates this newly-developed methodology alongside other aspects of social 
understanding and language into a comprehensive series of studies investigating 
pathways to social understanding in typically developing children and children with 
autism. 
XI 
INTRODUCTION -
SOCIAL UNDERSTANDING AND THEORY OF MIND: 
WHAT DO WE NEED TO RE-EXAMINE? 
1 
Chapter 1 
A widened lens on theory of mind: 
The broader notion of social understanding 
From its inception, the concept of theory of mind has established itself at the 
heart of a body ofliterature focusing on children's social cognitive development. The 
ability to be aware that other individuals may hold thoughts different from your own 
and to be able to use that knowledge to predict how others may behave is 
fundamentally a human capacity. All major institutions in life such as education 
require such a social foundation, otherwise communication would break down and 
social interaction would be ineffective. 
Since research on theory of mind began, its domain of influence has broadened 
beyond all recognition. While the focus throughout the 1980's until the mid-1990's 
centred upon cognitive abilities and understanding of a child's ability to attribute 
mental states such as belief and desire, research since has led the field to shift from a 
purely cognitive standpoint to a more encompassing focus - one which incorporates 
an awareness of the importance of social interaction and early experience in theory of 
mind development. Reflecting this expansion, the area has seen the terminology vary 
from theory of mind and menta/ising to increasingly more comprehensive terms such 
as social intelligence and social understanding. Such broadening has undoubtedly, 
and importantly, added a depth to the area which is more in tune with the complexity 
and social basis of understanding other people's minds. However, in furthering the 
field, two key issues have become intertwined, which if focused on more 
independently should advance the field yet further. The first of these receiving most 
focus is the issue of how theory of mind (whether narrowly or broadly defined) 
develops. The second, more theoretical endeavour, receiving less attention, asks 
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'What is theory of mind?' This thesis will be primarily tackling the latter issue in a 
bid to determine what is at the core of a broader notion of theory of mind in children 
and how paths link different constituents of this capacity together. 
Traditionally, interpretation of theory of mind has focused narrowly on the 
understanding of representational mental states such as belief. More recently, with 
some theories incorporating a more social dimension and a wealth of evidence 
reflecting this, the term theory of mind increasingly loses favour to the more 
encompassing phrase social understanding. This breadth of meaning is translated into 
a diverse research endeavour which not only examines children's social cognition, but 
which also includes investigation of earlier manifestations of social understanding in 
the domains of attention, perception, emotion and language. Thus, in its more broadly 
defined sense, theory of mind or social understanding has become an umbrella term 
for a wide range of abilities and this diversity contrasts with the narrow approach to 
theory of mind still taken by traditionalists within the field. Given that the terms 
underlying the different positions are often used interchangeably and given the 
intertwining of this issue with the aforementioned issue of how theory of mind 
actually develops, there is a degree of ambiguity about how the broader view of social 
understanding relates to the traditional view of social cognition. Examination ofthe 
link between the narrow and broad definitions of theory of mind, as planned here, 
should shed light on the distinction between different domains subsumed within the 
broader account and provide illumination on the continuity in ability from these 
domains to representational understanding. In setting the context for our investigation 
to these ends, we begin by considering the historical origins to this research area 
before focusing on the impetus for its recent broadening expansion and then 
3 
discussing the issues of definition and continuity currently surrounding theory of mind 
or social understanding. 
1.1 Early concepts or theories ofthemy of mind 
The origin of theory of mind research can be traced back to a primate study by 
Premack and Woodruff ( 1978) in which they asked if chimpanzees had a theory of 
mind. While finding that chimpanzees could understand the art of deception led 
Premack and Woodruff to claim that chimpanzees did have a theory of mind, various 
philosophers such as Dennett ( 1978) argued that further task specification was needed 
to give conclusive proof of an ability to understand the minds of others. Suggestions 
followed that tasks used with children or chimpanzees would need to demonstrate an 
understanding that beliefs can be false and an ability to predict how people would 
behave on the basis of their false belief. Wimmer and Pemer (1983) introduced a 
simple paradigm which could demonstrate unequivocally whether children could 
understand that mental states can be independent of reality. Their story used in this 
paradigm is based on a character, Maxi, who has a mistaken belief regarding the 
location of his chocolate- he thinks it is in a blue cupboard when in reality it is in a 
green cupboard. When children are asked where Maxi will look for his chocolate they 
respond correctly if they can reason that Maxi will act on the basis of his false belief 
rather than the child wrongly attributing what they already know to be the case in 
reality. With such a simple yet effective design, this type of task became the classic 
test within the tradition oftheory of mind research. Researchers then had a tool with 
which to assess the point in development at which children became able to conceive 
of the representational nature of mental states. Consequently, the trend throughout the 
1980's and a large part ofthe 1990's was to use this paradigm to provide evidence for 
acquisition of a theory of mind. Indeed, numerous studies demonstrated that the 
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ability to understand that thoughts may be independent of reality was generally 
evident by age 4 in typically developing children (Astington & Gopnik, 1991; 
Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner, 1985; Perner, Leekam & Wimmer, 1987; Sodian, 1991; 
Wimmer & Pemer, 1983) though several other studies have demonstrated such 
understanding in children at 2 and 3 years of age (Chandler & Hala, 1994; Sullivan & 
Winner, 1993; Wellman, 1991). 
While the benefit ofthe false belief paradigm was undoubted, it also served as 
a framework for a more complex paradigm to assess higher-order theory of mind 
abilities (e.g., "he thinks that she thinks ... "). Pemer and Wimmer (1985) devised a 
second-order false belief task which tapped a child's ability to attribute mental states 
not to physical states (first-order understanding) but to other people's mental states. 
The ability to understand the recursive nature of mental states was found to emerge in 
children by age 6 (Pemer & Wimmer, 1985), although studies which simplified the 
demands of the paradigm found this ability appeared in children at 4 or 5 years of age 
(e.g., Coull, Leekam, & Bennett, 2006; Leekam, 1991; Sullivan, Zaitchik & Tager-
Flusberg, 1994; Winner & Leekam, 1991) Generally, acquiring such understanding 
was taken to signal a fully fledged theory of mind. Thus, within the context of this 
research perspective, a time-scale was outlined of the ages at which these important 
theory of mind abilities emerged. In parallel, several theorists attempted to explain 
how children acquired a theory of mind. 
While making a valuable methodological contribution within theory of mind 
research, Perner also proposed a conceptualisation of theory of mind development. 
Perner ( 1991 ), along with Wellman ( 1990), provided two of the main theoretical 
offerings within theory of mind research which became known as theory theories. 
These theorists shared the view that the child's development of theory of mind could 
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be thought of in terms of theory formation. While their accounts are also similar in 
that they regard theory of mind development as a process which is internal, 
cognitively driven and individual to the child, they differ in their depiction of the type 
oftheory which the child acquires. From Wellman's (1990) perspective, the child's 
theory allows the child to distinguish between physical objects and mental entities. 
Furthermore, given the abstract nature of mental entities, he asserts that a theory is 
necessary in order to allow the child to reason about these when attempting to 
understand others' minds. For Wellman, two particular mental entities- desire and 
belief- shape the child's theory formation- with understanding of desire appearing 
around age 2. By age 4 the child's theorising allows their concept of desire to be 
distinguished from the intrinsically more complex concept of belief. Thus, transitional 
stages within children's theory of mind development are identified as the points at 
which the child's knowledge develops within their belief framework such that their 
understanding becomes incompatible with their current theory. In contrast, Pemer 
focuses more on the idea of representation within the child's theory of mind- the idea 
that mental representations are simply that- representations. According to Perner, 
following a period up to 4 years of age when the child has understood the basis of 
representation, there is then a crucial conceptual change within the child's theory, 
known as metarepresentation, at which point the child understands that 
representations do not necessarily reflect reality. Thus, it is at this point that children 
understand that people's representations, such as belief, can be false. Pemer suggests 
that within a couple of years of acquiring this conceptual knowledge, children can 
then recursively apply the notion of metarepresentation to relate mental states to other 
mental states. By this stage, children are able to understand that people can hold false 
beliefs about other people's beliefs; so by viewing the child as a theoretician in this 
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way, Pemer explains the child's journey to arrive at complex social cognition in terms 
of a purely cognitive vehicle. Thus, both theorists regard the critical point in theory of 
mind development as the conceptual change which leads to the emergence of 
understanding that people's thoughts can be independent of reality. In summary, 
absent of any mention of children's social experiences or environment, the theory 
theories regard the child's theory of mind as a cognitive framework which becomes 
more refined as the child matures. And it is the development of the particular 
cognitive mechanism - whether representation or the desire-belief distinction - which 
provides children with increasingly complex insights into understanding others' 
minds. 
With regard also to atypical development, theory of mind research became of 
great interest, particularly within the field of autism. Central to a diagnosis of autism 
is the presence of a triad of impairments, one of which is social interaction. Baron-
Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) were the first to investigate the presence of a theory of 
mind in children with autism. In their false belief study which compared children with 
autism to typical children and developmentally delayed children, they found that 
although children with autism were matched to clinical controls in terms of mental 
age, only the children with autism were impaired in their ability to attribute mental 
states. Many studies since have demonstrated that autistic children are significantly 
worse than matched controls on a wide range of theory of mind tasks (e.g., Baron-
Cohen, 1989; Baron-Cohen, 2000a, b; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg & Cohen, 1993). 
Such findings led Baron-Cohen to suggest that autism could be defined by a specific 
theory of mind deficit such that the social impairments which are characteristic of 
autism could be explained by a "circumscribed cognitive failure". Thus, Baron-Cohen 
regarded theory of mind as a cognitive construct and proposed a model (1994) of 
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understanding others' minds in which typically a fully specified module exists in the 
brain for theory of mind. With regard to atypical development, Baron-Cohen (1995) 
explained the social and communicative functioning deficits which feature in autism 
to be as a result of an impaired theory of mind module. Therefore, in harmony with 
the minimal role for the social environment in theory of mind development considered 
by the theory-theorists, Baron-Cohen tendered the social environment no more than a 
possible triggering influence upon the development ofunderstanding others minds. 
Similarly, given the emphasis at the time upon cognitive explanations to 
theory of mind development and the need to understand whether people with autism 
have a unique impairment, Leslie ( 1987) accounted for the social deficits in autism by 
proposing that theory of mind was a modular entity whereby a decoupling mechanism 
within the cognitive structure of the brain was impaired. Leslie suggested that children 
with autism have problems with false belief tasks because they cannot decouple true 
and false representations of the world and because they are also impaired in their 
ability to form propositional attitudes- i.e. an attitude such as thinking or believing is 
·applied to a proposition which describes an external state of affairs such as: she thinks 
that "the doll is in the garden". However, following Leslie's claim, a later study 
(Leekam & Pemer, 1991) - which focused on false photographs rather than false 
beliefs - showed that children with autism could detach their perception of reality (in 
this case a photograph) from reality itself. This finding conveyed that autistic children 
do not have a decoupling deficit but that they have impairment in their ability to form 
propositional attitudes necessary for representational understanding. In summary, both 
Baron-Cohen and Leslie propose impaired cognitive mechanisms as the underlying 
cause of theory of mind deficits which can explain the social problems which children 
with autism encounter. However, as will be discussed, such cognitive, modular 
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accounts of theory of mind are insufficient in explaining the full range of social 
deficits which feature in autism and are too narrow in scope to explain social 
understanding in typical children. 
While Baron-Cohen and Leslie's early work subscribed to the view that theory 
of mind development in autism is delayed by difficulty with representational 
understanding, studies since have shown that children with autism have difficulty with 
joint attention prior to their problems with representational theory of mind skills, (e.g., 
Mundy & Sigman, 1989; Mundy, Sigman & Kasari, 1990). These studies were 
important for two reasons. Firstly, they indicated that studying the process of 
development itself from as early an age as possible is fundamental to understanding 
the nature of developmental disorders such as autism (see Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). 
Secondly, they elucidated possible precursors to social cognition/theory of mind both 
in typical and atypical development. The consideration of such precursors is 
fundamental to a broader interpretation of social understanding. Therefore the 
cognitive accounts offered by Baron-Cohen and Leslie which focus on relatively late 
emergence of ability within the domain of children's social cognition inevitably offer 
an over-simplification of theory of mind development, particularly with regard to 
autism. Shortcomings such as these can also be recognised in the theory theories 
outlined earlier which adopt a position of cognitive maturation and neglect to include 
a social or true developmental dimension in consideration of children's theory of 
mind. 
1. 2 Theoretical changes in the study of the my of mind: The influence of social 
experience and language 
While the aforesaid theories drew criticism from several quarters, most 
notably from Russell ( 1996), the theory of mind tradition itself became increasingly 
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questioned by researchers who were aware that it was highly improbable that a 
complex construct such as theory of mind could develop independently of any social 
or experiential factors. As a result, several alternative accounts of theory of mind 
development emerged that suggested various mechanisms of change which 
incorporated the child's social context. For instance, Butterworth ( 1991) and Hobson 
( 1993b) acknowledged a social dimension to children's theory of mind by proposing 
that inner states are perceived directly through interpersonal engagement with others. 
In addition, Harris ( 1991) proposed that children acquire a theory of mind through 
social interaction whereby introspection and imaginative role-play allow the child to 
access their own mental states which can then be generalised to other minds. Distinct 
from Pemer's account (1991), the important step in the child's theory ofmind 
development according to Harris ( 1991) is not realisation of the representational 
capacity of the mind, it is grasping the concept that mental states can relate to 
situations which are distinct from reality. So Harris' simulation account incorporates 
more of a social influence on children's theory of mind than the theories summarised 
above. However, Harris' theory does not explicitly acknowledge the importance of 
social experiences for theory of mind. Furthermore, as Russell ( 1996) indicates, there 
are issues with how children may introspect from their inner feelings to other people 
when the subjective meaning of these mental state terms are likely to be grounded in 
shared interaction with other people rather than children's own private experiences. 
Regardless, these accounts did offer opposition to the theory-theories and in the 
process they began to point towards the child's wider social context. 
Preceded by the work ofDunn in the 1980's which essentially first grasped the 
importance oflooking at children's experiences within social interaction in order to 
understand children's social cognition, dissatisfaction with the theory-theories and 
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modular theories of social cognition grew throughout the 1990's. Increasingly, 
evidence suggested that theory of mind abilities were intertwined with everyday 
experiences and early social and language development. Dunn continued to champion 
the impact of a child's social experiences within the family. She proposed that 
children developed an understanding of mind through child-adult interactions such as 
conflict and cooperation. For example, experiences such as cooperating with older 
siblings and observing mother-sibling dyadic conflicts were found to be predictive of 
false beliefunderstanding (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla & Youngblade, 1991). 
Further studies (Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Pemer, Ruffman & Leekam, 1994) found 
that the presence of siblings had a facilitative effect upon first-order belief 
understanding. Similar studies have shown that specifically older siblings can 
facilitate children's acquisition of mental state understanding, (e.g., Lewis, Freeman, 
Hagestadt, & Douglas, 1994; Ruffman, Pemer, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 1998). 
Further research has demonstrated associations between theory of mind and various 
aspects of children's social experiences. For instance, theory of mind abilities have 
been linked to social factors such as quality of attachment with caregivers (Fonagy, 
Redfern, & Charman, 1997), parenting style (Hughes, Deater-Deckard, & Cutting, 
1999) and parental mind-mindedness (Meins et al., 2002). 
As well as an apparent role for social experiences in children's social 
understanding, many studies have demonstrated a link between social understanding 
and language abilities. For example, Astington and Jenkins (1999) and Ruffman, 
Slade, Rowlandson, Rumsey and Garnham (2003) have conducted longitudinal 
studies and found that language performance predicted children's false belief 
understanding. Also, in an attempt to address the bidirectionality which has been 
evidenced in ToM developments and other social and language developments, there 
II 
have been an increasing number of intervention studies. For example, Hale and Tager-
Flusberg (2003) and Lohmann and Tomasello (2003) have both used training studies 
to try and tease apart the influence of language from theory of mind development to 
determine the contribution of one to the other and found that children's syntactic 
abilities facilitated social-cognitive skills but not vice-versa. Strong relations between 
social understanding and language have also been found in autism - children with 
higher verbal mental ages have been found to have less impaired theory of mind 
understanding (Happe, 1995; Leekam & Perner, 1991; Prior et al., 1998). This is 
supported by studies conducted with individuals toward the more able end of the 
autism spectrum, who by way of their more typical language abilities, are able to 
perform relatively well on theory of mind tasks (Bowler, 1992; Ozonoff, Pennington, 
& Rogers, 1991 ). Furthermore, research conducted with deaf children provided 
further evidence of the close interweaving of language, social experience and theory 
of mind. Language had been found to allow more normal development of theory of 
mind abilities in deaf children born to deaf rather than hearing parents (Peterson & 
Siegal, 2000; Woolfe, Want & Siegal, 2002). Thus, by virtue ofbeing native users of 
the same method of communication (i.e. sign language), deaf parents have greater 
opportunity for interaction and conversation with their deaf children than late-signing 
parents. Such findings from both typical and atypical development highlight the 
importance of considering children's social context and early language experiences 
when researching theory of mind. The above studies convey that the research spotlight 
is now focused very much on the dynamic interplay between interactions within the 
social environment and the development of language and social understanding. 
As illustrated by the wealth of evidence above, theory of mind is linked to a 
multitude of different social experiences and aspects of language. However, up until 
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this point I have been talking about the evidence that links to theory of mind as 
defined in its traditional sense -i.e. in terms of cognitive performance on a false-
belief task. Thus, these studies describe the relationship of children's theory of mind 
with social experience and language in the context of the narrow interpretation of 
children's theory of mind. However, in acknowledging the importance of social 
experience for children's theory of mind abilities, researchers within the field have 
been increasingly eager to incorporate a social dimension into their theories. Indeed, 
acknowledging the social dimension and importance of early emerging abilities, 
Carpendale and Lewis (2004) defined children's theory of mind development more 
broadly by using the phrase social understanding. Carpendale and Lewis (2004, 
2006), Garfield, Peterson, and Perry (200 1 ), and Klin, Jones, Schultz, and Volkmar 
(2003) suggested mechanisms for how children's social understanding may be linked 
with their experiences within their social interactions at an early age prior to the 
emergence of false belief understanding. They recognised that cognitive accounts of 
theory of mind and studies which focus purely on the presence or absence of 
representational theory of mind (i.e. performance on false belief tasks) were unlikely 
to fully reflect an ability as complex and multifaceted as a child's understanding of 
others' minds. Indeed, Chandler (1988) criticised the theory of mind tradition for 
collapsing children's social cognitive development to the transition point at which a 
child was able to pass false belief tasks. 
From the perspective of children with autism, Hobson (1993a) identified that 
their difficulties with language and social interaction are liable to stem from problems 
with early aspects of theory of mind in infancy. Furthermore, as pointed out by Klin et 
al. (2003), there is a need for psychological theory to propose a model of its 
developmental psycho(patho )logy with a focus on early emerging skills and processes 
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which may have downstream effects. In the recent accounts of social understanding 
noted above, emphasis is placed upon social actions and interactions occurring in the 
first few years of development. Therefore, by preceding the point of conceptual 
change in theory of mind development highlighted by the theory-theorists and by 
considering the possibility of earlier forms of social understanding and interaction, 
these accounts embrace both a developmental and social dimension. Such views are 
congruent with the probabilistic nature of epigenesis as outlined by Gottlieb (1998) 
and are consistent within dynamic systems frameworks which discuss bidirectional 
transactions between the organism and the environment. As such, advocates of these 
recent accounts of social understanding view a child's theory of mind in much broader 
terms than theory of mind traditionalists. 
1.3 Broader views of the theory of mind concept 
In reflection of a broader focus upon theory of mind development, Tager-
Flusberg (200 1) proposed a model which describes theory of mind in terms of a 
broader, componential framework (see also Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). Two 
components are outlined in this model- a social-perceptual (SP) component and a 
social-cognitive component (SC). The SC component refers to an explicit theory of 
mind incorporating those abilities which reflect an acquisition of the understanding of 
mind as a representational system. Therefore, this component encompasses the 
inferential understanding of mind which has been at the core of cognitive explanations 
of theory of mind. However, unlike these accounts, the componential view- via the 
SP component - entertains an implicit level of theory of mind which precedes the 
cognitive level developmentally. The distinction between the two components is that 
the SP component refers to the lower level capacity to make online judgements of a 
person's inner states or emotions based on perceptual information (such as the face or 
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voice), while the SC component refers to the ability to make cognitive inferences 
about the content of such mental states. The SP component refers to early perceptual 
skills which extend from infancy onwards such as gaze following, joint attention and 
face processing and encompass the type of theory of mind skills which researchers 
such as Bloom (2000) describe as facilitating word learning. Thus, by examining early 
emerging perceptual skills in the context of theory of mind development there is an 
opportunity to explore the pathway from early social experiences to more complex 
social-cognitive processing necessary for effective social interaction. 
Via the breadth ofthe componential view of theory of mind, this model could 
begin to counter some ofthe criticism of the original theory of mind hypothesis of 
autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). As outlined by Mundy and colleagues, children 
with autism have problems with joint attention prior to their problems with 
representational theory of mind skills. Thus by incorporating a developmental 
perspective, the componential model can more readily address such findings. 
However, while Tager-Flusberg describes possible components underlying theory of 
mind development, she does not really outline how early social experiences and 
interactions may lead to the emergence of social-perceptual skills, or how these skills 
may develop into social-cognitive skills. Furthermore, even in her updated model 
(Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2005) which includes early abilities such as attention to 
social information there is considerable ambiguity about what constituents of 
children's social understanding are distinguished by the model- for instance, the 
social-perceptual component appears to encompass joint attention abilities and 
abilities which appear to be inherently more complex such as inferring a person's 
mental state or emotion from their facial expression. In order to comprehensively 
address the issue of what theory of mind is and what it consists of, exploration of 
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Tager-Flusberg's models will provide insight into the interrelationships between 
different aspects of theory of mind such as social attention, social perception and 
social cognition and should provide a suitable vehicle to enhance our understanding of 
the constituents and continuity of children's social understanding. 
Recent accounts offered by Carpendale and Lewis (2004, 2006) and Klin et al. 
(2003) provide more specificity of the mechanisms and abilities involved in social 
understanding in typical development and autism respectively. In what is likely to 
prove a seminal paper on social understanding, Carpendale and Lewis outlined a 
constructivist and emergent account which places social interaction at the heart of 
children's social understanding. Within this framework, they argued that all previous 
accounts of children's theory of mind- whether theory theories, maturation theories or 
enculturation theories - could not be validated in light of the wealth of new evidence 
implicating a role for social interaction in the development of social understanding. 
To address this void, Carpendale and Lewis' account focuses on a mechanism known 
as the epistemic triangle (Chapman, 1991) which incorporates a child's experience of 
the world along with the communicative interaction with others regarding their 
experiences and beliefs. In contrast to the enculturalist tradition (as endorsed by 
Dunn) they proposed that the child does not passively adopt social knowledge but 
rather actively constructs it through the process of triadic interaction. Their 
mechanism draws upon Piagetian and Vygotskian concepts whereby the former 
emphasised the relations between people and the objects which they experience in the 
world while the latter was concerned with the role of social interactions in the 
development of higher mental functions. Through mutual integration of these 
concepts, Carpendale and Lewis describe an epistemic triangle in which operative and 
communicative interaction combine through regularity of experiences with others to 
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construct a gradual understanding of mind in the child. They assume a view ofbelief 
that contrasts with those in the theory of mind tradition- namely that beliefs cannot 
be independent of activity and yet cause activity; rather, beliefs are created through 
action. Via their broad framework they are able to account for much of the recent 
evidence implicating a role for social interactions in the development of social 
understanding. 
From their emergent, constructivist account of social understanding, 
Carpendale and Lewis offer a developmental framework which allows the social and 
cognitive underpinnings of social understanding to be considered simultaneously. 
Furthermore, by focusing on triadic interaction, Carpendale and Lewis can extend 
beyond the cognitive accounts to provide a developmental explanation of social 
understanding that extends from infancy onwards without reference to supposed 
innate capacities. As a result of placing social interaction at the foundation of social 
understanding, Carpendale and Lewis identifY several key issues which they think 
should direct where this field of research ought to advance further. Given the 
protracted view of the theory of mind developmental process, they suggest that 
research should use task-based procedures to determine what factors may facilitate 
construction of social understanding at points earlier than the child is able to reason 
with false beliefs. They also indicate that there needs to be a detailed exploration of 
what it actually means for a child to understand beliefs. Given the significance of this 
mental state within later theory of mind development, it would appear to be important 
to delve further into the nature of this understanding in an effort to avoid the over-
simplification of the conceptual change typically identified at 4 years of age. Finally, 
Carpendale and Lewis underline the need to look beyond 4 years of age and to 
document further developments connected with more complex social understanding 
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(e.g., higher-order beliefs). Synthesis of these key areas reveals that there is a pressing 
need to understand the mechanisms underlying social understanding more clearly in 
terms of the progression from infancy through to late childhood. While the work of 
Carpendale and Lewis (2004, 2006), alongside, say, the mind-mindedness work of 
Meins and colleagues and the communicative language research conducted by Dunn 
and colleagues provide examples of research which highlight crucial potential causal 
mechanisms within children's social understanding, this thesis is concerned with 
mapping out what constitutes children's social understanding and determining how 
possible distinct domains of social understanding relate to each other. It is argued that 
in order to effectively understand the developmental progression from early 
precursors (such as social attention and social perception) through to later emerging 
aspects of theory of mind/social understanding (such as social cognition) it is first 
necessary to clarify what these supposed constructs of ability are; are they all aspects 
of social understanding? Does the development of these abilities on the path to social 
cognition suggest homotypic continuity? Alternatively, does their disparity indicate 
heterotypic continuity and thus that certain abilities may not actually constitute social 
understanding? Therefore, as expressed toward the beginning ofthis chapter, there is 
a need to tackle the (thus far relatively neglected) issue of establishing what theory of 
mind/social understanding actually is. The plan to study the paths between each of 
these aspects of social understanding via structural equation modelling should provide 
clarification of boundaries or crossover between the constructs of social cognition, 
social perception and social attention and delineate possible paths between these 
aspects of children's social understanding and language. 
While Carpendale and Lewis (2004) provide a detailed account of social 
understanding development in typically developing children, they admit that their 
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focus on processes involved in (early) social understanding in atypical development 
such as autism is rather limited. For instance, in describing early development of 
social understanding from dyadic skills to triadic orienting abilities, Carpendale and 
Lewis do not really outline how this process may proceed in atypical development. 
Yet, they acknowledge the merit in exploring claims like that ofHobson (1993a) 
which suggest autism is linked to problems with early affective engagement in such 
interactions. Also of merit is focusing on whether certain compensatory mechanisms 
such as language come into play in the development of social understanding in 
children with autism (e.g., as argued by Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2005). 
Furthermore, as Cicchetti ( 1984, p. 1) states: " ... we can learn more about the normal 
function of an organism by studying its pathology, and likewise more about its 
pathology by studying its normal condition." Therefore, investigation of the above 
issues and of what constitutes social understanding in children with autism within the 
current thesis will not only provide further understanding of the close links between 
problems with social understanding and the social deficits experienced by children 
with autism. It will also provide a complementary insight into paths to social 
understanding in typically developing children. Thus, focus on the processes and 
potential compensatory strategies by which children with autism may arrive at social-
cognitive understanding should provide rich detail in highlighting the mechanism 
behind the breakdown of normative processes. 
In a similar vein to the comment by Carpendale and Lewis (2006) on the need 
to focus on early emerging aspects of social understanding in autism, Charman (2003) 
asserted the importance in understanding the mechanisms by which joint attention 
behaviours are related to later outcomes and understanding why the development of 
joint attention skills is impaired in autism. As Volkmar, Lord, Bailey, Schultz and 
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Klin (2004) point out, it is crucial to study the interrelationships among early 
emerging interaction skills because it is unlikely that any of the early emerging 
processes will follow independent developmental courses. Recent years have seen a 
proliferation of studies investigating such behaviours and early emerging social 
attention abilities in children with autism. In a study by Leekam, Lopez and Moore 
(2000) it was suggested that impairments in dyadic social engagement may be present 
in autism and may relate to the triadic social engagement impairments most 
noticeably in joint attention behaviours. Furthermore, joint attention skills have been 
intimated as the main precursor of subsequent ToM disabilities in autism (Charman et 
al., 2001 ). Recent research suggests that the cognitive impairments that underlie these 
abnormalities may be at a more basic, low-level perceptual processing level (Milne et 
al., 2002) or at the level of processing and understanding emotions (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2000; Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002). In a more recent study 
(Leekam & Ramsden, 2006) it was reported that while triadic interaction difficulties 
are critically important to subsequent development, dyadic interaction difficulties 
alone provided a powerful indicator of later language and social cognitive skills. The 
preceding evidence indicates that broad investigation of social understanding in 
children with autism is likely to provide valuable insight into the continuity and 
discontinuity of the links between early emerging aspects of social understanding and 
later more complex levels of social understanding. This endeavour in addition to the 
planned concurrent investigation of such abilities in typically developing children 
should assist in defining the constituents of social understanding and illuminating the 
continuity from low-level social understanding abilities such as social, attention 
through to more complex understanding within the traditional domain of social 
cognition. While the benefit of a developmental perspective to examining social 
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understanding is undoubted and a longitudinal investigation would be a fruitful 
approach to delineating children's social understanding abilities, this option was 
beyond the scope of the current investigation. 
1.4 Summm)l and outline of forthcoming chapters 
The aim of this chapter was to provide a theoretical context for the empirical 
work of this thesis. As discussed, historical developments in the field have led to a 
growing dissatisfaction within the field regarding cognitive accounts of children's 
theory of mind. This is clear from the wealth of studies which have identified the 
intertwining of children's developing social-cognitive abilities with early social 
experiences and language. New, broader accounts of theory of mind/social 
understanding have been developed which necessarily consider interactions and the 
development of early abilities before the emergence of traditional social-cognitive 
abilities. However, the broadening ofthe field has led to the concept of theory of mind 
or social understanding becoming ambiguous. While the new focus on how social 
understanding develops has been important, it is not clear what develops into what. 
So, it is not clear whether the various developing skills that are all proposed to be 
social understanding or theory of mind are actually consistent with each other in any 
specific way. This means that in order to look at its development we really need to 
look at what social understanding is and what it consists of. This has implications for 
understanding of the constituents of children's social understanding and of the 
continuity in ability from low-level social understanding through to more complex 
aspects such as social cognition. In order for research to effectively address the issue 
of how social understanding develops it would appear to be invaluable to first clarify 
what the constituents of children's social understanding actually are. 
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Therefore, the overarching aim of the thesis was to investigate the constituents 
of children's social understanding from social attention through to social cognition. 
To achieve this, Part 1 ofthe thesis consists oftwo methodological chapters and Part 
2 consists of four theoretically-driven chapters. Within Part 1, chapter 2 investigates 
potential task artefacts of social-cognitive tasks which may cloud measurement 
sensitivity. Incorporating these findings regarding task design, chapter 3 then 
describes the development and testing of a composite social-cognitive methodology. 
Having established a valid and comprehensive method of assessing children's social 
cognition within Part 1, Part 2 of the thesis then incorporates this methodology within 
the broader investigation of the relationships between different aspects of social 
understanding. Chapter 4 sets the context for part 2 through discussion of 
componential models of theory of mind/social understanding and identifies the recent 
Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) model as the chosen vehicle for testing hypotheses 
regarding the constituents of children's social understanding. Using part ofTager-
Flusberg and Joseph's model as a framework, chapter 5 then examines the 
relationship between children's social-perceptual and social-cognitive abilities. 
Building on this, chapter 6 reviews key literature consistent with the broader view of 
children's social understanding across social cognition, social perception, social 
attention and language before investigating these four areas using various analyses 
including structural equation modelling. Thereafter, chapter 7 complements the 
endeavour of chapter 6 by examining relationships across tasks and between 
constituents of social understanding in a group of children with autism in order to 
determine whether the same relationships hold for this atypical group of children. Part 
3 of the thesis then summarises the key findings from each of the preceding chapters 
and discusses significant emergent issues and directions for future research. 
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PART 1-
DEVELOPING A NEW ME'I'HODOLOGY TO 
ASSESS SOCIAL COGNITION 
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Outline of Part 1 
As outlined in chapter 1, the overarching aim of this thesis is to clarify what 
the constituents of social understanding actually are. Before such theoretical 
enterprise in Part 2 of the thesis, it is important to first ensure that the methods 
employed for this endeavour tap into the supposed understanding required by the 
child. While the majority of tasks within the domains of social perception, social 
attention and language to be used throughout Part 2 were believed to appropriately tap 
into their relevant areas, the methodological examination of Part 1 was devoted solely 
to the domain of social cognition for the following reasons. As was apparent from 
chapter 1, social cognition is integral to theory of mind research; providing the link to 
the bulk of this research which has gone before and whether regarded in a traditional 
sense or not, abilities within this domain provide the greatest indication of ability to 
interact effectively with others as a social being. In addition, given that the overall 
aim of the thesis was focused around the clarification of ambiguous concepts, it was 
essential to first investigate conceptual concerns held by the author regarding certain 
social-cognitive methodology. Accordingly, with some concern that a second-order 
false belief task designed by Sullivan et al. ( 1994) does not sensitively measure what 
they purport the task to measure, chapter 2 provides experimental manipulation of 
such methodology to underline the importance of social-cognitive task sensitivity. In 
arriving at a more specific second-order false belief measure (free from the concerns 
of the task used by Sullivan et al.) chapter 3 then explores the possibility of extending 
this measure to arrive at a composite false belief story which can simultaneously 
measure first-order and second-order mental states. It was hoped that such a 
composite task would provide a unique opportunity to discover children's respective 
first-order and second-order social-cognitive abilities, whilst avoiding task confounds 
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that are likely to arise by testing children on separate tasks on separate occasions. 
Furthermore, with such a task having been developed and tested in chapter 3, it was 
planned that this comprehensive measure could then be used throughout the empirical 
investigation within part 2 as a valid indicator of children's social-cognitive abilities. 
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Chapter 2 
A new method of assessing children's 
second-order false belief understanding 
Introduction 
There are a multitude of methods available to researchers within the field of 
theory of mind (ToM) and social understanding and the general ambiguity which 
envelops definitions ofT oM or social understanding is matched by a lack of clarity 
in some areas of ToM task design. Therefore it is necessary to have clearly defined 
theory of mind tasks which genuinely measure the actual ability being hypothesised 
by the researcher. In addition, as this thesis focuses on cross-sectional research with 
children aged 4 to 6 years it was necessary to use a series of tasks which were 
appropriate for that particular age group. Since some tasks have previously been used 
with infants and others have been used with 7- to 8-year-olds, it was necessary to 
build new tasks across the spectrum of social understanding that were age 
appropriate to the children tested throughout this thesis. As part of this 
methodological endeavour, the first goal of the thesis was to develop a new 
composite theory of mind method that could be used to measure first-order and 
second-order mental states (e.g., belief and ignorance) in parallel in the same child. 
Once developed, this task is to be used in two studies desctibed in Part 2 that will 
examine the relationships between performance on this task and measures of social 
perception, social attention and language. 
In parallel with the main aim of building a new composite theory of mind task 
there were two subsidiary aims relevant to the present study. Both aims centre upon 
how task design can influence children's false belief understanding. Specifically, the 
first aim was to investigate how second-order false belief stories can be simplified by 
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reducing the information processing and language demands of such stories. The 
second aim was to investigate the conceptual distinction between different kinds of 
mental states which may lead to simplification of the conceptual demands of false 
belief understanding. It is important to address these two aims in order to test the 
claim of Sullivan et al. ( 1994) that children understand second-order theory of mind 
by the age of 4. While their second-order false belief task is well used within the 
theory of mind literature, we have two reservations regarding their methodology 
which are considered worthy of investigation. Compared to previous stories (e.g., 
Perner & Wimmer, 1985), Sullivan et al. designed second-order belief stories with 
reduced processing demands and found evidence of these abilities in 4-year-olds. 
However, we believe that the information processing demands of Sullivan et al. 's 
stories could have been reduced further. Secondly, the supposed simplicity of their 
second-order false belief stories is potentially confounded by the inclusion of a 
second-order ignorance question prior to the second-order false belief question, thus 
combining representational (i.e. beliefs) and non-representational (i.e. ignorance) 
understanding within one story. Therefore, while it would have been straightforward 
for us to address our overall aim by simply adopting the Sullivan et al. story format 
as the basis for the design of our composite theory of mind task, it was necessary to 
first investigate these two issues of task design. 
2.1 Factors of task design influencingfirst-order false belh:;f understanding 
Researchers in social cognition traditionally examine children's 
understanding of first-order mental states (e.g., "he thinks that ... ")rather than 
children's understanding of second-order ToM (e.g., "he thinks that she thinks"). 
Within the first-order literature, the evidence points to two avenues through which 
children's performance may be influenced on false-belief tasks- via either reducing 
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the information processing demands of false-belief tasks or varying the conceptual 
demands of false-belief test questions. These two possibilities are explored below. 
There are various ways in which first-order tasks can be simplified in terms 
of information processing demands, leading to enhanced performance by preschool 
children. Indeed, Wellman, Cross and Watson's (200 1) meta-analysis of theory of 
mind studies revealed several factors of task design which led to improved false 
belief performance such as: children's active participation within the scenes ofthe 
story, whereby participation perhaps made an otherwise abstract task seem quite 
concrete; thus reducing the processing requirements of the task. Another way in 
which false belief performance improved was demonstrated in a study where the 
motive for the main protagonist within the story is made explicit through a deceptive 
context (e.g., Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989); this serves to ease the child's 
information processing of the story because the act of deception allows the child to 
focus on the key mental states. A number of studies have reduced information-
processing demands in false-belief tasks by varying the wording of test questions. 
For instance, Lewis and Osborne ( 1990) found that young children's false belief 
performance was greatly improved in a condition where a temporal reference was 
given to the object in question- therefore, this facilitated the child's interpretation of 
the (ambiguous) false belief question and helped to reduce the degree of processing 
required. Similarly, Siegal and Varley (2002) suggest that false-belief performance 
can be enhanced when test questions are presented in a manner that explicitly signals 
the purpose/relevance of tasks. For example, by using a test question that explicitly 
asks where the protagonist thinks the other person will look .first for the object; this 
allows the child to avoid inferring that the question refers to the first location to be 
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searched. These various examples serve to illustrate how simplifying information 
processing demands can facilitate children's first-order false belief performance. 
While there has been little research investigating how simplifying the specific 
cognitive demands of mental state attribution can facilitate false belief performance, 
Fabricius and lmbens-Bailey (2000) do suggest a way in which false-belieftasks may 
be inadvertently simplified. They argue that a feature of the false-belief test may 
actually undermine the specificity/validity of the test. The basis of their argument is 
that in false-belief tasks, when the child is asked where they think the character (X) 
will now look for the object, the correct answer can be reached by the child simply 
realising that X does not know about the object being in the new location. So, on the 
basis of attributing the concept of ignorance rather than false-belief the child may 
choose the old location when asked to choose between the two locations. Fabricius 
and Imbens-Bailey's research suggests that understanding of ignorance might assist 
the child in making a correct false-belief judgement and since the former 
developmentally precedes the latter, then inclusion of ignorance within a false belief 
story may reduce the conceptual demands such that the child is not actually 
attributing the concept of belief but ignorance. However, this explanation might not 
apply to all types of false-belief task. Perner and Horn's (2003) findings show that 
when the unexpected contents version of this task is given, in which the child is not 
asked about imminent action (where will the protagonist look) but what a protagonist 
thinks, children have more difficulty in attributing false belief. Therefore, this 
conceptual distinction between ignorance and false belief is relatively unclear. We 
now turn to evidence from second-order tasks to examine how factors of task design 
may influence children's second-order false beliefunderstanding. 
2.2 Factors o_ftask design influencing second-orderfalse belief understanding 
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Second-order mental state attribution was traditionally tested using Perner 
and Wimmer's (1985) paradigm. In this paradigm, two characters- Mary and John-
are independently informed of the location of a critical object, X, such that they both 
have a true first-order belief as to the object location but John has a false second-
order belief about Mary's belief. Children are asked where they think John thinks 
Mary will look for X. Results suggested that the ability to correctly reason about 
second-order beliefs is not present until 7 years of age. Hogrefe et al. (1986) 
provided further evidence of emergence of this ability at 7 years of age. Additional 
findings showed that 5-year-olds could attribute second-order ignorance, supporting 
evidence from first-order studies that ignorance is a simpler mental state for children 
to understand. As for first-order beliefs, the same arguments about simplifying false 
belief tasks in terms of either lowering the processing requirements or varying the 
conceptual demands should be equally applicable to second-order beliefs. 
Since Perner and Wimmer's (1985) study, subsequent studies have shown 
that by simplifying information processing demands, second-order understanding 
emerges earlier than documented in the studies of Perner and Wimmer (Leekam & 
Prior, 1994; Perner & Howes, 1992; Winner & Leekam, 1991 ). However, as for first-
order understanding, a distinction needs to be made between tasks using second-
order representational and nonrepresentational understanding (Leekam, 1990), since 
some second-order mental states are simpler than others (i.e. second-order ignorance 
is a simpler concept for children to understand than second-order beliefs). Therefore, 
I will investigate how task design influences second-order understanding in 2 ways: 
via simplification of information processing demands and via simplifying the 
conceptual demands of false belief understanding. 
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Sullivan et al. ( 1994) investigated how second-order false belief stories can 
be simplified by reducing the information processing demands of such stories. With 
more scope in second-order rather than first-order belief tasks for longer and more 
complex stories, Sullivan et al. had simplified the information-processing demands of 
their second-order false-belief stories by shortening story length, providing feedback 
to four probe questions and involving fewer characters, locations, and episodes. They 
found that by simplifying the stories created by Pemer and Wimmer (1985) as well 
as their own, children as young as 4 years of age were able to exhibit second-order 
reasoning of false beliefs and 90 per cent of children aged 5 and a half years were 
able to do so. Therefore, they argued that the processing requirements of Pemer and 
Wimmer's paradigm were sufficiently demanding to underestimate by several years 
the age at which children are able to engage in second-order reasoning. 
Although Sullivan et al. ( 1994) found that children could attribute second-
order beliefs up to two years earlier than Pemer and Wimmer's (1985) results had 
indicated, it was possible that Sullivan et al. had not simplified their task sufficiently. 
The second-order belief stories of both Pemer and Wimmer, and Sullivan et al. 
necessitated that children pay attention to at least three different dialogues. Coull 
(unpublished) argued that these stories were unnecessarily complex for the following 
reasons. Firstly, there is no need to include any dialogue in second-order belief 
stories. Secondly, to minimize information-processing demands, stories should 
require only two characters rather than the usual three or more characters featured in 
the stories of Pemer and Wimmer, and Sullivan et al. Furthermore, to answer the 
second-order false-belief question correctly, Coull argued that it was necessary only 
to have directed attention towards the epistemic states of two characters rather than 
three. Finally, stories need have only two scenes, rather than the usual three or more 
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scenes; thus requiring the child to concentrate on less narrative detail. Therefore, 
given that the aim of Sullivan et al. was to simplify Pemer and Wimmer's task by 
reducing task complexity, Coull aimed to further reduce the information-processing 
demands of second-order belief stories to discover if further improvements could be 
made. Therefore, as a pilot study to the development of new social-cognitive stories 
in the current study, Coull presented 5- to 7-year-olds with stories which had only 
two characters, contained no spoken dialogues, were shorter in length and had fewer 
scenes, and compared them to their performance on Pemer and Wimmer's original 
story. Results from this showed that significantly more children were able to attribute 
second-order beliefs when given the new simplified stories compared to Pemer and 
Wimmer's story. While these findings provided further evidence that simplifying the 
information processing demands of a second-order false belief test improved 
children's task performance, a surprising finding was that only 42 per cent of 5- to 6-
year-olds could pass these simplified second-order stories. In contrast, Sullivan et al. 
found that 90 per cent of children at this age could attribute second-order beliefs. 
What could explain this discrepancy? 
To attempt to explain this contrast between the results of Sullivan et al. and 
Coull (unpublished), we tum to logic presented by Leekam (1991). Leekam 
discussed the importance for theory of mind tasks to distinguish between different 
types of higher-order mental states. Given conclusive evidence that children 
understand the concepts of desires and intentions before they understand beliefs 
within first-order understanding it is highly probable that the same logic applies to 
second-order understanding. Indeed, Leekam described a study in which children's 
performance was significantly better giving correct responses to questions of second-
order intention compared with second-order belief. This is congruent with Pemer's 
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argument that 5-year-olds difficulty with second-order false beliefs lies in the 
complexity of representational understanding rather than recursion per se. Therefore, 
while the basis of Leekam' s logic was the conceptual distinction between second-
order intentions and second-order belief, the same principle applies to the distinction 
between second-order ignorance and second-order belief. 
The above principle would appear to have particular relevance for explaining 
the contrast in findings between Sullivan et al. ( 1994) and Coull (unpublished). 
While Sullivan et al. found that they could improve upon Perner and Wimmer's 
( 1985) results there was a crucial difference between their paradigms. Perner and 
Wimmer (and Coull) did not incorporate a second-order ignorance question into their 
task, whereas Sullivan et al. did. As second-order ignorance understanding is known 
to precede second-order belief understanding by about two years (Hogrefe et al., 
1986), combining these two mental states within one task may have influenced the 
child's conceptual understanding. It is suggested here that this juxtaposition may lead 
the child through to answer a question on second-order false-belief understanding 
simply on the basis of attributing a character's ignorance of another's belief. This is 
illustrated in the story designed by Sullivan et al. Their story is based on a mother's 
ignorance of her son's belief, where he, Peter, wants a puppy for his birthday, is told 
by his mother that he is receiving a toy, where in fact his mother had bought him a 
puppy as a surprise. Peter later finds the puppy, unbeknownst to his mother. The 
crucial stages of second-order ignorance and second-order belief proceed as follows: 
(i) Grandma: 'Does Peter know what you really got him for his birthday?' 
(ii) Second-order ignorance question: 'What does Mum say to Grandma?' 
(Answer: NO) 
(iii) Grandma to Mum: 'What does Peter think you got him for his birthday?' 
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(iv) Second-order false-belief question: 'What does Mum say to Grandma?' 
(Answer: TOY) 
We argue that it is plausible that the child can answer (iv) by merely following on 
from answer 'No' to (ii) to correctly answer 'toy' rather than 'puppy'. On this basis, 
the child can correctly answer 'toy' by acknowledging that the mother is ignorant of 
reality, rather than making an inference from the analysis of two conflicting 
propositions that define both the reality of the situation and the situation as falsely 
believed by the mother (i.e. holds a false belief of reality). If this is the case, and 
given that children's understanding of ignorance precedes belief in second-order 
reasoning (Hogrefe et al., 1986), it may be argued that the juxtaposition of a second-
order ignorance question with a second-order belief question serves to facilitate a 
child's ability to attribute second-order beliefs. 
If the above rationale is correct then the validity of Sullivan et al. 's claims 
would be called into question. Specifically, the age at which they claimed children 
understand second-order false beliefs may not be an accurate reflection of their 
representational abilities. Furthermore, studies which have adopted Sullivan et al. 's 
paradigm may need to revise their findings to distinguish between representational 
and non-representational understanding. Similarly, future researchers planning to 
adopt this paradigm should be aware that there is an important distinction between 
understanding of ignorance and belief, and crucially that the Sullivan et al. paradigm 
does not make this distinction. 
Further support for the conceptual distinction argument outlined above is 
provided in a study conducted by Karmiloff-Smith, Klima, Bellugi, Grant, and 
Baron-Cohen (1995). Their study examined theory of mind, among other variables, 
in individuals with Williams Syndrome. Children were tested on the Perner and 
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Wimmer (1985) paradigm and on the second-order story designed by Sullivan et al. 
(1994). It was found that 31 per cent of individuals succeeded on the former story 
whereas 88 per cent succeeded on the latter. Karmiloff-Smith et al. explained this 
inconsistency by suggesting that second-order belief attribution was couched in the 
latter story via the simpler propositional mental state know rather than believe. The 
above argument is given further support via Fabricius and lmbens-Bailey's (2000) 
earlier suggestion that children may answer false belief questions correctly on the 
basis of their understanding of ignorance rather than belief. Therefore, it is important 
to explore how a questioning sequence incorporating ignorance immediately prior to 
belief may lead to improved false-belief performance. This is particularly important 
since the inclusion of the non-representational state of ignorance may inflate our 
perception of children's representational abilities and lead to an overestimation of the 
age at which second-order representational understanding emerges. 
Our discussion thus far has revealed two ways in which task demands may be 
simplified in first-order and second-order belief understanding. These stories can be 
simplified by reducing the information processing demands and simplified via the 
specific cognitive demands of mental states (distinguishing between the demands of 
ignorance and false belief). In order to address concerns regarding Sullivan et al. 's 
second-order false belief methodology, both ofthese routes to story simplification 
were investigated in the study below. 
2.3 SimplifYing the task demands of second-order false belief stories1 
Introduction 
The main aim of part 1 of this thesis was to build a new composite theory of 
mind task that can be used to measure first-order and second-order social cognition. 
1 This study which was carried out as part of the PhD is now published as Coull, Leekam, and Bennett 
(2006) in Social Development, 15,260-275. 
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However, as the preceding discussion has demonstrated, we first needed to 
investigate whether conceptual constraints on second-order belief attribution might 
be eased by asking children a question about second-order ignorance immediately 
before a question about second-order belief. Therefore, in this study, the question 
format (ignorance question first vs. no ignorance question) was manipulated in a 
standard task identical to that given by Sullivan et al. (1994). It was predicted that 
children who received second-order false-belief stories that included a second-order 
ignorance question would show significantly better second-order belief 
understanding than children who did not receive an ignorance question within the 
sequence. It was also predicted that the simplified stories with reduced processing 
demands developed within the pilot study would produce better performance, 
particularly when a second-order ignorance question was included. 
Method 
Participants 
Fifty children from two primary schools participated in this experiment. 
The majority of children were either 4 or 5 years of age (N = 41 ), with several 
6-year-olds (N = 9). Ages ranged from 4 years 0 months to 6 years 5 months, with a 
mean age of all the children tested of 5 years and 6 months (s.d. = 8 months). There 
were a roughly equal number of boys (23) and girls (27) who participated. Twenty-
five children were given the 'False belief only' question-format and 25 were given 
the 'Ignorance and false belief' question-format. The mean age of the children in 
these groups was 5 years and 5 months, and 5 years and 6 months. 
Design and Procedure 
A mixed design was used with question-format (ignorance+ 
36 
false belief (IG + FB), false belief only (FB)) as a between-subjects variable and 
information load/story type (standard, new) as a within-subjects variable. The 
dependent variable (maximum score of 4) was the number of correctly justified false-
belief responses. Appendix 2.1 lists the scoring criteria and gives examples of correct 
and incorrect justifications. The story order was counterbalanced within and across 
groups. 
To examine the reliability of performance on each story type, children were 
tested on two story trials instead of one trial for each version of the second-order 
belief task. Thus, the 25 children in each question-format group were presented with 
two 'standard' stories taken from Sullivan et al. (1994) and two more simplified 
stories based on those previously used by Coull (unpublished). The format of 
standard and new stories was essentially the same; however, the new stories were 
shorter in length, omitted any dialogue between characters, and had fewer scenes and 
characters. 
The story themes for the standard story type included Sullivan et al. 's (1994) 
puppy story and their chocolate bar story, which was slightly differently themed 
(cake story), but importantly, retained the same structure as before. The themes for 
the new story type included a story about a robot which one child hides from another 
and another story about a child who moved a bar of chocolate to stop it melting on 
the beach and was observed by the second child. An example of each story type is 
shown below in Table 2.1. The two other stories used in this study are presented in 
Appendix 2.1. 
Table 2.1 
Example of new Coull, Leekam, and Bennett story used in explicit 
comparison with Sullivan, Zaitchik, and Tager-Flusberg stmy 
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Story used bv Sullivan eta!. (1994) 
Tonight it is Peter's birthday and Mum is surprising him with a puppy. She has 
hidden the puppy in the basement. Peter says, 'Mum, I really hope you get me a 
puppy for my birthday.' Remember, Mum wants to surprise Peter with a puppy. So, 
instead of telling Peter she got him a puppy, Mum says, 'Sorry Peter, I did not get 
you a puppy for your birthday. I got you a really great toy instead.' 
Probe question 1: 'Did Mum really get Peter a toy for his birthday'? No. 
Probe question 2: 'Did Mum tell Peter she got him a toy for his birthday'? Yes. 
Probe question 3: 'Why did Mum tell Peter that she got him a toy for his birthday'? 
To swprise Peter. 
Now, Peter says to Mum, 'I'm going outside to play.' On his way outside, Peter goes 
down to the basement to fetch his football. In the basement, Peter finds the birthday 
puppy! Peter says to himself, 'Wow, Mum didn't get me a toy, she really got me a 
puppy for my birthday.' Mum does not see Peter go down to the basement and find 
the birthday puppy. 
Nonlinguistic control question: 'Does Peter know that his Mum got him a puppy 
for his birthday'? Yes. 
Now, the telephone rings, ding-a-ling! Peter's grandmother calls to find out what 
time the birthday party is. Grandma asks Mum on the phone, 'Does Peter know what 
you really got him for his birthday'? 
1Second-order ignorance question: 'What does Mum say to Grandma'? No. 
Memory aid: Now remember, Mum does not know that Peter saw what she got him 
for his birthday. 
Then, Grandma says to Mum, 'What does Peter think you got him for his birthday'? 
1 2Second-order false-belief question: 'What does Mum say to Grandma'? Toy. 
Justification question: 'Why does Mum say that'? Because she doesn't know that 
Peter saw the puppy. 
Story used by Coull eta!. (2006) 
It is Paul's birthday. Paul and Sally are in his toy-room. He is showing Sally his 
favourite new present - a robot. Paul puts the robot back in the box with the lid on 
and then has to go outside. While Paul is away, Sally decides to play a trick on Paul 
and move the robot from its box and hide it away in the cupboard. 
Probe question 1: 'Did Paul leave the room'? Yes. 
Probe question 2: 'Did Sally leave the robot in the box'? No. 
Probe question 3: 'Why did Sally move the robot to the cupboard'? To play a trick. 
While Sally is hiding the robot in the cupboard, Paul passes by the window and 
sees Sally hiding the robot in the cupboard. But Sally doesn't see Paul watching her 
hide the robot in the cupboard. She doesn't see him! Paul then returns to the toy-
room. 
Nonlinguistic control question: 'Does Paul know that Sally hid the robot in the 
cupboard'? Yes. 
1 Second-order ignorance question: 'Does Sally know that Paul knows where the 
robot is'? No. 
Memory aid: Now remember, Sally doesn't know that Paul saw her hide the robot. 
1 2Second-order false-belief question: 'Where does Sally think Paul will look for the 
robot'? Box. 
Justification question: 'Why does Sally think Paul will look for the robot in the 
'?Because she doesn't know that Paul knows the robot is in the cupboard. 
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' Children in the IG+FB condition received both questions. 
2Children in the FB only condition received only the false-belief question. 
For all 4 stories, children in the FB only condition received exactly the same stories 
as the IG+FB group with the exception of the second-order ignoranceguestion. 
In order to enable children to visualize the stories, the experimenter used 
various dolls to act out each story. All of the characters featured in the stories were 
represented by three-dimensional figures while modelling clay and Lego were used 
to construct the various locations and furnishings described in the stories. 
The experimenter saw all the children individually inside a quiet area of their school. 
Before beginning each story, the experimenter introduced the child to the various 
characters, props, and furnishings that were to be used. After explaining the 
procedure to the child, the experimenter then orally presented the stories to the child 
verbatim as outlined in Table 2.1 in parallel with the enactment of each story. 
In order to compare the procedure used by Sullivan et al. ( 1994 ), all of the stories 
contained a series of probe and control questions. Following Sullivan et al., each 
story contained three probe questions after the first episode to ensure that the children 
understood the central theme of the story. Furthermore, both standard and new stories 
included a non-linguistic control question that assessed the children's understanding 
of first-order knowledge. For all probe and control questions, feedback was provided 
and corrections were done if necessary. In a similar way to Sullivan et al., all 'yes' 
and 'no' responses to these questions were balanced in order to avoid creating a bias 
for responses. 
Once the children had been asked the various probe and control questions, 
they were required to answer the crucial test questions. One group of children were 
asked a second-order ignorance question followed by a memory aid and a second-
order false-belief question whereas the other group of children received the same 
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presentation with the exception of the second-order ignorance question. Both 
ignorance and false-belief questions were asked as open-ended questions; however, if 
the children did not provide an answer then a forced-choice format was adopted. For 
example: "Does Sally know that Paul knows where the robot is?" or "Does Sally not 
know that Paul knows where the robot is?" In these cases, the forced-choice response 
was counterbalanced across children. Finally, all the children were asked to justify 
their response to the second-order false-belief question. No feedback or correction 
was provided for either of the test questions or the justification responses. Test 
question responses were scored as correct or incorrect. Responses to justification 
questions were scored according to the criteria used by Pemer and Wimmer (1985). 
Results 
All results are based on correctly justified false-belief responses. One point 
was awarded to a child for each trial if they gave a correct response and justification 
to the second-order false-belief question. There were no practice effects for either 
group. Initial analyses of normality revealed that the dataset was not normally 
distributed because of a negatively skewed distribution within the group of children 
who were also asked an ignorance question (IG + FB); therefore, nonparametric 
statistics were used to analyse the dataset. 
First, we examined the effect of question type. As predicted, children who 
received the second-order ignorance question before the second-order belief question 
(IG + FB) performed better on the second-order false-belief question than children 
who received only the second-order belief question (FB). The mean score for 
children in the IG + FB group was 2.04 (s.d. = 1.27) whereas the mean score for 
children in the FB-only group was 1.28 (s.d. = 1.17); Mann-Whitney, U = 204, z 
= -2.17, p = .03. Within each of these groups, no significant differences were found 
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that arose from simplifYing the information load (i.e., performance on the new vs. 
original stories). Children in the IG + FB group had similar scores whether they were 
given either Sullivan et al. 's standard stories or the new stories (mean 'standard' 
= 1.00; s.d. = .71; mean 'new'= 1.04; s.d. = .79). The same applied to children in the 
FB group (mean 'standard'= .68; s.d. = .69; mean 'new'= .68; s.d. = .75). Therefore, 
contrary to expectation, the more simplified format in the new stories did not 
enhance performance. 
Given that there was no difference between performance on new and standard 
stories, responses were combined from both story types in subsequent analyses. 
Table 2.2 shows the number of children passing one, two, three, or all four trials of 
false-belief test questions. Taking a strict criterion of three out of four trials correct, it 
may be seen that irrespective of story type, 36 per cent (nine children) in the IG + FB 
group consistently attributed second-order false beliefs, whereas only 12 per cent 
(three children) in the FB group consistently attributed second-order false beliefs (X2 
= 3.95,p < .05). 
Table 2.2 
Number and percentage of children passing 0 to 4 trials of second-order false belief 
0, 1 or 2 trials 3 trials 4 trials 
Group n n % n % n % 
IG+FB 25 16 64 5 20 4 16 
FB 25 22 88 4 2 8 
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The above results show that irrespective of age and story type, children 
within the group who received a second-order ignorance question in addition to a 
second-order false-belief question were significantly better in their second-order 
false-belief performance than children who did not receive a second-order ignorance 
question. This supports the hypothesis that second-order false-belief tests 
incorporating a second-order ignorance question have a facilitative influence upon 
second-order false belief performance. 
It was clear from above that 36% of 4- to 6-year-olds who had been given 
stories similar in nature to those received by the children in Sullivan et al.' study, 
were able to attribute second-order beliefs. This is discrepant from the 90% of 
children able to do so in their study. However, this latter figure refers to 90% (n = 
20/22) of children within the age range of 5 years and 5 months to 6 years and 5 
months who were able to correctly justify at least 112 (i.e. 50%) trials of the false 
belief question. Examination of the same level of performance by children within the 
same age range on 50% of trials in the current study revealed that 67% (n = 12/18) of 
children were able to achieve this. Thus, the findings from the two studies are closer 
than the initial comparison between the two studies would suggest. 
Discussion 
As outlined in the introduction, the main aim of Part 1 of the thesis was to 
develop a simplified and composite methodology with which to assess social 
cognition. Given reservations about the second-order methodology used by Sullivan 
et al. ( 1994 ), this study focused on developing a simplified measure of second-order 
beliefunderstanding. To achieve this we addressed two particular aims: investigating 
the effect on children's second-order belief understanding of simplifying the 
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information processing demands of second-order belief stories; and investigating the 
effect on children's second-order understanding of simplifying the specific cognitive 
demands of mental state attribution (ignorance vs. false belief). 
In terms of the first aim, results showed that additional attempts to lessen the 
processing demands of the second-order story did not make any difference beyond 
the simplification already made by Sullivan et al. (1994). This suggested that the new 
story format introduced here provided a suitable and concise platform with which to 
assess children's second-order false-belief understanding. However, although the 
story methods in each study led to similar performances, it is true that children's 
performance generally within Sullivan et al. 's study was more convincing than 
children's performance here, as demonstrated by 90% success by 5-year-olds in their 
study vs. 67% in the current study. This discrepancy may be due to one of two 
possible reasons. Firstly, unlike the current study, Sullivan et al. provided feedback 
or correction after each probe and control question had been answered by the child 
which may have enabled the child to recognise crucial features of the story more 
readily. Secondly, Sullivan et al. utilised two experimenters in their procedure, one of 
whom was able to enact much of the story, while the other presented the story, but 
both ofwhom acted out the scenes of the story. This 'double act' may have enabled 
the child to distinguish characters and actions more easily than children in the current 
study given the lone experimenter. Given these suggestions, as well as the small 
sample size of both studies, it is perhaps not surprising that children's performance 
levels differed. 
In addressing the second aim, investigation of the conceptual distinction 
between ignorance and belief revealed that 4- to 5-year-olds are significantly more 
likely to correctly answer second-order false-belief questions when these are 
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preceded by a second-order ignorance question than when they are not. The findings 
indicate that inclusion of the concept of ignorance was crucial to facilitating 
children's second-order belief performance. Almost 40 per cent of 4- to 5-year-olds 
could consistently provide the correct answer to second-order false-belief questions, 
having been asked about second-order ignorance immediately beforehand. In 
contrast, just over 10 per cent of 4- and 5-year-olds could consistently provide the 
correct answer to second-order false belief in the absence of second-order ignorance. 
These findings convey the extent to which children's second-order belief 
performance can be enhanced by couching it within second-order ignorance 
understanding. It is therefore possible that the opportunity to reflect on second-order 
ignorance might help to scaffold a fragile understanding of second-order false 
beliefs. 
What might be the mechanism for the facilitation of false belief 
understanding by inclusion of ignorance? It may be argued that the use of complex 
syntactic structures might help children to answer the belief question. Giving the 
child a question with a double embedded structure "Does Sally know that Paul 
knows where the robot is?" may prime the child to answer a subsequent question of a 
similar structure "Where does Sally think that Paul will look?" This view would be 
supported by recent linguistic accounts of ToM development, which propose that 
understanding of syntactic complexity plays a major role in children's false belief 
understanding (e.g., de Villiers, 2000). 
To examine the possible role of syntactic priming, a post hoc experiment was 
carried out with 15 children (mean age 5 years and 6 months) drawn from the same 
schools as in the main experiment. These children did not take part in the main 
experiment. All were subjected to the IG + FB condition only. The procedure was 
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carried out in exactly the same way as in the main experiment with one small change. 
Prior to the second-order ignorance question, these 15 participants were also asked a 
linguistic control question "Does Sally know that Paul saw her hide the robot in the 
cupboard?" This question taps a higher level of linguistic complexity than the 
original non-linguistic control question ("Does Paul know that Sally hid the robot?"), 
yet it does not refer to higher-order mental states directly. The results showed no 
further facilitative effect of the linguistic control question on second-order belief 
attribution when compared with the children who were given the second-order 
ignorance question but not the linguistic control question. Given the earlier findings, 
this implies that there is something special about reflecting on second-order 
ignorance that may allow it to facilitate second-order belief. The wording of the 
linguistic control questions focuses on knowledge of action, whereas the wording of 
the ignorance questions (despite varying between standard and new stories) focuses 
on knowledge of knowledge. Thus, it would appear that it is the conceptual 
understanding of ignorance that is fundamental to providing a short cut to second-
order belief understanding. 
There are several different ways that this may be explained. One is that 
directing a child's attention to someone's knowledge immediately prior to their belief 
is a sufficient and necesswy factor in simplifYing second-order belief understanding. 
Knowledge is inherently more concrete and less open to interpretation than belief, so 
by presenting such a sequence of questions in false-belief tasks, focus on knowledge 
may be enough to prime children's fragile understanding of false beliefs. It is 
possible then that conceptual understanding is more crucial in earlier ToM 
development at the ages of 4 to 5 - as demonstrated here - whereas more general 
information-processing resources come into play later in development. 
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However, it also the case that juxtaposing a second-order false belief question 
with a second-order ignorance question does not necessarily imply that the latter 
scaffolds a fragile understanding of second-order false beliefs. Rather, given the 
important distinction between ignorance as a non-representational concept and belief 
as a representational concept, it is probable that children who focus on second-order 
ignorance in false-belief tasks achieve second-order belief success by virtue of their 
non-representational rather than representational understanding. Such a scenario has 
implications both for the findings of Sullivan et al. 's ( 1994) study and consequent 
studies which have employed their methodology. Based on their finding that 40% of 
4-year-olds could correctly answer second-order belief questions, Sullivan et al. had 
claimed that preschoolers could attribute second-order beliefs. However, if the above 
scenario is true whereby children achieve success through non-representational 
reasoning, then Sullivan et al. 's claims are misleading and overestimate children's 
genuine second-order belief reasoning ability. Furthermore, studies which have 
employed Sullivan et al. 's procedure prefacing a second-order belief questions with a 
second-order ignorance question, are liable to have similarly inflated findings. Rather 
than Sullivan et al. 's finding that 90% of children aged 5 and a half could attribute 
second-order beliefs, finding that 12% of 5 and a halfyear-olds correctly attributed 
second-order beliefs in our non-ignorance condition in the present study is likely to 
provide a more accurate reflection of young children's second-order belief abilities. 
In summary, this study has achieved each of its two subsidiary aims. We have 
learned of the facilitative effect which children's understanding of second-order 
ignorance has on their second-order false belief performance; and we have used our 
newly developed second-order belief story to help confirm our reservations that the 
second-order belief methodology used by Sullivan et al. (1994) was perhaps not 
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simplified in the manner they had claimed. Study 1 has provided a successful test of 
a new second-order false belief methodology; meeting the overall aim of the chapter. 
Now, acknowledging that second-order ignorance and second-order belief need to be 
kept separate within social cognitive stories, we can take our new methodology 
forward to Chapter 3 to develop it further into a composite first-order and second-
order methodology. 
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Chapter 3 
A new composite measure of first-order 
and second-order social cognition 
Introduction 
. Chapter 3 discusses the steps to further develop the new second-order false 
belief methodology with the aim to arrive at a composite social-cognitive measure 
which can simultaneously measure first-order and second-order mental states. This 
was thought to be beneficial as such a comprehensive, consistent measure is likely to 
avoid the task confounds that are likely to arise from testing children on separate 
measures on separate occasions. Therefore, given the apparent simplicity and 
conciseness of the new second-order false belief story developed in Chapter 2, the 
next step in developing the method was to design a task that combined first-order and 
second-order belief understanding. This chapter reports a study that tests children's 
ability on a new combined task. 
Traditionally, first-order and second-order mental state understanding have 
been tested in two separate tasks. The aim of developing a composite false-belief 
methodology was to provide a test of both first-order and second-order belief 
understanding into one story. In designing a false belief story narrative which 
examines understanding of first and second-order beliefs in parallel, it was 
anticipated that such a composite task would provide greater insight into consistency 
of ability when analysing social cognitive performance within the two respective 
levels of understanding than would be obtained when these levels are tested 
separately. In addition, a more practical benefit of using such methodology would be 
the potential easing of a (social understanding) test battery load both for children and 
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experimenters. Therefore, the primary aim of the present study was to test the 
function of a new composite false-belief methodology. 
The logic behind the composite methodology was similar to that of the new 
second-order belief stories developed in the previous chapter. Indeed, the story 
content itself was identical; however, given the influence of second-order ignorance 
upon second-order belief understanding as described in the previous chapter, the 
composite stories omitted ignorance questions. Furthermore, to enable the design of a 
composite first-order and second-order story, Table 3.1 (within the method section) 
illustrates how the first-order question and justification question were incorporated 
into the format ofthe story. Three alternatively themed versions of this composite 
first-order and second-order belief story are presented in Appendix 3.1. 
If performance levels on the new composite false belief methodology are 
found to correspond to those from studies that have examined first and second-order 
false belief understanding separately, then this will provide validation for our 
composite false belief measure. As mentioned previously, numerous studies have 
conveyed that in typical development first and second-order false belief 
understanding is present by 3- to 4 years of age and 5- to 7 years of age respectively. 
Therefore, in order to obtain a range of performance across both levels in the current 
study we examined theory of mind performance in typically developing 4- to 6-year-
olds. Given the simplified nature ofthe false belief methodology used here, ifthe 
method is valid, then it would be expected that a significant majority of the 4- to 6-
year-olds tested here would pass the first-order false belief questions. Furthermore, 
since 12% of 4- to 5-year-olds could consistently apply correct reasoning to second-
order belief questions as described in Chapter 2, it was expected that a slightly higher 
proportion of children would pass the second-order false belief question here for the 
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following two reasons: children here were slightly older than those in chapter 2 (age 
range: 4 years and 9 months to 6 years and 9 months compared to 4 years and 0 
months to 6 years and 5 months) and the inclusion here of a first-order false belief 
question prior to second-order false belief may help to scaffold the child's fragile 
second-order understanding. 
To summarise: the main aim ofthe study was to test the effectiveness of a 
new composite false belief methodology which has the potential to gauge first-order 
and second-order mental state understanding in conjunction. This methodology is 
expected to provide measures of first-order and second-order levels of understanding 
which are comparable to findings obtained by testing these separately. 
Method 
Participants 
Nineteen typically developing children comprising 9 boys and 10 girls were 
selected from a junior school in County Durham, (age range from 4 years and 1 0 
months to 6 years and 9 months, mean= 5 years and 9 months, s.d. = 8 months). This 
age range was chosen to reflect the findings of Coull et al. (2006), Leekam (1991) 
and Sullivan et al. (1994) showing that some 4- to 6-year-olds can attribute second-
order beliefs and enabled a distinction to be made between those who could and 
could not perform well on second-order mental state tests. None of the children 
participating here took part in the previous experiment. 
Materials 
Social-Cognitive Task 
In total, 4 composite false belief stories were created with different themes 
but which were structurally similar to each other (see Appendix 3.1). All4 stories 
were presented to all children. Stories were read aloud, but to encourage children's 
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engagement with these stories the various scenes were acted out with the aid of 
models. Structures were made out of modelling clay and Lego to represent the 
various locations, whilst puppets and toy people were used to represent the various 
characters. 
Table 3.1 below provides one of the four story versions to summarise the 
standard sequence of scenes and questions used to test children's composite 
understanding of first and second-order beliefs. Through a sequence of scenes 
concerning two characters, first and second-order reasoning skills were examined in 
the following way. Firstly, Character A, moves a critical object from one location 
(left there by Character B) and moved it to a different location unbeknownst to 
Character B. Then at this point 'frozen in time' the first-order question was posed: 
"Where does Character B think the object is?" immediately followed by a 
justification question. Next came the critical scene to enable incorporation of second-
order understanding: as if the story was 'playing from pause', the next scene is 
structured - "While A was moving the object into the new location, B saw A moving 
the object but A does not realise that B saw them move the object in the new 
location." Therefore A has a false belief about B 's belief of where the object is now 
located. Consequently, the second-order question was posed: "Where does A think B 
will look for the object?" immediately followed by a justification question. Also, 
because the correct response to both the first and second-order questions was the 
same (old location), a control question was asked at the end of the story which asked 
where B would now look for the object- correct response: new location. Therefore, 
this allowed us to determine whether participants were achieving correct responses 
through valid reasoning or whether they were simply providing the same response for 
each question. 
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Table 3.1 
Prototypical version of composite false belief story assessing first and second-order 
understanding 
"Paul and Sally and the robot" Scenario 
Scene 1: It's Paul's birthday. Paul and Sally are in his toy-room. He is showing 
·Sally his favourite new present - a robot. 
Scene 2: Paul puts the robot back in the box with the lid on and then has to go 
outside. 
Scene 3: While Paul is away, Sally decides to play a trick on Paul and move the 
robot from its box and hide it away in the cupboard. 
First-order false belief question: Where does Paul think the robot is? 
Justification question: Why does Paul think the robot is in the ?* 
Scene 4: While Sally was hiding the robot in the cupboard, Paul passes by the 
window and sees Sally hiding the robot in the cupboard. But Sally doesn't see 
Paul watching her hide the robot in the cupboard. She doesn't see him! 
Scene 5: Paul then returns to the toy-room. 
Second-order false belief question: Where does Sally think Paul will look for the 
robot? 
Justification question: Why does Sally think Paul will look for the robot in the 
?** 
----
Control question: Where will Paul look for the robot? 
*Criteria for appropriate/inappropriate first-order justifications are given below. 
** Criteria for appropriate/inappropriate second-order justifications are given 
below. 
NB. The shaded areas highlight the parts of the story which were presented to 
children in chapter 2. 
In relation to first-order reasoning, justification responses were regarded as 
appropriate under the following criteria: 
1. First-order reasoning: e.g. , "Paul does not know the robot is hidden 
in the cupboard." 
2. Nesting of crucial information within character 's belief: e.g., "Paul 
does not know that Sally hid the robot." 
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3. Original location of critical object: e.g., "Paul put it in the box 
before he left." 
Justification responses for first-order reasoning were regarded as inappropriate under 
the following criteria: 
1. Zero-order reasoning: e.g., "That is where the robot is." 
2. Irrelevant information: e.g., "Paul watches from the window." 
3. Nonsensical information: e.g., "Paul was really excited." 
The appropriateness of the responses to the second-order justification questions was 
assessed by the same criteria as used by Pemer and Wimmer (1985). That is, a 
response was deemed to be correct within one of the following three criteria: 
1. Embedding of mental states: e.g., "Sally does not know that Paul 
knows where the robot is." 
2. Nesting of crucial information within character's belief: e.g., "Sally 
thinks that Paul did not watch her hide the robot." 
3. Original location of critical object: e.g., "Paul had left the robot in 
the box." 
Justification responses for second-order reasoning were regarded as inappropriate 
under the same criteria as outlined for inappropriate first-order justifications, but 
given the higher level associated with second-order understanding, first-order 
reasoning was also inappropriate for second-order justifications, e.g., "Paul knows it 
is hidden in the cupboard." On the basis of the criteria outlined above, all of the 
justification responses were analysed by an independent coder who was unaware of 
the rationale of the study. While a few responses were ambiguous, generally 
justifications were clearly defined in terms of the criteria, and from the entire sample, 
substantial inter-rater reliability was achieved: Cohen's kappa= 0.74. 
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Procedure 
Once ethical approval was obtained, consent letters were sent to the parents 
from one infant school. From those parents who had consented, 19 children were 
randomly selected from two year groups, who were then seen individually. 
All children received all 4 false belief trials in a counterbalanced order. Each 
composite false belief story was preceded by an introduction of the characters and 
then the child was asked to listen carefully to the short story, as several questions 
relating to the story were to be asked at various intervals. Each story was then read 
aloud and acted out with the various models. No prompts were given after questions 
were asked, although on a handful of occasions a question was repeated upon request 
by the child. There was no time limit in place. Responses were written down 
verbatim by the researcher. At no point in the story was the child told whether their 
answer was correct or not, although encouraging feedback was provided. 
Results 
In order to test whether the composite false belief task produced equivalent 
findings to previous false belief studies that had examined these levels separately, 
analysis was carried out by examining: i.) the percentage of children who 
appropriately justified their responses to test questions and ii.) the consistency in 
performance across first and second-order understanding. 
3.1 Effectiveness of the new composite theory of mind task 
Preliminary analyses showed that there was no effect of the story type ( 4 
variations -robot, flag, chocolate bar, and doll) upon performance within terms of 
either first-order or second-order theory of mind. Furthermore, there were no effects 
of the order of presentation of the stories. Therefore all resultant analyses were based 
on performance from each of the 4 false belief stories. 
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Replicating the analysis used within chapter 2 to assess children's social-
cognitive (only second-order belief understanding), Table 3.2 provides a summary of 
the number of COITectly justified responses to first-order and second-order belief 
questions. Correct justifications to test questions are categorised here whilst 
acknowledging that a correct response was provided to the false belief question. 
There was only one instance where a child provided the wrong response to the 
(second-order) test question but then followed this with an appropriate justification-
otherwise all correct justifications summarised below were in agreement with a 
correct test question response. As would be expected for first-order belief 
understanding, Table 3.2 below indicates that a significant proportion of 4- to 6-year-
olds could reliably provide correct justifications - 84% of 4- to 6-year-olds could 
support their correct false belief response with an appropriate justification in at least 
3 out of 4 trials. Indeed, all of the children could provide correct justifications to the 
first-order test question on at least 50% of occasions. For second-order questions 
answered correctly, a majority (69%) of 4- to 6-year-olds could provide an 
appropriate justification on at least 2 out of 4 trials. Of this group, 32% of 4- to 6-
year-olds could reliably provide correct justifications to correct test questions 
responses on at least 3 out of 4 trials. This is higher than the 12% of children 
achieving this level of understanding in chapter 2 and was expected since the 
children here were slightly older and due to the possible facilitative effect of also 
asking children about first-order beliefs beforehand. 
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Table 3.2 
Number of 4- to 6-year-olds providing correctly just?fied response to false belief 
question 
First-order questions 
All 4 trials 3 trials 
N n 
19 9 
n 
7 
Second-order questions 
All 4 trials 3 trials 
N n 
19 2 
n 
4 
2 trials 
n 
3 
2 trials 
n 
7 
I trial 0 trials 
n n 
0 0 
1 trial 0 trials 
n n 
1 5 
In order to examine the consistency of each child's responses to first and 
second-order questions, their pattern of performance- displayed in Table 3.3- was 
analysed using a McNemar test. The number of children who passed the first-order 
question and failed the second-order question in at least 75% of trials was different 
from the number of children showing the reverse pattern of performance but this 
difference did not quite reach significance, X2 (1) = 6.11, p = 0.06. This reveals that 
the majority of children were liable to either consistently answer both questions 
correctly or incorrectly. This difference was expected since children would be 
unlikely to exhibit second-order belief understanding before displaying first-order 
belief understanding. 
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Table 3.3 
Within-subject comparison of first and second-order belief pelformance in at least 3 
out of 4 trials 
1st/2nd:++ 1st/2nd:+_ 1st/2nd:_+ 1st/2nd: __ 
N n n n n 
19 5 5 0 9 
3.2 Summmy offindingsfor composite theory of mind task 
Together the above findings suggest that the composite false belief 
methodology developed here produced first-order and second-order belief 
performance in 4- to 6-year-old children which was comparable to previous studies 
which examine these levels of understanding separately. Also, the McNemar test 
confirms that children's first-order belief understanding is a necessary but not 
sufficient ability to enable children to consistently understand second-order beliefs. 
Discussion 
To recap, the main aim of the current study was: to test the effectiveness of a 
new composite social-cognitive methodology upon typically developing 4- to 6-year-
olds. It was hypothesised that the composite false belief task which combines tests of 
first and second-order mental state understanding would yield levels of performance 
that would be comparable to previous false belief studies which examine these levels 
in separate tests. 
Findings from the current study were similar to those obtained from 
conventional first and second-order false belief studies. As Wellman et al. (200 1) 
note within their meta-analysis of theory of mind studies, the vast majority of 4- to 5-
year-olds can consistently apply correct first-order belief reasoning- this is 
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congruent with the first-order findings for the present study. In using a composite 
false belief task which examined first and second-order understanding in parallel, the 
results indicated firstly that a large majority of 4- to 6-year-olds could reliably 
answer first-order questions correctly and an overwhelming proportion of this group 
could consistently provide correct justifications to these questions. This finding 
concurs with evidence from previous first-order false belief studies which indicates 
that first-order mental state understanding is generally evident by 4 years of age, 
(e.g., Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Hogrefe et al., 1986; Wimmer & Pemer, 1983 ). 
With respect to second-order mental state understanding, it was found that 
roughly a quarter of the 4- to 6-year-olds could reliably answer second-order 
questions whilst also correctly answering the corresponding control questions. This 
indicates that children were not randomly guessing the location of where the object 
was believed to be. This is supported by the finding that over two thirds of 4- to 6-
year-olds in the present study could typically provide appropriate second-order 
justifications, whilst a third of these could consistently apply correct second-order 
reasoning. This suggests that the ability to attribute second-order mental states is 
emergent by the age of four, and is effectively in place by 6 years of age. Via simpler 
stories than used in early second-order false belief studies (e.g., Hogrefe et al., 1986; 
Pemer & Wimmer, 1985) this finding is congruent with more recent studies adopting 
narratives with reduced processing demands (e.g., Sullivan et al., 1994) and 
corroborates the level of second-order understanding described in the previous 
chapter. Although, a slightly higher proportion of children could successfully 
attribute second-order beliefs in the present study, this may be due to the fact that the 
children here were of a slightly higher age. However the mean age of the children 
passing second-order tasks here was only 4 months greater than the mean age of the 
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children who consistently attributed second-order beliefs in chapter 2, although such 
a narrow age gap can have disproportionately large effects at a time in the child's 
development when this type ofunderstanding is quickly evolving. Indeed, Bennett 
and Matthews (2000) found that 50% of 6-year-olds were able to attribute second-
order beliefs, and Broomfield, Robinson, and Robinson (2002) found an equivalent 
level of ability in similarly-aged children. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
the younger age of children in the present study led to a slightly lower task 
performance, but which was comparative to other studies, particularly given the 
inclusion here of a strict criterion of correctly justified responses only. It is also 
possible that children here performed more successfully on second-order belief 
questions than children described in chapter 2 because the first-order phase of the 
story included in the present study had drawn their attention to the nature and effect 
of mistaken beliefs, albeit at a more simplistic level. Thus, the comparability of the 
present findings to findings from studies which have tested first-order and second-
order mental states separately, suggest that the composite false belief task provides a 
valid gauge of first and second-order belief understanding. 
As has been illustrated thus far, children performed relatively well on second-
order aspects of the composite theory of mind task and very well on first-order 
aspects of the task. In terms of their consistency across first and second-order belief 
understanding, our fmdings revealed that the majority of children were liable to 
either pass both first and second-order questions or fail both first and second-order 
questions. This indicates that once a child has acquired the ability to attribute first-
order mental states, they usually also have the ability to attribute second-order mental 
states. This consistency was not immediately apparent for 4- to 6-year-olds since a 
quarter of children were able to apply first-order reasoning but unable to apply the 
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more complex second-order mental state understanding. Nonetheless, just as many 
children were as likely to pass both first and second-order questions as pass only 
first-order questions. Although it cannot be concluded from this that children can 
reason about second-order mental states just as easily as first-order mental states, 
there is an indication that the lag between children's ability to pass first and second-
order tasks is not as prolonged as 2 or 3 years as would have been surmised from the 
findings of Perner and Wimmer (1985) and Wimmer and Perner (1983). Such a claim 
was made by Sullivan et al. (1994) and if a larger sample of children had been tested 
in the present study, firmer conclusions could have been drawn regarding the 
duration and influence (task artefacts vs. conceptual change) ofthe lag between the 
ability to pass first-order and second-order tasks. It is unlikely that the conclusions 
drawn from a study which investigates this lag in ability via separate false belief 
tasks would be as convincing as a study which examines this lag in parallel. Thus 
such a methodology which examines first and second-order in parallel within the 
same test may provide a unique opportunity to discover individuals' respective first 
and second-order social-cognitive abilities, whilst avoiding task confounds which are 
likely to arise from testing individuals on separate theory of mind tasks in separate 
instances. 
The discussion has illustrated that the new false belief methodology which 
was introduced in the current study as the first composite test of both first-order and 
second-order understanding, produces levels of performance which are comparable 
to findings from previous studies in typical development. In summary, the new 
composite false belief methodology appears to represent an effective combined 
social-cognitive task which can serve several purposes. It provides an opportunity to 
examine both first and second-order mental state attribution concurrently within the 
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same task and thus provide valuable insight into individual consistency across these 
levels of understanding. Secondly, it also offers a measurement of composite social-
cognitive ability which consequently provides a comprehensive assessment of social-
cognitive capacity. Furthermore, researchers and child participants alike may benefit 
from a reduced task load in which both levels of social cognition can be assessed 
within one story, rather than the standard practice of assessing first-order and second-
order social cognition independently. 
In Part 1, a composite social-cognitive methodology has been developed and 
tested. This methodological focus was necessary given the previously outlined 
concern that a well-used representational theory of mind task (i.e. the stories of 
Sullivan et al., 1994) may not actually tap into children's false belief understanding. 
While it would have been straightforward to simply implement Sullivan et al. 's task 
within the broader investigations of Part 2 (as will be the procedure with tasks in the 
other constructs of social attention, social perception and language), there was not 
immediate acceptance of tasks of social cognition for the following two reasons. 
Firstly, even within the context of a broad investigation across social understanding, 
the domain of social cognition is integral to theory of mind research and provides the 
strongest link with past research; as such it is particularly important that the tasks 
tapping into this domain are carefully selected and that they measure what they 
purport to measure. Secondly, given that the overall aim of the thesis was to 
illuminate the constituents of children's social understanding, it was imperative to 
first investigate conceptual concerns regarding Sullivan et al. 's second-order belief 
task. The findings from chapter 2 confirmed these concerns and justified the design 
of alternative methodology. Building on the findings from chapter 2 and the 
simplified story format therein described by Coull (unpublished), the present chapter 
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has described the development and testing of a composite (first-order and second-
order) false belief methodology. This endeavour has provided a broad measure of 
children's social-cognitive understanding which together with tasks within the 
domains of social attention, social perception and language can now be used in Part 2 
to investigate the main question of the thesis, namely: what are the constituents of 
children's social understanding? 
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PART2-
INVESTIGATING THE CONSTITUENTS AND 
CONTINUITY OF CHILDREN'S SOCIAL 
UNDERSTANDING 
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Outline of Part 2 
Given the apparent suitability of the composite false belief methodology 
developed and tested within Part 1, the next stage was to use this - alongside other 
measures - to investigate the wider view of theory of mind/social understanding that 
has been proposed in recent years by examining the relationship between children's 
abilities within the domains of social cognition, social perception, social attention 
and language. Part 2 contains 4 chapters. In chapter 4, the goal of Part 2 is first 
outlined and the broad rationale for the methodology is discussed. Chapters 5 and 6 
are guided by an attempt to examine the constituents oftypical children's social 
understanding in the context ofTager-Flusberg and Joseph's (2005) model of social 
understanding (or theory of mind as they term it). In Chapter 5, a basic proposal 
drawn from the Tager-Flusberg and Joseph model and other models (e.g., Baron-
Cohen, 1994; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000) is investigated; namely that 
children's social cognitive abilities are positively associated to their social-perceptual 
abilities. Chapter 6 then broadens the investigation to incorporate a focus upon two 
additional constructs: social attention and language; with an extensive review of the 
literature before describing the comprehensive analysis of testing 4- to 5-year-olds in 
the areas of social cognition, social perception, social attention and language using 
Structural Equation Modelling to arrive at a final model for the constituents of social 
understanding. To complement all the research into typically developing children's 
social understanding within preceding chapters, chapter 7 then applies the findings 
from these chapters to a sample of children with autism. In particular, to test whether 
the relations between different constituents of social understanding observed in the 
typically-developing 4- to 5-year-olds apply to children with autism, comparison was 
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made between a group of children with autism who were matched on verbal ability to 
a subset of the large group of typical children who had been tested within chapter 6 
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Chapter 4 
Componential models of social understanding 
4.1 Why investigate the relationship benveen components of social understanding? 
Chapter 1 discussed the impetus within the field of theory of mind in moving 
from a narrow cognitive stance to a broader, more social perspective upon children's 
understanding of others minds. Undoubtedly, this shift in focus is more in tune with 
the social basis and complexity involved in such understanding. However, as argued 
within chapter 1, emphasis has focused on how and when different aspects of 
children's understanding develop with less attention upon what it is that underlies 
children's social understanding. Furthermore, unfortunately the advantage of a 
broader approach brings with it a lack of definition- increasingly, inherently 
different abilities are confused by the same terminology or studies refer to a whole 
range of disparate aspects of social understanding under an umbrella term such as 
theory of mind/social intelligence. Resultantly, there is a degree of ambiguity 
regarding the theoretical distinction between constituents of children's social 
understanding and there is uncertainty upon the continuity from early aspects of 
social understanding to later aspects such as social cognition. Elucidation of both of 
these issues will importantly provide insight into the manifestation of a range of 
social understanding abilities - and this is important for one primary reason. In order 
to fully understand the developmental process up to the point by which children can 
effectively engage in social interaction with others, it is necessary not only to outline 
which abilities appear when. First, it is necessary to clarify just what these abilities 
actually are. 
Theoretical offerings have been given in the attempt to model specific 
abilities subsumed by children's theory of mind/social understanding. Baron-Cohen's 
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(1994, 2004) model distinguished between various modules of a child's theory of 
mind, suggesting that early abilities within social attention were associated with 
children's traditional theory of mind abilities. Similarly, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan 
(2000) proposed a componential model of theory of mind in which social-perceptual 
abilities were associated with children's social-cognitive abilities. While their 
original model is developed from traditional componential or modular conceptions of 
theory ofmind (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1994), Tager-Flusberg's more recent model 
(Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2005) extends the original framework of the model 
further and so provides a valuable opportunity to examine children's theory of 
mind/social understanding abilities in broader terms. The focus on earlier emerging 
abilities taken by each of these accounts is essential for a broader investigation. In 
addition, there is a clear need in research within this area to provide empirical 
evidence of the relationships proposed within these models. 
While it is acknowledged that such componential models are not entirely 
harmonious with a growing trend in research for delineating the developmental 
process for social understanding, these models do span across development and offer 
an opportunity to test the distinction between abilities which perhaps deserve to be 
regarded as fundamentally distinct capacities. In addition, the componential model 
has not been tested directly and it would appear to be theoretically short-sighted to 
render such models redundant before at least testing the claims which define them. 
Therefore, this will be addressed here by empirically testing the componential model 
of theory of mind to primarily test the claims ofTager-Flusberg, but also by 
definition, those of Baron-Cohen. This will serve as a suitable vehicle with which to 
address our overarching aim of the thesis: to provide elucidation of the constituents 
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of children's social understanding and illumination of the continuity in the pathway 
from early to late social understanding. 
While the benefit of a developmental perspective to examining social 
understanding is undoubted and a longitudinal investigation would be a fruitful 
approach to delineating children's social understanding abilities, this option was 
beyond the scope of the current investigation. For instance, since children's early 
abilities within social understanding appear in infancy and their social-cognitive 
skills generally appear between the ages of 3 to 6 years of age, for a longitudinal 
investigation to be completely insightful across this range this would require a 
duration of at least 3 years over at least two time points. Therefore, the relationships 
within componential models of theory of mind were tested concurrently in typically 
developing 4- to 5-year-olds, while acknowledging that analysis of children's social 
understanding in Part 1 of the thesis, although examined concurrently, still revealed 
interesting conceptual differences. Furthermore, as advocated by Carpenter, Akhtar, 
and Tomasello (1998) and Carpenter, Pennington and Rogers (2002), taking a 
snapshot of children's development can be useful in inferring likely developmental 
patterns. Given that Tager-Flusberg (2001) suggested that it is probable that the 
social-perceptual component of theory of mind develops throughout childhood and 
since there is ample evidence of continual development of social-cognitive abilities, 
there is apparent merit in taking a snapshot of these abilities at one developmental 
point. Also, concurrent examination of abilities within and between these latent 
constructs (particularly using structural equation modelling as will be conducted 
within chapter 6) will provide an interesting insight into similarities and differences 
across a broad range of children's social understanding. 
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4.2 Examining a componential model oftheo1Jl of mind 
As indicated above, several componential models of theory of mind have 
been proposed. Baron-Cohen (1994) preceded the componential models ofTager-
Flusberg (200 1, 2005) with his modular mindreading model of children's theory of 
mind. In this account he proposed 4 modules which could explain how children 
acquired theory of mind: the intentionality detector and eye direction detector 
modules typically function between 0-9 months. These modules help to build dyadic 
representations such as "Sally wants the robot" which then form the foundation for 
skills within the next module: the shared attention mechanism (SAM). The SAM 
combines the dyadic representation of both earlier modules to create triadic 
representations such as "Paul sees that Sally wants the robot". Baron-Cohen 
proposed that this ability typically appears between 9- to 14-months-old and allows 
joint attention behaviours such as gaze following to occur, which then appear to be 
necessary but not sufficient for development within the final module: the Theory of 
Mind Mechanism {ToMM) which develops between 2- to 4 years of age. Baron-
Cohen asserted that once this module is in place children can begin to represent the 
full range ofmental states (e.g., knowledge and belief) allowing children to 
understanding for example, that beliefs can be false. 
Tager-Flusberg (2001) argued that Baron-Cohen's account of children's 
theory of mind did not take a strong developmental perspective. In acknowledging 
this, Tager-Flusberg (2001) (see also, Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000) embraced 
the suggested broader view of theory of mind development by introducing a 
componential model of theory of mind. In their account, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan 
outline two components- the social-perceptual (SP) component and the social-
cognitive (SC) component. The SC component refers to an explicit theory of mind 
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which entails those abilities which reflect an acquisition of the understanding of the 
mind as a representational system, e.g., knowledge of simple mental states (appearing 
around 3 years of age) and knowledge of complex mental states - appearing around 4 
years of age for first-order beliefs and around 5 to 7 years of age for second-order 
beliefs. Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan suggest that the SP component is an implicit 
level of theory of mind which may precede the explicit social-cognitive component 
developmentally but is likely to continue to develop across childhood. This 
framework is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The crucial distinction between the two 
components is that the SC component refers to the capacity to make cognitive 
inferences about the content of people's mental states (e.g., false belief 
understanding) while the SP component refers to the lower level ability to make an 
on-line immediate judgement of a person's mental state based on perceptual 
information (e.g., judging how they may feel from the expression in their face or 
voice). Tager-Flusberg (2001) does not provide an exhaustive list ofwhat SP 
includes but refers to the above ability as well as the ability to distinguish between 
people and objects. The most commonly mentioned social-perceptual ability that 
Tager-Flusberg refers to is the ability to detect facial expressions (e.g., .. Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes" task designed by Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 
1997). However, the SP component also refers to lower-level abilities including 
perception and response to social stimuli appearing from 6 months of age upwards, 
such as gaze-following, joint attention and social referencing (i.e. the type of abilities 
referred to by Baron-Cohen within the SAM module ofhis 1994 model). 
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Figure 4.1. Schematic representation of the Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) 
componential model of theory of mind 
Online judgements of mental 
states based on face and voice 
SOCIAL PERCEPTUAL LEVEL 
Representational 
theory of mind 
e.g., false belief 
SOCIAL COGNITIVE LEVEL 
By outlining a component of theory of mind which can encompass earlier 
perceptual abilities, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan's model offers an opportunity to 
explore the development from early emerging capacities in infancy through to 
advanced mindreading abilities in adolescence such as attributing mental states to 
people through on-line judgement of the emotions or thoughts expressed in their eyes 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). Furthermore, in terms of autism, this expanded model 
can more readily account for the findings which led to criticism of the original theory 
of mind hypothesis of autism offered by Baron-Cohen et al. ( 1985). As mentioned in 
chapter 1, this theory stated that the social and communicative impairments which 
characterise autism could be explained solely by a representational theory of mind 
deficit. However, studies have shown that children have problems with joint attention 
prior to their problems with representational theory of mind skills, (e.g., Mundy & 
Sigman, 1989; Mundy et al., 1990). Also, the origins of social dysfunction in autism 
can be traced back to impairments which form the foundation of the social-perceptual 
domain such as social-orienting deficits (Osterling & Dawson, 1994). 
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While it is true that Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan's (2000) model did broaden 
the theory of mind lens to arrive at a model detailing separate areas of children's 
social understanding, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan do not really delve into what early 
social experiences can lead to the emergence of social-perceptual skills or exactly 
what social-perceptual abilities may develop into social-cognitive skills. With regard 
to typical development, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan explain in their article that 
social-perceptual skills are likely to provide the foundation to social cognition- i.e. 
children are unlikely to be able to develop social cognitive skills without first 
acquiring certain social-perceptual abilities. This has also been argued by several 
theorists (e.g., Hobson, 1993b) however there has been no direct test of the 
relationship between these components. Also, as Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan noted 
in their article: 
" ... there has been little work in formulating a model of theory of mind, or 
more broadly, social knowledge. What are its basic concepts, rules and 
representations? ... The absence of such a model has led to the broadening of the 
concept oftheory of mind with little regard to potentially important theoretical 
distinctions that have implications for underlying mechanisms within this broad 
domain." (p. 60). 
In the intervening years, there has been a wealth of empirical research (see chapter 6 
for a review of recent literature) which has been conducted in this broader vein, with 
a disproportionate amount of research attempting to identify what constitutes 
children's social understanding and identify underlying mechanisms serving social 
cognition. Indeed, it would appear that Tager-Flusberg's model remains untested in 
typical development. 
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Perhaps reflecting on her point described above, Tager-Flusberg elaborated 
on her original account and proposed a more comprehensive model of children's 
theory of mind (Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2005, p. 310), pictured below in Figure 
4.2. As this model illustrates, Tager-Flusberg and Joseph detail not only social 
perception and social cognition, but also incorporate language and lower-level 
perceptual abilities in the form of attention to social information (termed from here 
on as social attention). Thus, by virtue of its delineation of abilities across 
development from social attention through social perception to social cognition, such 
a model of theory of mind provides a more extended, encompassing framework for 
the investigation of children's social understanding. The explicit importance assigned 
to early social information within Tager-Flusberg and Joseph's model mirrors themes 
within current explanations of social understanding (e.g., Carpendale & Lewis, 2004, 
2006). 
Figure 4.2. Tager-Fiusberg and Joseph (2005) schematic model of the acquisition of 
a representational theory of mind 
Attention to social information 
Face, Voice, Body Motion 
Awareness of other minds 
Mental States 
SOCIAL PERCEPTUAL 
LEVEL 
REPRESENTATIONAL 
THEORY OF MIND 
False Belief 
SOCIAL COGNITIVE LEVEL 
Language-
specific 
mechanisms 
LANGUAGE 
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From above, it can also be seen that language plays a much more significant 
role within this model than compared to Tager-Flusberg's original (2000) model. 
Within the original model, Tager-Flusberg speculated that language was not linked to 
social perception in any way, and that language may only be important for social 
cognition -particularly for children with autism (e.g., Tager-Flusberg, 1997). 
Therefore, the linking of language to both social cognition and social perception as 
illustrated above is a considerable addition to the original model. However, their 
inclusion of a language construct is congruent with the burgeoning focus within 
empirical research upon elucidating the links between language and different aspects 
of social understanding, particularly false belief understanding within the domain of 
social cognition (e.g., Astington & Baird, 2005; de Rosnay & Hughes, 2006; de 
Villiers & de Villiers, 2000; Slade & Ruffman, 2005). Therefore, the wealth of recent 
research which has identified links between different aspects of social understanding 
and language appears to be reflected by the encompassing nature ofTager-Flusberg 
and Joseph's model. 
Within their model, Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) propose for typically 
developing children that social-perceptual ability directly leads to both language 
ability and to social cognition. In addition, they propose that as language -
particularly syntax ability- develops, this then influences children's social cognition 
(representational understanding). While Tager-Flusberg and Joseph outline these 
probable links and while there has been a plethora of empirical studies in this area 
exploring the language-social cognition links, it is true that the rest of the model 
remains virtually untested (Leekam, 2005). Certainly, the nature of the links between 
each aspect of social understanding- social attention, social perception and social 
cognition- is ambiguous. Indeed, while Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan acknowledged 
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the following point within their article (2000): "we do not yet have clear evidence 
from either the developmental or the cognitive science literature on how these 
components might be interrelated" (p. 80), there has been little attempt since to 
explore these interrelationships to better understand what constitutes children's social 
understanding. Indeed, it appears that no study thus far has simultaneously 
investigated across these three domains of social understanding. 
In summary, this section has described several componential models which 
have been proposed to account for children's developing theory of mind or social 
understanding. Given that neither the model ofTager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) 
or Tager-Flusberg and Joseph's (2005) model have been directly tested, and given 
the utility in using such models as a guide to investigating broader definitions of 
children's social understanding, the next couple of chapters will use the Tager-
Flusberg and Joseph model as a guide to examining the constituents of social 
understanding. 
4.3 Developing the methodology to examine the constituents of social understanding 
By defining a model of children's social understanding in terms of 
components to broadly represent children's capacities, these components are likely to 
encompass a range of ability within them. For instance, Tager-Flusberg (2001) 
asserted that each component would have a distinct underlying mechanism for 
processing different aspects of social information. Therefore, given the broad range 
and complexity of social information which children are required to process, it is 
inevitable that these components of social understanding denote a myriad of abilities 
-i.e. a broad component such as social perception cannot be measured definitively. 
As such, it is necessary to accept that these components are not directly observable 
and as such social perception, social cognition and social attention should be 
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regarded as latent constructs. While Tager-Flusberg may regard these 3 domains as 
latent constructs, they are explicitly regarded as such here by way of their make-up 
and for purposes of later factor analyses and structural equation modelling. 
While the components of social understanding represent latent constructs, 
which by definition relate to terminology that are inherently subjective, such 
constructs nonetheless provide an approximation of the different aspects of children's 
social understanding. Distinguishing between social attention, social perception, and 
social cognition helps to classify a range of their social understanding which can be 
individually assessed via tasks- for instance, social cognition has traditionally been 
examined via performance on false belieftasks. By this rationale, each of the three 
constructs can be tested empirically and in order to provide a comprehensive profile 
of children's ability within each component, chapter 6 builds on the findings of 
chapter 5 by examining children's abilities across at least 2 measures within each 
construct. Such empirical testing of models is important in order for the field to 
progress conceptually, and in order to assess the constituents of social understanding 
and the relations between them, structural equation modelling (SEM) offers a 
sensible and effective method of analysis. SEM is the only analysis that allows 
complete and simultaneous tests of all relationships within a model. Therefore, as 
will be shown in chapter 6, SEM can provide valuable insight into the relationships 
between constructs via modelling the framework which best fits the dataset. As well 
as statistically testing the direction and strength of links between constructs and thus 
indicating possible heterotypic or homotypic continuity in social understanding 
abilities, SEM offers the additional benefit of detailing how tasks load within 
constructs. Given that relatively newly-defined constructs such as social attention and 
social perception were under investigation, this feature of SEM allowed the issue of 
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definition to be addressed in terms of how the various constructs are best defined and 
assisted in the overarching aim to distinguish between the constituents of children's 
social understanding. However, prior to reviewing the key literature and describing 
methodology and results for each of the four domains within chapter 6, chapter 5 
focuses on the constructs underpinning the componential models ofTager-Flusberg 
and her colleagues: social cognition and social perception. 
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Chapter 5 
Using the componential model to explore the 
relationship between social cognition and socian perception 
As outlined in the previous chapter, to explore the untested model of social 
understanding as proposed by Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005), focus was first 
reserved exclusively on the relationship between social perception and social 
cognition as this forms the backbone of their componential account. Therefore, the 
aim of the present study was to examine the concurrent association between social 
perception and social cognition. Specifically, is there a significant positive 
correlation between 4- to 6-year-olds performance within the social-perceptual and 
social-cognitive components of theory of mind? 
In order to investigate the relationship between social-perceptual processing 
and social-cognitive processing (these parts ofTager-Flusberg's model are 
highlighted below in Figure 5.1), the present study looked at children's performance 
across two different tasks. Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) had examined social-
perceptual processing by way of an emotion-matching task but they obtained 
unexpected results using this task which contrasted with previous findings (Tager-
Flusberg, Boshart & Baron-Cohen, 1998). It was suggested by Tager-Flusberg and 
Sullivan that one reason for this discrepancy could be that a more sensitive measure 
of social-perceptual processing is prqvided by the "Reading the mind in the eyes" 
task- Eyes Task- designed by Baron-Cohen et al. (1997). This version of the Eyes 
Task is an adult measure of theory of mind capacity which taps into social-
processing skills since it requires individuals to assign a complex mental state to a 
person based solely on an on-line judgement of the expression in the person's eyes-
therefore it involves attribution of the relevant mental state but not inference of the 
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content of that mental state (the latter resembling social-cognitive processing). To 
deal with several psychometric flaws, this task was subsequently revised (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001) and a child version has been 
introduced. 
Figure 5.1. Parts (shaded in grey) of the Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) model 
being tested in this chapter 
Attention to social information 
Face, Voice, Body Motion 
In the present study, a child version of the Eyes Task (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill & Lawson, 200 1) was implemented. This differs from 
the adult version only in the sense that the mental state terms which the child has to 
select from are more simplistic in meaning than the mental state terms used in the 
adult version. Therefore, this task was used in the present study primarily since it was 
suggested to be a more sensitive measure than for example, an emotion matching 
task, of non-linguistic theory of mind abilities such as social-perceptual processing 
(Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, et al. (200 I) 
found that a small proportion (8%) of 6- to 8-year-olds could not score above chance 
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on this task. Therefore, although the age range of the children within this study was 4 
to 6 years of age, it was hypothesised that a slightly larger proportion of children 
would not score above chance. In addition a fairly normal distribution of scores was 
expected within this age range. 
Whilst the Eyes Task was used in the present study to examine performance 
within the SP domain, ability within the SC component was explored via 
performance on the newly developed composite false-belief methodology (as 
outlined in chapter 3). In addition to examining the direct association between social 
perception and social cognition, IQ was measured to control for possible effects on 
social-cognitive or social-perceptual abilities. Numerous studies have demonstrated 
that verballQ is related to theory of mind ability (e.g., Cole & Mitchell, 2000) and 
given the degree of language involved in the social-perceptual task it was quite 
possible that verballQ may be involved in the interrelationship between social 
perception and social cognition. Also, Gagliardi et al. (2003) found that mental age 
scores were positively correlated to performance on a social-perceptual type task. 
Therefore, it seemed prudent to have a measure oflQ. Due to age, children's second-
order false belief performance may be expected to vary within our study since our 
age-group spans a range from 4 years to 6 years of age - mirroring the main 
transition phase for children's second-order belief understanding. Therefore, we 
would expect that older children and children with higher verbal abilities would 
perform better within the two components of theory of mind. 
Having established the suitability of a new composite social-cognitive 
measure within chapter 3, the aim of the present chapter was to look at the concurrent 
relationship between social-perceptual processing and social-cognitive processing. 
This venture should provide valuable insight into how children's social-perceptual 
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abilities are linked to social cognition generally, but also to both first-order and 
second-order mental state understanding. Given the structure ofTager-Flusberg's 
models (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000; Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2005), a 
significant positive relationship was expected to exist between typically developing 
children's social-perceptual and social-cognitive abilities. 
Method 
Participants 
The 19 children who completed all 4 social-cognitive stories as described in 
chapter 3 are the same children who completed the social-perceptual task and IQ test 
in the present study. Their data are included here in order to examine the association 
between performance on the social-cognitive and social-perceptual task. In addition a 
new scoring system was piloted in this study. To recap, children's ages ranged from 
4 years and 10 months to 6 years and 9 months (mean: 5 years and 9 months, s.d.: 8 
months). 
Design 
This study had a within-subjects design. Children received 28 Eyes Task 
trials and 4 false-belief trials in a counterbalanced order in which the trials for each 
task were presented in two blocks to reduce possible effects of fatigue. Half of the 
children were given 14 eye trials followed by 2 false-belief stories, with this pattern 
repeated twice, while the remaining children received the trials in the opposite order. 
Materials 
Social-Cognitive Task 
Data from the composite social-cognitive task (chapter 3) was used again for 
a new analysis in order to investigate the association between children's social-
cognitive and social-perceptual abilities. However, for the purpose of this and 
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subsequent chapters using statistical methods, a new scoring system was introduced 
to assess children's composite false belief understanding. Although this scoring 
system was different to the one described in previous chapters, it was necessary in 
order to allow the variability of social cognition scores to be more comparable to the 
range of social-perceptual scores. This new scoring system was also implemented to 
obtain a wider-ranging scale of social cognition for each child for the purposes of 
correlational analyses in following chapters. One of the four composite false belief 
stories appears again below in Table 5.1 with the new scoring system shown. 
For a summary of the procedure and list of appropriate/inappropriate 
justifications for the composite false belief task refer back to the method section in 
chapter 3 (pp. 52-53). As can be seen below in Table 5.1 the new scoring system 
awarded one point within each story for correct responses to the first and second-
order test questions. While the answer to these is essentially a choice of two options 
- the old or new location - answers to the justification questions are intrinsically 
more complex, i.e. a detailed sentence containing several key terms worded in the 
correct order. To reflect this in terms of scoring, correct justifications to first-order 
questions were awarded 2 points, while correct justification to more complex second-
order questions were awarded 4 points. Thus, with a maximum of 8 points for each 
story, an average score (range: 0-8) of false belief understanding was created. When 
an incorrect response to the control question was combined with incorrect 
justifications, the child's score for that particular story was marked as zero. 
Furthermore, to distinguish between children who answered all 5 story questions 
correctly from children who provide an incorrect response only to the control 
question, the children within this latter scenario had one point deducted (i.e. they 
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would have a story score of 7, rather than 8 as obtained by children correctly 
answering all 5 questions). 
Table 5.1 
Example of story used to assess children's social-cognitive pelformance 
"Paul, Sally and the robot" Story 
Scene 1: It's Paul's birthday. Paul and Sally are in his toy-room. He is showing 
Sally his favourite new present- a robot. 
Scene 2: Paul puts the robot back in the box with the lid on and then has to go 
outside. 
Scene 3: While Paul is away, Sally decides to play a trick on Paul and move the 
robot from its box and hide it away in the cupboard. 
First-order false-belief question: Where does Paul think the robot is? (1 point) 
Justification question: Why does Paul think the robot is in the ? (2 
points) 
Scene 4: While Sally was hiding the robot in the cupboard, Paul passes by the 
window and sees Sally hiding the robot in the cupboard. But Sally doesn't see 
Paul watching her hide the robot in the cupboard. She doesn't see him! 
Scene 5: Paul then returns to the toy-room. 
Second-order false-belief question: Where does Sally think Paul will look for the 
robot? (1 point) 
Justification question: Why does Sally think Paul will look for the robot in the 
____ ? (4 points) 
Control question: Where will Paul look for the robot? 
Bracketed scores indicate the scoring system used to provide a continuous 
measure o[SC ability (average stmy score rangingfrom 0-8). 
Social-Perceptual Task 
The Eyes task required children to make a judgement about a person's mental 
state solely by perceiving the eye region from a picture of a face. The child version of 
the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong et al., 
2001) requires the child to choose from four mental state terms to describe the 
perceived mental state. This version consists of 28 pictures of human faces which 
display only the person's eye region. Children are required to pick one of 4 words 
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placed around the picture which they think best describes what the person in the 
picture is thinking or feeling. Only one of the 4 words is correct and if the child did 
not understand any of the words then the experimenter explained the word by 
providing an example sentence containing the word. Across the sequence of pictures, 
various combinations of 4 mental state terms are used from an overall pool of 42 
mental state terms. In addition the position of the correct word is randomised. All of 
the pictures of equal size (11.5cm x 4.5cm) were presented in black and white on A4 
paper. Once all trials had been completed each child had an individual score out of a 
total of 28. The Eyes task stimuli were downloaded with permission from the source: 
the Autism Research Centre via its website (www.autismresearchcentre.com/tests). 
IQ Test 
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (W ASI) was used to collate 
information on the full scale IQ, verballQ and performance IQ for each of the 
participants. The W ASI consists of 4 sub-tests- Vocabulary, Similarities, Block 
Design and Matrix Reasoning and provides a reliable, brief measure of intelligence. 
The first two sub-tests which measure crystallised abilities constitute the verbal scale 
and result in the verbaliQ. The latter two sub-tests compose the performance scale 
and measure visuomotor/coordination skills and nonverbal fluid abilities. For a study 
discussing the application of short forms of IQ tests such as theW ASI see Minshew, 
Turner, and Goldstein (2005) who discuss verbaliQ, performance IQ as well as full 
scale IQ. Due to child absence, only 18 of the 19 children could be tested on all 4 
sub-tests. 
Procedure 
The social-cognitive and social-perceptual tasks were completed within one 
test session lasting about 25 minutes, while the W ASI testing occurred in a different 
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session, lasting approximately 25 minutes. The social-cognitive tasks were conducted 
as described in the previous chapter. The experimenter followed the procedure for the 
social-perceptual Eyes task as informed by the instructions accompanying the test. 
Children were told that they had to choose one of four words around a picture which 
best described what the person in that picture was thinking or feeling. After 
responding, the experimenter gave encouraging feedback without indicating whether 
the child's response was correct or not. No time limit was in place and children were 
provided with mental state definitions where necessary. 
During the second testing session, all 4 subtests of the W ASI were 
administered in the following order: Vocabulary, Block Design, Similarities, and 
Matrix Reasoning. Again, children were not told whether their responses were 
correct or not; the experimenter simply gave encouraging feedback throughout the 
test. 
Results 
5.1 How are the social-perceptual and social-cognitive components of social 
understanding related? 
The main aim here was to investigate the componential model of theory of 
mind by examining the interrelationship between social perception and social 
cognition. The continuous measure of children's social-cognitive ability as outlined 
in the method section (pp. 82-83)- since describing children's composite social-
cognitive performance- is termed here as composite social cognition (CompSC). 
Correlation analysis was conducted while controlling for age and IQ before 
proceeding with multiple regression analysis. The conclusions drawn from these 
analyses were then investigated further via logistic regression analyses with overall 
social-cognitive performance measured in terms of a pass/fail criterion. 
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Assessment of normality via both Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk 
statistics revealed that all variables were normally distributed (all p > 0.05); 
therefore, we proceeded with Pearson's zero-order and partial correlations. Table 5.2 
displays the zero-order correlations for the following variables: Eyes task, CompSC, 
first-order belief understanding and second-order belief understanding. It can be seen 
that the social-perceptual Eyes task was not significantly related to the continuous 
composite social-cognitive measure. When examining the levels of the composite 
task separately, social-perceptual ability was not significantly related to either first-
order false belief understanding or second-order belief understanding. In addition, 
age was not significantly related to either social-perceptual or social-cognitive 
ability. However, correlations were analysed between age and the original measure of 
social-cognitive ability as used in chapters 2 and 3 (i.e. the number of correctly 
justified false belief responses) to ensure that this non-correlation was not as a result 
of using the new scoring system. Similarly to the findings obtained within those 
chapters, age was not related to the old scoring system for composite false belief 
understanding. Furthermore, none ofthe IQ scales (full scale IQ, verbal IQ, 
nonverbal IQ) were significantly related to social perception or any measure of social 
cognition. As Table 5.2 shows, one of the few significant correlations obtained was 
for the relationship between first-order and second-order belief understanding, r = 
0.58, p = 0.01; this corroborates the earlier analysis within chapter 3 suggesting a 
link between these levels of understanding. 
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Table 5.2 
Zero-order correlations of social-perceptual and social-cognitive variables 
Variable Eyes task CompSC 1 s'-order FB 2na_order FB 
Eyes task 
CompSC 0.23 1 
1st -order FB 0.10 0.82** 1 
2"d -order FB 0.26 0.94** 0.58** 1 
**:significant at 0.01 level 
Given that age and each IQ scale were not significantly related to either social 
perception or social cognition, the partial correlations when controlling for the 
former two variables were not greatly different to the pattern of zero-order 
correlations. When controlling for age, there was no significant correlation between 
Eyes task and CompSC: r = 0.25, p > 0.3, or indeed, between Eyes task and either 
first-order FB or second-order FB, both p > 0.2. Also, when controlling for age, there 
were no significant correlations between the Eyes task and the full scale of the 
WASI, r = 0.15, p > 0.5; or the Eyes task and the VIQ, r = -.03, p > 0.9. However, 
there was a marginally significant correlation between the Eyes task and nonverbal 
IQ: r = 0.41, p = 0.1 0. Partial correlations while controlling for age also indicated 
that there were no significant correlations between any of the social-cognitive 
measures and any of the W ASI scales. When controlling for each of the IQ scales, 
partial correlations indicated that there were no significant correlations between the 
Eyes task and any social-cognitive measures. 
Multiple regression analysis was then used to investigate the dataset further. 
For this endeavour we used the CompSC measure to define each child's overall 
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social cognitive ability. Firstly, a regression analysis was conducted to investigate the 
relative contribution of the Eyes task, IQ performance and age to predict children's 
overall social cognitive ability. Assumptions of the regression such as normality of 
residuals, no multicollinearity, homoscedasticity and independence of errors were all 
met. As suggested by the correlation analysis, neither Eyes task nor age, nor any of 
the IQ scales were significant predictors of social cognitive ability. Examining 
regressions involving each IQ scale separately, the model which accounted for most 
of the variance in social cognition included nonverballQ, rather than full scale IQ or 
verbal IQ. However even then the total variance was only 12.6%, with the first step 
including Eyes task accounting for only 6.9% of the variability in social cognitive 
ability. When nonverballQ was included into the model at the next step, it accounted 
for only a further 5. 7% of the variance. The F -change value for both steps revealed 
that the addition of either variable did not make a difference to prediction of social 
cognitive ability: Step 1: F(1,16) = 1.19, p = 0.29; Step 2: F(2,15) = 1.08, p = 0.36. 
Thus the final model was not significantly better at predicting false belief 
understanding than using the CompSC mean as an estimate. 
As outlined in the introduction, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) suggest 
that development of social-perceptual ability is likely to continue throughout 
childhood. Acknowledging this and that social cognitive ability (and/or age/IQ) may 
influence social perceptual ability we conducted multiple regression analyses similar 
to above, but with Eyes task performance rather than CompSC as the dependent 
variable. We obtained similar findings with the exception that nonverbal IQ was 
found to be a significant predictor of social-perceptual ability at the 10% level (F = 
3.01, p = 0.10). Aside from this, there were no significant predictors of children's 
social-perceptual ability. In summary, irrespective of age or IQ, no relationship was 
88 
found (in either direction) between children's social-perceptual and social-cognitive 
abilities. 
5.2 Is social-perceptual ability related to a pass/fail measure of social-cognitive 
ability? 
While the previous section described analysis conducted in the context of a 
continuous overall social-cognitive measure, we now tum to analysis using a 
dichotomous measure of social cognition. Logistic regression analysis was used to 
investigate whether social-perceptual ability (or age/IQ) predicted children's ability 
to pass or fail social-cognition. Specifically, the overall social-cognitive variable 
(CompSC) was dichotomised to provide an indication of the extent to which the 
variables account for the ability of the individual to either pass or fail composite false 
belief stories. Thus the overall social-cognitive measure CompSC that was analysed 
within the previous section was dichotomised here by applying a passing criterion of 
50%. This level of achievement was applied by Wellman, Cross and Watson (2001) 
in their meta-analysis to determine the age at which children were liable to succeed 
on 50% of first-order trials. Therefore, this level was adopted here to enable 
confidence that those children classed as passers were displaying appropriate social-
cognitive responses by virtue of genuine understanding rather than guessing. Thus, 
children who had average social-cognitive (CompSC) scores greater than or equal to 
4 were classed as passers. Indeed, this relatively strict pass-level resulted in 53% of 
children being classed as failers despite nonetheless having answered some first and 
second-order questions correctly. The effect of this was to create a passing group 
who could consistently apply the necessary first-order and/or second-order 
justifications, whilst also offering the correct response to the control question. Thus, 
if similar findings to the multiple regression analysis were obtained here this would 
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substantiate the conclusions drawn from the preceding analysis. Further, this would 
instil confidence in our conclusions regarding how social-perceptual processing may 
be related to success or failure on tasks which tap social-cognition. 
In opting for the 50% criterion level, 4 7% of the TD group were classed as 
passers for their combined first and second-order ToM scores. Summary statistics 
can be seen in Table 5.3. It can be seen from Table 5.3 that the mean age of those 
children who can reliably pass a composite first-order and second-order false belief 
task was 5 years and 7 months. Furthermore, the children passing the composite 
social-cognitive task exhibited better performance on the social-perceptual Eyes task 
than children failing the SC task, however this difference was not significant: F( 1, 
17) = 2.1 0, p = 0.17. Unsurprisingly however, the SC passers displayed significantly 
better first-order and second-order belief understanding than the SC failers, both p < 
0.0 1. Therefore, as expected this suggests that those children who are more likely to 
pass combined first and second-order false belief tests such as this, show greater 
ability over both levels of false beliefunderstanding. The general better performance 
of passers than failers across the variables generally was explored in more depth via 
logistic regression. 
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Table 5.3 
Means and standard deviations for passers and Jailers of composite social-cognitive 
task 
Variable Passers (n = 9) F ailers (n = 1 0) 
M SD M SD 
Age (months) 67 5.77 71 8.67 
Eyes task (max. 28) 13.22 4.35 11.00 2.06 
First-order beliefs (max. 12) 9.78 2.91 5.60 3.17 
Second-order beliefs (max. 20) 13.78 4.30 3.60 3.13 
Full scale IQ 109.33 12.60 103.891 12.34 
Verbal IQ 106.33 11.78 105.221 17.43 
Nonverbal IQ 110.44 12.63 101.001 5.98 
1 Based on 9 children 
Stepwise logistic regression analyses were conducted to attempt to give some 
indication of the extent to which the various factors- age, Eyes task and IQ- may 
explain children's ability to pass or fail composite false-belief stories (i.e. the 
dichotomised measure ofCompSC). For each of the analyses the plot of 
unstandardized residuals revealed no obvious pattern, thus suggesting that the data 
were normal. Logistic regressions analyses revealed that including age and Eyes 
Task within the first block of the model did not predict social-cognitive success any 
better than when the constant was included: X2(2) = 4.64, n.s .. Wald statistics for both 
variables revealed that they were non-significant predictors: 1.76, n.s.; and 2.73, n.s 
respectively. The second block containing the three IQ scales did not predict social-
cognitive success any better: X2(3) = 6.46, n.s. Similarly to the two variables in the 
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first block, the Wald statistics revealed that all 3 IQ scales were not significant 
predictors of social-cognitive ability- full scale IQ: 1. 73, n.s.; verbal IQ: 0.03, n.s.; 
although nonverbal IQ approached significance as a predictor of children's social-
cognitive performance: 2.97, p < 0.09. This analysis corroborated the findings 
obtained in the multiple regression analysis, suggesting that as well as choosing an 
appropriate pass/fail criterion, that children's social-perceptual abilities and social-
cognitive abilities were not related. 
Discussion 
Investigation ofTager-Flusberg and Sullivan's (2000) componential model of 
theory of mind revealed that for typically developing 4- to 6-year-olds, social-
perceptual processing was not related to social-cognitive abilities. The absence of a 
relationship between social-perception and social cognition was contrary to the 
hypothesis. It had been expected that those children who were scoring more highly 
within the social-perceptual domain would also be scoring more highly within the 
social-cognitive domain (particularly second-order belief understanding). Such a 
relationship was anticipated in line with the arguments made by Baron-Cohen 
(1994), Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan, and Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) that the 
social-cognitive component of theory of mind builds on social-perceptual knowledge. 
However, it would appear that those children who are more able within the social-
perceptual domain do not necessarily possess more highly developed social-cognitive 
skills than children who are less able within the social-perceptual domain. This idea 
was reinforced by the finding obtained when a 50% pass/fail criterion was adopted 
for composite social-cognitive performance (i.e. combined first and second-order 
abilities). Although, social-cognitive passers scored more highly on the social-
perceptual Eyes task than social-cognitive failers, this difference was not significant. 
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This was especially interesting given that children performed relatively well within 
both domains- 79% of children scored above chance on the Eyes Task and 47% of 
the children were classed as passers of the social-cognitive task, indicating for both 
components that there was a relatively broad range of abilities. Given the argument 
that social-perceptual abilities precede social-cognitive abilities developmentally and 
given that it has been plausibly suggested that abilities within the latter domain 
would build upon earlier abilities (e.g., Tager-Flusberg & Joseph), what could 
explain the absence of a relationship between the social-perceptual and social-
cognitive components for typically developing 4- to 6-year-olds? 
It is possible that the children who were competent within the social-
cognitive domain acquired this ability at an earlier point within their development 
when the impact of social-perceptual processing skills would have been more 
influential. Furthermore, in taking a snapshot of social-perceptual processing across 
4- to 6-year-olds, the age-range may not have been low enough or broad enough 
within a developmental context to sufficiently distinguish between children whose 
social-perceptual abilities were already well established compared to those children 
whose social-perceptual ability had just emerged - only 21% of children failed to 
score above chance on the Eyes task, confirming our earlier hypothesis that a higher 
proportion than 8% of 6- to 8-year-olds tested in Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, 
et al. 's study (200 1) would fail to score above chance. These concerns could be 
investigated in a future study which implements a longitudinal or cross-sectional 
design in younger children to examine how social-perceptual skills may develop into, 
or be built upon by, social-cognitive skills, and thus provide a clearer picture which 
is perhaps more sensitive to the developmental timing associated with these abilities. 
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This breadth of perspective is addressed in the next chapter as we look more broadly 
across the domains of social perception and social cognition. 
Another possible explanation for the absence of a relationship between these 
two components in typically developing children could be that social-cognitive skills 
do build upon/are predicted by social-perceptual performance; however, it may be 
that the social-perceptual skills which are critical for social-cognitive development 
are more basic in nature than those examined in the current study. For instance, 
attribution of mental states through on-line judgement of emotions or thoughts 
expressed in the eyes, as represented by the Eyes task, provides a more advanced 
measure of social-perceptual processing than, say, joint attention or gaze-following. 
Thus it may be that earlier social experiences which expose the child to social-
orienting situations and joint attention behaviours are more critical to subsequent 
social-cognitive development in childhood than more complex social-processing 
skills. Indeed, Clements and Perner ( 1994) suggested that children's eye gaze may 
reflect implicit knowledge of social-cognitive measures such as false belief and 
Baron-Cohen (1994, 2005) proposed that children's joint attention abilities are 
necessary but not sufficient for social-cognitive understanding. The relative 
importance of earlier and later social-perceptual skills for subsequent social-cognitive 
development could be investigated via a study which compares performance on tasks 
which tap these earlier and later skills, e.g., a gaze-monitoring task (Scaife & Bruner, 
1975) and the Eyes Task (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, et al., 2001). Again, 
this line of thought will be pursued in the following chapter by extending the focus of 
investigation back from social perception to lower level aspects of social 
understanding. 
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Another alternative explanation for the absence of a relationship between the 
social-perceptual and social-cognitive domains in typically developing children is 
based on the idea that performance within both domains is mediated by a third factor 
such as language. Indeed, Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) suggest that as well as a 
direct link from social perception to social cognition, language may mediate this 
relationship. Verbal IQ was not significantly related to either social perception or 
social cognition within the present study; however, it may be that more general 
language abilities such as syntax (e.g., de Villiers, 2000) and receptive vocabulary 
(e.g., Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002) are involved in linking social perception and 
social cognition. This point will be addressed further in the next chapter by 
investigating various aspects of language in conjunction with social perception and 
social cognition. 
In summary, the absence of a significant relationship between social 
perception and social cognition contradicted the original hypothesis and the claims of 
Tager-Flusberg and colleagues (2000, 2005) and Baron-Cohen (1995). This 
unexpected finding is unlikely to be due to the new scoring system adopted to 
provide a continuous measure of social-cognitive ability since the original scoring 
system produced similar findings. However the absence of a link between social 
perception and social cognition may be due to testing a small sample size. Given this 
and the conjecture outlined above to explain the non-significant relationship, it was 
apparent that a broader and more complex investigation was required to explore these 
issues further. The following chapter provides a literature review of the issues 
surrounding these aspects of children's social understanding in the context of social 
cognition, social perception, social attention and language, before empirically testing 
the interrelationships between these four constituents. 
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Chapter 6 
Exploring the componential model more broadly: 
What does a model of social understanding actually 
constitute for typically developing children? 
Introduction 
Various suggestions were proposed in the previous chapter to explain the 
absence of a relationship between social perception and social cognition in 4- to 6-
year-olds. This chapter explored these suggestions further and broadened the scope 
of the thesis in order to address the overarching aim of the thesis: to elucidate the 
constituents and continuity of children's social understanding. In order to appreciate 
the wider scope of this investigation, prior to outlining and testing various 
hypotheses, this chapter first provides a more detailed review of the key literature 
within the domains of social cognition, social perception, social attention and 
language. 
6.1 Measures of social cognition 
Traditionally social cognition is the domain which has been focused upon 
when investigating children's social understanding. While the multitude of studies 
identifying the links between social relations and theory of mind has necessarily 
broadened the theoretical focus of children's social understanding beyond simply 
looking at their false belief understanding (Hughes & Leekam, 2004), equally it is 
important "not to overlook the specific importance that false belief understanding 
may have both as a conceptual development in and of itself..." (de Rosnay & 
Hughes, 2006, p. 12). The previous chapters have outlined the focus that has been 
given to false belief understanding and social cognition thus far and underlined the 
importance ofthis area within children's development. Chapter 2 described the 
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facilitative effect which ignorance has upon children's second-order belief 
performance. Recognising the need for greater specificity within false belief tasks, 
chapter 3 outlined false-belief stories which importantly excluded any ignorance 
questions. These composite social-cognitive stories were also developed to allow the 
testing of first-order and second-order mental states in parallel. This culmination saw 
the design of a composite first -order and second-order false belief methodology 
which produced levels of understanding comparable to studies which had assessed 
these aspects separately. Given this comparability alongside the apparent benefit of a 
composite story, and to allow continuity of methodology within the thesis, children's 
social cognition was tested here using two of the composite stories which had been 
developed in chapter 3. 
While performance on the two composite false-belief stories was combined to 
create an aggregate score reflecting children's false belief understanding, these 
stories were also adapted here to provide an additional social-cognitive task. By 
simply using the same story format but adapting story questions to reflect children's 
understanding of first-order and second-order ignorance rather than belief, it was 
possible to tap into another aspect of children's social cognition. This additional 
focus also provided continuity from the themes discussed in chapter 2 and allowed 
further investigation of the relationship between the mental states of ignorance and 
belief. Both composite ignorance stories and both composite false belief stories are 
outlined in Appendix 6.1. Given the facilitative effect of ignorance upon belief 
understanding as discussed in chapter 2, it was expected that children who performed 
better within composite ignorance tasks would also display better performance within 
composite belief tasks. It was anticipated that the two composite tasks would provide 
a brief, yet sufficiently comprehensive measure of children's social cognition. 
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6.2 Reviewing the construct of social perception 
Of the four constructs to be investigated, it is social perception and social 
attention which have been more recently introduced in the field and tend to be more 
ambiguous in nature. Although specified within the models ofTager-Flusberg and 
Sullivan (2000) and Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) the domain of social 
perception remains an ambiguous constituent of children's social understanding. 
Tager-Flusberg and colleagues defined it as: the on-line immediate judgement of a 
person's mental state based on perceptual information (e.g., from the face or the 
voice) and posed the question of whether it was exclusively based on perception or 
always included some level of emotion processing. Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan 
suggested that affect is integral to this component given the role of the amygdala in 
processing of social-perceptual tasks ( cf. Baron-Cohen, et al., 1999; Pierce, Muller, 
Ambrose, Allen, & Courchesne, 2001). This has been corroborated by 
neuropsychological studies which identify the amygdala as playing a central role in 
face processing (e.g., Whalen et al., 1998) and monitoring gaze direction (e.g., 
George, Driver, & Dolan, 2001 ). Yet, this latter finding considers joint attention type 
abilities rather than social-perceptual abilities and may partly explain why Tager-
Flusberg and Joseph refer to such abilities within the specification of their social-
perceptual component. However, it seems apparent that a higher level of processing 
is required for social perception in comparison to social attention- i.e. as mentioned 
by Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan, versions of Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong et 
al.'s (2001) Eyes Task are likely to provide a sensitive measure of children's social-
perceptual abilities and require children to attribute mental states such as excited 
based on their perception of people's facial expressions or voices. Indeed, a recent 
study (Skwerer, Verbalis, Schofield, Faja, & Tager-Flusberg, 2006) defined social-
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perceptual ability in terms of performance on the Eyes task. Conversely, as explained 
earlier, social attention (which Tager-Flusberg presents within the social-perceptual 
component) generally involves the child's emerging understanding of other people as 
intentional beings in terms of such abilities as joint attention and social referencing. 
Therefore, given the apparently more simplistic nature of processing within the social 
attention domain, it could be anomalous for Tager-Flusberg and colleagues to define 
a social-perceptual component which encompasses both levels of processing. For this 
reason, it seemed sensible to distinguish in this study between the domains of social 
perception and social attention (the latter construct being defined in terms of joint 
attention and social orienting as outlined in the following section). Support for this 
distinction is provided in a recent study (Morales, Mundy, Crowson, Neal, & 
Delgado, 2005) which examined social attention and social-perceptual type abilities 
separately and, consistent with previous findings, found that infants' joint attention 
abilities and ability to follow gaze at 6 months were both significantly correlated 
with emotion regulation strategy use at 24 months of age. 
Interpreting the social-perceptual construct as originally defined by Tager-
Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) with an emphasis on the online attribution of mental 
states, social perception is focused on here in terms of children's ability to attribute 
mental states to facial expressions. Few studies thus far have examined how social-
perception relates to social attention or social cognition in typically developing 
children. However, informed by findings from studies of children with autism, 
Schultz (2005) argues that the development of social perception (processing of faces) 
and social-cognitive skills are supported by the amygdala and fusiform face area. 
Akin to Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005), Schultz proposed that these abilities are 
linked during development such that growth in social-perceptual skills provides an 
99 
important scaffold for social-cognitive development. The lack of association between 
children's social-perceptual abilities and social-cognitive skills in the previous 
chapter may have been due to the relatively small sample of children who were 
tested. Alternatively, this may have been due to the Eyes task which was used 
possibly not tapping into social-perceptual abilities per se. These concerns were 
addressed here through testing a large sample of children and by examining social 
perception more broadly than solely using the Eyes task (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Spong, et al., 2001). 
The construct of social perception was examined via two additional social-
perceptual tasks- the Affect task and the Friendliness task. The animated full facial 
expression comprehension test (Affect) task first described in a study by Gagliardi et 
al. (2003) was developed to avoid ceiling effects since expressions such as happiness 
traditionally produce such levels of performance within facial expression recognition 
tasks (Vicari, Reilly, Pasqualetti, Vizzotto, & Caltagirone, 2000). The Affect task 
aimed to avoid this by virtue of varying the level of expression intensity within the 
presentation of faces (see the Method section for further detail). Although infants can 
display facial expression recognition abilities, previous studies have found that full 
development of these social-perceptual abilities does not occur until much later in 
life. However, no research had looked at these abilities across a wide age range. To 
address this void, Burt et al. (in submission) examined children's performance on the 
Affect task in a cross-sectional study of children between ages 4 to 14. Burt et al. 
found that these abilities developed throughout the age range, suggesting that using 
such a task with 4- to 5-year-olds would elicit a range of ability. Moreover, while 
expertise in verbally labelling basic emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness- the five expressions examined within the Affect task) would seem to be 
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achieved around this age (since related words are commonly used by the age of 4 
(Wellman, Harris, Banerjee, & Sinclair, 1995)), a more recent study indicated that 
the ability to label anger, fear, disgust, and surprise improved with age from ages 5 to 
6 through to 9 tolO (Vicari et al.). Furthermore, while there is inevitably a degree of 
language involved in such a task (in a similar manner to the Eyes task), since the 
development of facial expression recognition labelling improves well beyond the age 
of 5 (Vicari et al.) it is unlikely that linguistic skill can fully account for this. 
Therefore, the Affect task seemed an appropriate task to use with the typically 
developing 4- to 5-year-olds in this study as a measure of their social-perceptual 
abilities. 
In the aim to provide a broad measure of children's social-perceptual abilities, 
the Friendliness task - based closely on a task used by Frigerio et al. (2006) - was 
also employed. This was similar to the two other social-perceptual tasks in that 
children had to inspect pictures of people's facial expressions, but required the child 
to infer the friendliness of the pictured person on the basis of their facial expression. 
Unlike the Affect task, yet like the Eyes task, the Friendliness task consists of static 
rather than animated faces. However, it is similar to the Affect task in that children 
have only 5 mental state labels (ranging from very friendly to very unfriendly) to 
choose from throughout the task rather than the multitude of mental state terms used 
in the Eyes task. The level of inference required to predict the person's friendliness 
suggests that it may be an intrinsically more complex test than the Affect task, but is 
likely to be linguistically simpler for 4- to 5-year-olds than both the Eyes and Affect 
tasks. Given the normal distribution of 5- to 6-year-olds' scores on the Eyes task as 
described in chapter 5, as well as the range in performance on Affect/Friendliness 
type tasks expected of 4- to 5-year-olds as described above, it was expected that the 
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three tasks employed here would elicit a range of social-perceptual ability in 
typically developing 4- to 5-year-olds and that these tasks would be strongly 
interrelated. 
6.3 Discussing the new construct of social attention 
The social attention construct was explored here primarily via joint attention 
ability. Joint attention can be defined as the ability to use nonverbal behaviour to 
share the experience of objects and events with others and is probably the simplest 
form of attention (Butterworth & Jarrett, 1991). Whether in terms of Baron-Cohen's 
(1994, 2005) models, Tager-Flusberg and Joseph's model (2005), or more recently, 
Carpendale and Lewis' (2006) theory, joint attention is presented some role or 
another in the development of children's social understanding. In both of Baron-
Cohen's modular mindreading models, joint attention ability is subsumed within the 
shared attention mechanism (SAM) module which precedes the theory of mind 
mechanism (ToMM) ~see Chapter 4 for a discussion of these mechanisms. 
By viewing social understanding in its broader sense, Carpendale and Lewis 
(2004, 2006) also focus on possible early forms of social understanding acting as 
precursors to later social cognition. With a strong emphasis on the basic beginnings 
of social interaction, Carpendale and Lewis suggest that early social understanding 
skills emerge from triadic interactions between children and their parents or siblings, 
with the focus very much on action. Joint attention is integral to such interaction 
which provides a supportive context to then allow the child to construct socially 
available information. They also argue that the ability to talk about mental states 
within action will be critical to the child's development of social understanding. 
Therefore, although Baron-Cohen (1994, 2005), and Carpendale and Lewis (2006) 
suggest different mechanisms by which joint attention may manifest itself within the 
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wider context of social understanding, they each appreciate the benefit of a 
developmental perspective and acknowledge that joint abilities necessary for 
interaction are likely to be an early precursor to later more complex social 
understanding. Such a view is integral to the broader definition of children's theory 
of mind. As Flavell (2004) remarked on this broader venture: "One exciting future 
prospect is the possibility of telling longer and richer developmental stories in key 
sectors of theory-of-mind development." (p. 284). 
While Baron-Cohen (1994, 2005) and Carpendale and Lewis (2006) suggest 
these mechanisms by which joint attention ability may figure within the context of 
children's social understanding, how do these correspond with empirical findings? 
Studies by Moore and Corkum (1994) and Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner (1993) 
suggested that joint attention is at the origin of intentional understanding and this 
lays the foundation for more complex social understanding. Lee, Eskrit, Symons, and 
Muir ( 1998) reported that there was little evidence up to that point indicating when 
and how young children develop the ability to use triadic eye-gaze for more 
advanced social understanding like "mindreading". A study conducted by Charman 
et al. (2000) found that only a certain aspect of joint attention behaviour (gaze 
switches between adult and toy and looking to adult during an ambiguous task) at 20 
months old was longitudinally associated with social cognition at 44 months. This 
led them to argue that joint attention, language and theory of mind may feature as 
part of a shared social-communicative representational system which becomes 
increasingly specialised and differentiated throughout development. 
Therefore, some earlier forms of social understanding like certain aspects of 
joint attention may be early manifestations of later social cognition, but which 
become sufficiently different by ages 3 to 4 onwards such that they are no longer 
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significantly positively related. There may be a logical connection between joint 
attention and social cognition via language, but as Miller (2006) argues, there needs 
to be further investigation of a direct relationship between this aspect of social 
attention and social cognition. Despite the benefit of a longitudinal approach, 
Charman et al. 's (2000) findings were based on a small sample of children (n =13) 
and the theory of mind tasks were not representational. However, this importance of 
timing was corroborated in a study by Morales et al. (2000) in which they found a 
positive association between the ability to respond to joint attention bids and 
vocabulary development in 6- to 18-month-old infants but not in 21- to 24-month old 
children. 
Since joint attention abilities typically appear from 10- to 14-months-old 
(Corkum & Moore, 1998) it may be expected that by ages 4 and 5, developmental 
timing is less important since joint attention ability would have been expected to 
reach ceiling level. However, while studies have shown that children can reliably 
determine others focus of attention by 18 months (Butterworth & Jarrett, 1991) and 
begin to use triadic eye gaze at 18 months for referential communication purposes 
such as word learning (Baldwin, 1993), no studies as yet have identified an upper age 
limit with 100% consistency in joint attention responses. Indeed, Leekam, Baron-
Cohen, Perrett, Milders, and Brown ( 1997) found a similar success rate to infants 
with 75% of 5-year-olds correctly following the gaze of another person to a specific 
object or event. However, Leekam et al. 's finding was based on a small sample and 
although they had suggested that the lack of improvement in joint attention ability 
could be due to these older children being socially inhibited to follow the gaze of 
another person, they also suggested that a much larger sample would be required to 
determine if the 75% finding holds in 4- to 5-year-olds. Therefore, since the children 
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within the present study were 4- to 5-year-olds and since a large sample of children 
were to be tested, the joint attention measure selected was based on that of Leekam et 
al. It was expected that the children who were more responsive to attention bids 
would exhibit better social-perceptual, social-cognitive and language skills than the 
children who were less so. 
It was also of interest to establish how joint attention ability may relate to 
another low-level attention-based aspect of social understanding: namely, social 
orienting. This involves the ability to orient attention to objects or events and differs 
from joint attention in that the object or event itself attracts the child's attention 
initially rather than the gaze of another person. A study by Swettenham et al. ( 1998) 
showed that typically developing infants shifted attention between an object and a 
person more than between an object and another object whereas children with autism 
showed the opposite pattern, indicating a natural propensity within typical 
development to focus upon social stimuli. Social orienting has been investigated 
further by Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi, and Brown ( 1998) and Dawson et 
al. (2004). Using an improved methodology in their latter study Dawson et al. also 
showed that there was a distinction between children's ability to orient to social and 
non-social stimuli. They tested this by presenting 8 sound stimuli consisting of 4 
social sounds and 4 non-social sounds to 12- to 46-month-old typically developing 
children and 3- to 4-year-old children with autism. While the main experimenter 
interacted with the child, a second experimenter (in the background) presented each 
of these sounds three times in succession. Dawson et al. (2004) found that typical 
children reacted more quickly to social stimuli than non-social stimuli; however, this 
was not the case for children with autism. They also found a relationship between 
social orienting ability and joint attention ability in typically developing children ( 1-
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to 3-year-olds). Leekam and Ramsden (2006) also found that children's dyadic social 
orienting abilities were strongly related to their triadic joint attention abilities. 
Therefore, given these findings and given the likely similarity in the levels of 
processing required for joint attention and orienting, a social orienting measure was 
included in this study for three reasons. Firstly, at least two measures of social 
attention were required in order to investigate this construct more broadly in and of 
itself, and in its relation to other aspects of social understanding using structural 
equation modelling. Secondly, an attempt was made to adapt and improve the 
methodology used by Dawson et al. (2004) as the author believed there was an 
inherent flaw in the nature of their method (discussed below). Thirdly, given that 
responses to social and non-social stimuli is markedly different in children with 
autism, using this task with typically developing children here enabled the cross-
study comparison of social orienting abilities in children with autism in chapter 7. In 
terms of the typically developing children tested here, it was expected that joint 
attention and social orienting abilities would be significantly positively related. 
6.4 Language links to social understanding 
As outlined earlier, both Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) and Carpendale 
and Lewis (2006) have articulated a significant role for language within the 
development of children's social understanding. Tager-Flusberg and Joseph have 
specified this within terms of language development (in particular, syntax) which 
then influences children's representational understanding. On the other hand, 
Carpendale and Lewis describe the role of language in terms of children's ability to 
talk about mental states within action, whereby the meaning of language is 
constructed within the child's interactions and ultimately leads to development of 
their social-cognitive abilities. Thus, via different mechanisms both theories suggest 
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that language development acts as a foundation for social-cognitive development (see 
also Garfield et al., 2001). This view contrasts with Bloom (2000) who suggests that 
language development depends on children's social understanding abilities, albeit in 
terms of early emerging aspects such as social attention and social perception rather 
than traditional social-cognitive understanding. Therefore, there are questions of 
causality and the direction of the relationship, both of which are further complicated 
depending on the concept of theory of mind which is applied (i.e. broad vs. narrow). 
The broad definition of theory of mind/social understanding as embraced here can 
reconcile findings in both directions by acknowledging that low-level abilities within 
social attention and social perception can facilitate word learning (Baldwin & Moses, 
2001; Brooks & Meltzoff, 2005; Morales et al., 2000), and also recognising that 
language abilities such as syntactic skill can then facilitate more complex social 
understanding in terms of representational understanding as evidenced on false belief 
tasks (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000). In an attempt to 
further delineate the role of language in children's social understanding, the last few 
years have seen several longitudinal and training studies delving into this area. So 
what do the empirical findings from these studies suggest about the link between 
language and social understanding? 
Although the relation between early forms of social understanding and 
language is mentioned above (e.g., Brooks & Meltzoff, 2005) the majority of studies 
thus far, (whether intervention or longitudinal studies) have investigated how 
language relates to social-cognitive aspects of social understanding. Intervention 
studies by Hale and Tager-Flusberg (2003) and Lohmann and Tomasello (2003) gave 
preschool children training conditions which included focus on false beliefs or 
syntactic ability (via sentence complements). Both studies found that children who 
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had received syntax training had significantly improved false belief understanding by 
the end of training; in contrast the children who received false belief training only did 
not improve their language skills. These findings suggest that children's language, 
specifically syntactic ability, acts as a significant contributor to children's social 
cognition. This is corroborated by longitudinal research - after 4 training sessions, de 
Villiers and Pyers (2002) found that the strongest predictor of preschoolers' ability to 
understand false beliefs was mastery of tensed complements, again suggesting that 
such syntactic ability is likely to be a necessary precursor for successful false belief 
performance. In another longitudinal study, Slade and Ruffman (2005) tested a larger 
group of similarly aged children on various language and false belief tasks. Although 
Slade and Ruffman also found syntactic ability to be a contributor to children's later 
false belief understanding, syntax did not play a unique role and contrary to the 
aforementioned studies, they found a bidirectional relation between language and 
theory of mind. Thus, it is clear that certain aspects of language are necessary for 
children's social-cognitive development; however it is also apparent that early forms 
of social understanding can facilitate word learning and language development 
generally. Therefore, in the context of the present study it was important to examine 
language in conjunction with early and later aspects of social understanding. 
In an attempt to further unravel the relationship between language and social 
understanding, a construct of language was examined in the current study in parallel 
with the three social understanding constructs. Reflecting on the empirical evidence, 
the two main aspects of language which were focused upon in this study were 
vocabulary acquisition and syntactic ability. The former was investigated since 
children's vocabulary acquisition appears to stem from early forms of social 
understanding (e.g., Baldwin & Moses, 2001) and the latter since this has been 
108 
implicated as a causal precursor to children's social-cognitive development (e.g., de 
Villiers & de Villiers, 2000). The British Picture Vocabulary Scale (2nd edition) 
(Dunn, Dunn, & NFER-Nelson, 1997) was used to measure children's vocabulary 
levels. Many studies have used this measure, demonstrating a link between children's 
verbal abilities and their false belief understanding (Carlson et al., 2002; Cutting & 
Dunn, 1999; Happe, 1995). In addition, using this measure enabled a group of 
children with autism to be verbally matched to a subset of the typically developing 
group in a similar study described in chapter 7. 
To measure children's syntactic ability a parental questionnaire was used: the 
Children's Communication Checklist (2nd edition) (Bishop, 2003). This was used for 
three reasons: firstly, this produces a composite scale indicating general 
communication ability, but more importantly for the present investigation it assesses 
performance across individual scales oflanguage including a syntax scale. Secondly, 
amid the battery of tasks which children were tested upon, it was desirable to use a 
measure which assessed children's abilities in an everyday setting - completion of 
this questionnaire by parents gave a valuable opportunity for a natural perspective on 
children's language. Thirdly, given the processing load involved for children in 
completing the range of social understanding and language tasks, it was beneficial to 
use a measure which could inform us of their language abilities without requiring 
further effort from the children. In addition to these two language measures, a final 
language measure was included - the Wechsler abbreviated scale of intelligence 
(WAS I) (Wechsler, 1997) to broaden the investigation of children's language 
function. Using the short form ofthis test provides a brief measure ofiQ based on an 
expressive vocabulary test and a non-verbal matrix reasoning test. Therefore, given 
the inclusion of this vocabulary measure and since IQ has been linked with 
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performance on false belief tests (e.g., Green, Pring & Swettenham, 2004), it was 
anticipated that this would provide a complementary insight, primarily into its 
relation with social cognition. 
In order to fully address the central aim of clarifying the constituents of social 
understanding, this study required not only analysis of the relationships between the 
four components, but also analysis of the relationships within components. While 
social cognition and language are both relatively well-defined constructs, the other 
two components ofTager-Flusberg and Joseph's (2005) model, namely social 
attention and social perception, are comparatively new and as such are less clearly 
defined. For instance, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) asked whether social 
perception was based exclusively on perception or whether it always entailed an 
affective component. Also, what Tager-Flusberg and Joseph call attention to social 
information has been termed here as social attention. This may seem congruent but 
their definition does not necessarily coincide with our view that social attention 
incorporates joint attention. It appears from Tager-Flusberg and Joseph's account that 
joint attention would be classified within the social-perceptual level of 
understanding. Furthermore, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan describe the Eyes task 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) as a measure of social-perception, yet this task is 
inherently different in nature to the kind of ability which would be required for joint 
attention. Therefore, although the social-perceptual component has existed since 
Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan first proposed it within their componential view, there 
has not been elucidation or expansion on the nature of this construct and the type of 
understanding it should encompass. Evidently, there are issues of definition and 
specificity which surround the domains they describe. Therefore, in conjunction with 
the central aim of the present chapter which was to examine the interrelationship 
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between constructs, I attempted to address the issue of definition within constructs by 
looking at performance across several tasks within each domain of social 
understanding (as well as language). 
6.5 Summwy of hypotheses 
To reiterate, the overarching aim of the present study was to better understand 
the constituents of children's social understanding and how they relate to language. 
This is to be addressed through a comprehensive exploration of the interrelationships 
within and between the constructs of social cognition, social perception, social 
attention and language. Within constructs it was expected that the measures chosen 
would be positively correlated. Therefore, within social cognition it was expected 
that children's performance on composite false belief and composite ignorance tasks 
would be correlated; within social perception it was expected that performance across 
the Eyes task, Affect task, and friendliness task would be strongly related; within 
social attention it was expected that joint attention and social orienting abilities 
would be linked; and finally within language, abilities as measured on the BPVS, 
syntax scale of the CCC-2 and W ASI were expected to be positively correlated. 
In terms of the relationships between constructs, based on the above 
discussion of each construct and the general framework of Tager-Flusberg and 
Joseph's (2005) model, the following hypotheses were predicted. While we would 
expect a strong relationship between the social attention and social cognition 
constructs as has been clearly proposed by the literature on both typical and atypical 
development, it is not clear whether the association between social attention and 
social cognition would still be found on a concurrent basis in 4-to 5-year-olds. For 
typical children, cognitive and social developmental change might mean that infants 
'grow out' of their reliance on social attention and do not use it alongside other forms 
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of social cognition- in other words, it might provide a building block 
developmentally but not be actually concurrently associated with social cognition 
when children are older. On the other hand, social and cognitive development may 
take a different path for children with autism so that the outcome in early and mid 
childhood might lead to a concurrent relation. However, because there is no clear 
indication in the literature whether a concurrent relationship would be found or not-
in other words there is insufficient evidence to tell. Therefore, it is hypothesised in 
line with Tager-Flusberg and Joseph, and Baron-Cohen (1994) that: i) there will be a 
concurrent relationship between social attention and social cognition. ii) In a similar 
way and in terms of these componential models, a significant positive association 
would also be expected between the constructs of social attention and social 
perception. iii) Tager-Flusberg's original model and more recent model would both 
predict that children's social-perceptual and social-cognitive abilities would be 
strongly correlated. iv) and v) The model ofTager-Flusberg and Joseph would also 
suggest that both of these abilities are positively correlated with children's language 
competence. vi) Finally, it is hypothesised that language will be closely tied to 
children's social attention abilities and act as a potential mediator for later social 
understanding. 
Method 
Participants 
127 typically developing children comprising 66 girls and 61 boys from 6 
primary schools in the north of England and central Scotland participated in this 
study. Children's ages ranged from 4 years and 3 months to 5 years and 11 months, 
with a mean age of 5 years and 2 months (SO: 5 months). The size of the sample was 
necessary to meet the criteria necessary for conducting Structural Equation 
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Modelling (SEM) analysis (at least 10 subjects per variable, with 10 variables being 
measured) and to obtain adequate power. Using the G*Power analysis program 
(Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) in consultation with a statistician it was 
calculated that a power of 0.9 could be achieved with a medium effect size (0.15) by 
having a sample size no fewer than 108 children while exploring 4 constructs. The 
size of the sample comfortably met these criteria. None of the children participating 
in earlier studies took part in the present study. 
2 Social-Cognitive Tasks 
False-belief stories 
Two combined first-order and second-order false-belief stories were used. 
These stories were developed and tested in earlier research with a different sample of 
children (see chapters 3 and 5). To recap: these stories were based on two characters 
and a particular object. Character A hides an object X and thinks that Character B 
still believes X to be in its original location. However, unbeknown to A, B sees A 
hide X in the new location. First-order and second-order false-belief questions appear 
at appropriate points in the narrative. Both are followed by justification questions and 
children are also asked one control question. The two composite false-belief stories 
and their corresponding questions are presented again in Appendix 6.1. 
Ignorance stories 
Children were given two composite first-order and second-order ignorance 
stories which were adapted to have the same structure as the composite false-belief 
stories. The only difference was that the test questions refer to characters knowledge 
states rather than beliefs, i.e. "Does A know that B knows where X is .. ?" As for the 
false-belief stories, the ignorance stories were acted out with various props by the 
experimenter during the story-telling. The two ignorance stories and their 
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corresponding questions can also be seen in Appendix 6.1. Since the format of the 4 
composite stories here was the same as those discussed in chapters 3 and 5, for 
consistency the same scoring procedure was implemented to allow comparison with 
the average composite false-belief scores described in earlier chapters and to offer a 
broad scale of social-cognitive understanding for the variables to be investigated in 
later analyses. 
Scoring 
To summarise the scoring procedure outlined in chapter 5: for all4 social-
cognitive stories, children were awarded one point for a correct response to first-
order and second-order test questions. Correct justifications to first-order questions 
were awarded 2 points, while correct justifications to second-order questions were 
awarded 4 points. Thus, with a maximum of8 points for each story, an average false-
belief score (range: 0-8) and an average ignorance score (range: 0-8) was created. 
When an incorrect response to the control question was combined with incorrect 
justifications, the child's score for that particular story was marked as zero. 
Furthermore, to distinguish between children who answered all 5 story questions 
correctly from children who provide an incorrect response only to the control 
question, the children within this latter scenario had one point deducted (i.e. they 
would have a story score of 7, rather than 8 as obtained by children correctly 
answering all 5 questions). As was previously indicated in chapter 5, such a novel 
scoring system provides a wide-ranging possible score while importantly penalising 
children who give wrong answers to control questions and giving extra credit for the 
intricacy of the answer required for a correct justification response. 
3 Social-Perceptual Tasks 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (as previously used in chapter 5) 
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This child version of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Spong et al., 2001) consisted of 28 pictures of human faces which 
display only the person's eye region. The child was required to pick one of 4 words 
situated around the picture that best described what the person in the picture is 
thinking or feeling, with only one of the four words being the correct answer. The 
general procedure of this task is described in chapter 5 (pp. 83-84). However, unlike 
in chapter 5 where the stimuli were presented on paper, stimuli were presented here 
via a computer screen with all pictures of equal size (approximately 13.9cm x 5.5cm) 
appearing individually in the centre of the screen. To recap, the child was asked to 
look carefully at the picture, with the four words appearing equidistant from the 
picture of the eyes, and then to choose the word which best described what the 
person in the picture was thinking or feeling. Beginning with a practice item, the 
words were slowly read out and pointed to by the experimenter to ensure that the 
child knew which word was which. The experimenter randomly varied the order in 
which each set of four words was read aloud to reduce the likelihood of the child 
responding due to a word being in a certain location. Given the younger age of the 
children here compared to those described in chapter 5, there was more need to 
explain to the child what some of the words meant - for example, the mental state 
"surprised" may be described to the child as: "A person might be surprised if they get 
a birthday party that they did not know about." The experimenter gave encouraging 
feedback without revealing whether the child had responded correctly or not. If the 
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child was unsure of the best word to respond with, then the experimenter encouraged 
the child to guess, as per the task instructions. 
Affect task 
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An adapted version of the Animated Full Facial Expression Comprehension 
Test (Affect) (Gagliardi et al., 2003) was used and differed from the original task 
only in the sense that the range of stimuli also incorporated the faces of two children, 
rather than solely adult faces - it was deemed that the adapted task would be more 
suitable for young children. The child was presented with pictures on a computer 
screen of people's faces that showed one of 5 basic emotions - happy, sad, angry, 
frightened and disgusted. The child had to choose one of the emotional states that 
they believed corresponded with each animated picture. Five practice trials were 
given prior to the presentation of 4 blocks and each block contained 21 trials. Five 
possible emotions were each trialled once within the practice session, and then 
presented in a randomized order within each block; happy was presented 5 times 
while the 4 remaining emotions were presented 4 times. Also, the pictures varied in 
terms of the degree to which the face was animated - each of the emotional 
expressions was animated from a neutral state to 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of the 
point to which the expression was full-blown, depending on the intensity of 
expression which was required, at which point the picture was then 'frozen'. The 
additional one happy trial within each block was animated to 10% of its peak 
expression. 
Procedure 
Prior to administration of this task, the experimenter first explained to the 
child what would be presented on the screen and told the child to choose the emotion 
label corresponding to the expression that the child believed the pictured person to be 
feeling. To ease children's anxiety and to ensure the child understood the 5 emotions 
to be presented, the experimenter asked the child if they could explain and 
demonstrate each of the emotions. If the child showed any difficulty with this then 
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the experimenter gave an example of an occasion when someone might feel that 
particular emotion before demonstrating the appropriate facial expression. Once the 
child had indicated that they understood, the experimenter began the test. The picture 
ofthe face (measuring approximately 13.2cm x 8.5cm) was displayed in the centre of 
the screen with each of the 5 emotion labels to the left. Each of the pictures was one 
of 4 people - a man, a woman, a boy or a girl. If the child was unsure of an answer 
then the experimenter encouraged the child to guess as there was a chance they may 
choose the correct answer. Given the length ofthis task (approximately 15 minutes to 
complete), a short rest was allowed between blocks to allow the child to concentrate 
fully on the next block. 
Depending on the child's competence, the answers chosen were either pointed 
to, spoken aloud, or if the child was comfortable using the computer mouse then 
entered directly by the child (after saying the answer aloud to ensure the child was 
clicking on the appropriate label). Children's answers for this test as well as the two 
other social perceptual tasks were stored in the computer and checked afterwards to 
determine their individual score for each task. As for the Eyes task, children received 
one point for every correct response, in this case giving a possible total score of 84. 
Friendliness task 
The format of this task was similar to the Affect task in terms of the 
presentation of pictures of faces on a computer screen and choosing emotion labels 
corresponding to the expression in the picture. However, this time the pictures were 
not animated and the child had to determine whether the person pictured looked 
friendly or unfriendly. Similarly to the Affect task, the child could choose from 5 
labels, but on this occasion the labels varied along a scale from very friendly to very 
unfriendly. The other labels were quitefi-iendly, quite unfriendly and neither- it was 
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explained to children to choose neither if the face looked neither friendly nor 
unfriendly or if the child was unsure and could not decide either way. As mentioned 
earlier, the wording of these 5 labels was likely to make this task linguistically 
simpler than the two other social-perceptual tasks, while still testing social 
understanding at a relatively complex level. Also, prior to beginning the task, the 
child was asked to explain what features would make a person friendly or unfriendly. 
If a child was unable to do this then the experimenter aided children's understanding 
by describing example situations in which a person may be friendly or unfriendly. 
The task itself consisted of 24 colour pictures, presented individually, showing either 
a male face (10.5 x 7.8cm) or a female face (9.6 x 8.7cm), with the 5 labels presented 
to the left of the picture with ve1yfriendly appearing as the top label sequencing 
down to ve1y unfdendly as the bottom label. For each presentation the experimenter 
read the five words aloud randomly starting with either the uppermost or lowermost 
term until the point at which the child had evidently grasped the various terms and 
was able to offer their responses spontaneously. If children pointed to the response 
then the experimenter asked the child to also say their choice to ensure that the child 
was pointing at the response which was intended. For some children it was necessary 
to list all five possible responses throughout all of the pictures. 
The picture stimuli that were presented within the Friendliness task 
represented a morph between neutral and angry faces. Previous work with similar 
stimuli (Frigerio et al., 2006) has shown that individuals see angrier faces as less 
friendly. In the current study, the slope of the regression line relating each child's 
ratings of the friendliness of each of the face stimuli (ratings between 1 (least 
friendly) to 5 (mostfriendly)) to the intensity of the anger in the face stimuli was used 
as the measure of sensitivity to the friendliness of people in the pictures. This was 
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scored in terms of a gradient with positive scores furthest from zero indicating that 
children were most adept at determining whether a person looked friendly or not. 
2 Social Attention Tasks 
Social orienting measure 
The orienting measure used here was an adapted version of the task used by 
Dawson et al. (2004). Their paradigm involved the presentation of 8 stimuli - 4 
social sounds (a person humming, calling child's name, clicking fingers and patting 
hands) and 4 non-social sounds (timer beeping, phone ringing, whistle blowing and 
horn blowing). In Dawson et al. 's study, while the child was interacting with the 
main experimenter, a second experimenter presented these sounds in the background. 
The social stimuli were produced directly by the experimenter, whilst the non-social 
stimuli originated from inanimate objects which were activated by the experimenter. 
Adaptation of Dawson eta!. 's (2004) social orienting measure 
The adaptation of Dawson et al.'s (2004) task involved presenting 8 sounds-
4 social and 4 non-social - from a computer program and output through 2 speakers 
which were connected to the computer. This was done for two reasons- firstly, it 
was not practically feasible to have a second experimenter present for the testing 
sessions. Secondly, and more importantly, it seemed more logical to have the sounds 
appear from a standardised source rather than allow for the possibility of human error 
and/or the second experimenter's physical presence in priming the child to look 
toward a certain location. Thus, a computer program was designed which could 
deliver the 8 stimuli and just as Dawson et al. had done, each stimulus was delivered 
3 times in succession with a 1 second interval between each repetition, resulting in 
approximately 6 seconds duration for each stimulus. 
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The sounds within our program were chosen to approximate those originally 
used by Dawson et al. and consisted of the following social sounds: (a) child yelling, 
(b) man coughing, (c) woman laughing, and (d) person whistling. The 4 non-social 
sounds within our program were: (a) timer beeping, (b) phone ringing, (c) car hom 
blowing, and (d) whistle blowing. The sound files for the orienting task were 
obtained from an internet website: http://www.sounddogs.com.©. Each sound file 
was edited using Creative Lab's Wave Studio. Since the original files were in 16-bit 
stereo format, these each had one channel deleted leaving only the left or right 
channel to ensure that each sound was only played out of one of two speakers. Given 
the wide variety of sounds used it would have been difficult to balance them with a 
decibel meter, so the sound levels of the files were balanced subjectively by ear so 
that the apparent loudness of each sound was the same. This was done by a 
technician and agreement on the loudness of the sounds was provided by two other 
judges. 
Piloting the new measure of social orienting 
Although the sound stimuli were selected to approximate those used by 
Dawson et al. (2004), it was important to ensure that our interpretation of the social 
vs. non-social nature of the sounds was valid. Therefore, the presentation of all 8 
sounds via the computer program was piloted with 20 adult participants before 
running the study to ensure that the social and non-social sounds had been chosen 
sensitively and categorised appropriately. These participants received the stimuli in 
the same manner as presented in the experimental task. However, rather than actually 
orienting to the particular sounds, it was necessary for these adult participants simply 
to rate the stimuli in terms of how social or non-social they sounded on a 5-point 
scale ranging from 1 (definitely non-social) to 5 (d~finitely social). Across the sample 
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of 20 participants, the four social items received average ratings of 4.30 (s.d. = 0. 73), 
4.55 (s.d. = 0.51 ), 4.60 (s.d. = 0.60) and 4.55 (s.d. = 0.51 ), whilst the four non-social 
items received average ratings of 1.1 (s.d. = 0.31 ), 1.3 (s.d. = 0.4 7), 1.4 (s.d = 0.50) 
and 1.5 (s.d. = 0.51 ). Thus, the 8 sounds which were chosen appeared to be 
categorised appropriately. This allowed use of the adaptation of Dawson et al. 's 
measure with confidence that this would gauge children's ability to spontaneously 
orient to social and non-social sounds. Furthermore, producing these sounds 
electronically rather than via a second experimenter as Dawson et al. had done, 
enabled the procedure to be free from the potential priming effect of a physical 
human presence. 
Procedure 
To replicate Dawson et al. 's (2004) procedure each of these sounds was 
presented for a duration of one second three times and each sound had one second of 
silence added to the end to give the required interval between successive 
interstimulus sounds. In order to present the stimuli through speakers connected to 
the computer via the touch of a button, the 8 sounds were stored within a file which 
was run within a wavesequence program on a laptop. This program served to 
facilitate the standardised systematic presentation of the 8 sounds. It also allowed 
alternating delivery between left and right speakers, each time with the sound being 
presented via a covert touch on the mousepad of the laptop by the experimenter to 
activate the particular trial to ensure that the child's reaction to each stimulus could 
not be primed. During the presentation of all stimuli the experimenter ensured he was 
looking down at the floor to avoid influencing the child's reaction, while a webcam 
was set up to video the child's responses to each of the stimuli. Two social and two 
non-social sounds were delivered from each speaker in a counterbalanced order. 
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Each speaker was located approximately two feet away from the child at an angle of 
30° to the left and right just behind the child. Both speakers were concealed to reduce 
the likelihood of the child discovering the origin of the sounds. 
Scoring 
In terms of scoring children's responses to the 8 orienting trials, a trial was 
successful (score of 1) if the child oriented their head and/or eyes within 30° toward 
the relevant sound within 6 seconds of the trial commencing. Therefore, the 6 second 
duration from the presentation of each sound was used as the period through which 
the child's response was observed (with reactions to the stimuli occurring outwith 
those 6 seconds being disregarded). However, despite this temporal criterion, it is 
important to note that the scores for children on this task reflect their accuracy to 
respond within the time limit. A trial was scored as a mismatch (score of -1) if the 
child first looked toward the opposite speaker during a trial. All trials were recorded 
on video and videos were then analysed for accuracy in responding to trials using the 
Observer Video-Analysis Program. 
Joint Attention measure 
The joint attention task was similar in nature to that used by Leekam et al. 
( 1997) with typically developing 5-year-olds. Their task had been adapted from a 
similar task used with infants by Butterworth and Jarrett ( 1991) and Scaife and 
Bruner (1975). For the current study joint attention trials were carried out in a 
sparsely furnished room located in a quiet area ofthe child's school. Whilst sitting 
approximately 3 feet opposite the child, the experimenter conducted 6 joint attention 
trials. The sequence of the experimenter looking to the right, left and behind the child 
was repeated twice. On each occasion the experimenter would gain eye contact with 
the child before instantly turning his head and eyes to the appropriate target for 6 
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seconds whilst displaying a look of interest. In a handful of cases, it was necessary to 
call the child's name initially to establish eye contact with the child before 
proceeding with a trial. Targets to the right and left sides consisted of a 20cm x 20cm 
gold star and were located 3 feet to either side of the dyad at the experimenter's eye 
level, equidistant between the experimenter and the child. A further two behind trials 
were then carried out whereby the experimenter looked behind the child at a doorway 
as if to suggest someone was entering the room. There was a distance of 
approximately 6 feet between the child and the target behind. A webcam was located 
just behind and to the right of the experimenter (approximately one foot away) to 
ensure that there was a full view of the child's head and eyes. This recorded 
children's responses to each trial. 
Scoring 
Responses were later scored as successful (match) if the child first turned 
his/her head and/or eyes toward the appropriate target (score of 1) within 6 seconds 
of the trial commencing. Additionally, since the children in this study were 
considerably older than those used in previous joint attention studies involving 
infants that scored responses within 6 seconds, children's joint attention abilities 
were also examined using a stricter criterion of 3 seconds to respond from onset of 
the trial. Also, in line with previous research (e.g., Corkum & Moore, 1998; Leekam, 
Hunnisett, & Moore, 1998; Morissette, Ricard, & Decarie, 1995) the presence of 
mismatches was considered in addition to matches in order to adopt a stricter 
measure of joint attention. Thus, a response was scored as a mismatch (score of -1) if 
the child first looked to the target opposite the one being fixated by the experimenter 
within the time criterion. The trial was scored as 'no response' (score of 0) if the 
child failed to react to the experimenter's bid for attention. At no point were the 
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details of the social attention tasks explained to the child as this may have 
compromised the integrity of the tasks. All social attention trials were interspersed 
between the social-cognitive stories and language tasks administered to children in 
order to make the attention trials appear as natural and unobtrusive as possible. 
Use of Observer Video-Analysis Program and Reliability 
The two social attention tasks were coded and scored using the Observer 
video-analysis program. A coding scheme was devised which categorised 
behavioural actions made by either the experimenter or the child. Codes were applied 
to represent the experimenter actions: i.e. 4 possible types of social orienting trials: 
left-side (of experimenter) social sound, right-side social, left-side non-social, right-
hand non-social, and the 3 classes of joint attention trials: left-side of experimenter, 
right-side of experimenter, and behind child. Similarly, codes were applied to 
represent the child's actions, namely: match, mismatch, no response, and no trial. 
Response time between onset of trial (sound for orienting task or head tum for joint 
attention task) was recorded precisely using the Observer and the accuracy of 
response within either 6 or 3 seconds was scored and used in subsequent analyses. To 
check that the videos were being scored accurately and consistently, a reliability 
coder blind to the hypotheses coded 25% of the videos. Inter-rater reliability was 
substantial for the joint attention task: Cohen's kappa= 0.73 and was moderate for 
the orienting task: Cohen's kappa= 0.52. For a diagram depicting the set-up of 
equipment for both social attention tasks see Figure 6.1. (NB. The boxes containing 
the terms 'JA behind', 'JA left' and 'JA right' represent spaces where these targets 
were located rather than an object as such.) 
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Figure 6.1. Diagram depicting set-up of equipment for social attention tasks 
S: speaker 
C: child 
L: light box 
E: experimenter 
~ 
§] t 
JA 
behind 
8 
Tests of Language and Cognitive Functioning 
~ 
@] t 
The British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS-II) - Dunn et al. ( 1997) - was 
used to measure children's receptive vocabulary. The Children's Communication 
Checklist (CCC-2)- Bishop (2003)- was selected as a second more comprehensive 
measure of language because it has a pragmatic scale and a syntax scale which are 
not in the BPVS. Since the CCC-2 is completed by parents it also provided a more 
ecologically valid reflection of children's language abilities, in terms of their 
everyday communicative function. This 70-item questionnaire provided scores and 
percentiles for several subscales including: syntax, use of context, and semantics. 
These, along with other subscales, in turn lead to two composite scales: a general 
communication scale - which identifies children who are likely to have clinically 
significant communication difficulties - and a social interaction deviance scale which 
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can help to identify children with a communication profile characteristic of autism; 
providing further useful comparison with children with autism tested on social 
understanding and language in the following chapter. 
Finally, the 2-subtest format of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence (W ASI) - Wechsler ( 1997) was used due to the large battery of tasks 
being used in this study and the resultant length of the testing sessions for children. 
As indicated by the W ASI manual, the combined score for the vocabulary and matrix 
reasoning subtests provides a standardised short-form measure of general cognitive 
functioning. This variable was then included as a covariate in subsequent analyses. 
Materials and Procedure 
All the testing took place in a small quiet room within each of the schools. 
Due to the variety of schools, room size varied between 2 x 4m and 4 x Sm. Several 
pieces of equipment were required for the tasks including a laptop computer, 2 sound 
speakers, a webcam, 2 gold stars (20 x 20cm) and a light-box connected to a box 
with a button which when pressed activated an LED. This was displayed as a lit lamp 
on the video produced from the webcam. This light was used to signal to the 
experimenter the beginning and end of social attention trials and was out of sight of 
the child. 
All children were tested on a range of social understanding tasks and tests of 
language and general cognitive functioning. This battery consisted of two tasks to 
measure social attention; three tasks to measure social perception; two social-
cognitive tasks, the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) and the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence (WAS I). In addition, the Children's 
Communication Checklist-2 (CCC-2) questionnaire was distributed to parents of 
which 95 (74.8%) were returned. 
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Children were seen individually over two sessions approximately one week 
apart with the first occasion lasting approximately 45 minutes and the second one 
lasting approximately 35 minutes. The experimenter briefly explained to the child 
that they would be working with the experimenter on 2 occasions and he told the 
child that the first session would involve various computer-based tasks and listening 
to two false-belief stories, before checking that the child was happy to continue. 
During the first testing session the experimenter sat next to each child and worked 
with them through the computer-based tasks- 3 social-perceptual tasks- taking 
approximately 35 minutes. Then the experimenter sat opposite the child and told the 
child two false-belief stories, while acting these out with various props. 
The second testing session began with two ignorance stories - these always 
followed the false-belief stories to ensure that the easier ignorance stories did not 
influence children's more complex false-belief understanding (as demonstrated in the 
study described within chapter 2). Given the age by which children normally pass 
second-order ignorance, it was not expected that children's ignorance understanding 
between the ages of 4 and 5 would be facilitated and thus over-inflated by their prior 
experience of false belief stories (particularly since there was generally a duration of 
one week between these sessions). As- for the false belief stories, the ignorance 
stories were acted out and took approximately 10 minutes to complete before moving 
on to the BPVS and W ASI (2-subtest format). During the administration of the 
psychometric tests, the experimenter conducted the social attention trials. At random 
intervals between questions on these tasks, the experimenter conducted 6 joint 
attention trials and 8 social orienting trials. For the joint attention trials the 
experimenter engaged the child in conversation and then at a convenient point when 
eye contact was obtained the experimenter immediately looked to the child's left or 
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right (at 90° from his midline), or behind the child. For the social orienting trials, the 
experimenter found a similarly convenient point to activate each trial. This was 
achieved, unbeknown to the child, by the experimenter pressing the mousepad on the 
laptop which then produced a sound which was repeated three times, with the 8 
sounds alternating between the two speakers. The experimenter ensured that all of the 
social attention trials were completed before the last subtest of the W ASI was 
complete. Since the positioning of equipment and webcam did not allow for the 
experimenter's head to be included in the video shot, a small light box was 
positioned so as to be in the range of the webcam. For each of the social attention 
trials, the experimenter pressed a button (unbeknown to the child) which then lit a red 
LED within the light box. On video footage this appeared as a bright white lamp 
lighting up and clearly signalled the beginning of each joint attention (and social 
orienting) trial. 
Results 
A complete dataset for the 127 children was achieved with the following 
exceptions: one child was not present for the second session of testing and so did not 
complete the two ignorance stories, the BPVS, the W ASI or either of the social 
attention measures. Also, the video files for 6 children became corrupted and so their 
responses to joint attention and social orienting trials were not accessible. The only 
other missing data stemmed from the parental questionnaires due to a minority of 
parents (25%) who did not return the Children's Communication Checklist-2. In line 
with structural equation modelling procedures (as described later), the relevant 
variable mean value was imputed to each of the missing values (these missing values 
will be discussed in more detail within part 3 of the results when describing structural 
equation modelling analyses). 
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6. 6 Results Part 1: Descriptive statistics and normality testing 
Descriptive statistics for the social understanding and language tasks are 
detailed in Table 6.1 below separately for 4-year-olds and 5-year-olds. 
Table 6.1 
Mean accuracy scores and standard deviations of social understanding and 
language tasks for 4-year-olds and 5-year-olds 
4-year-olds 5-year-olds 
(n = 40) (n = 872 
Hypothesised Variable/Task Mean (s.d.) Mean (s.d.) 
Construct 
Social Cognition Ignorance 6.08 (2.11) 6.44 (1.96) 
Social Cognition false belief 4.43 (2.68) 4.94 (2.49) 
Social Perception affect 51.13 (9.29) 52.15 (8. 68) 
Social Perception eyes 13.55 (3.43) 12.13 (3.45) 
Social Perception friendliness 23.74 (17.80) 27.38 (16.14) 
Social Attention orienting 5.94 (1.90) 6.57 (1.62) 
Social Attention joint attention 4.42 (1.36) 3.95 (1.46) 
Language BPVS 107.13 (11.68) 104.30 (1 0. 70) 
Language syntax 8.87 (3.00) 8.57 (3.10) 
Language/! Q WASI 99.14 (8.09) 98.46 (6.89) 
It can be seen that the performance of 4-year-olds and 5-year-olds is generally 
similar. The performance of children in general across the ten tasks is conveyed in 
Table 6.2 and is described below in more detail, beginning with the social-cognitive 
tasks. 
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Table 6.2 
Mean accuracy scores and standard deviations of social understanding and 
language tasks 
Hypothesised Variable/Task Mean Standard 
Construct Deviation 
Social Cognition Ignorance 6.33 2.00 
Social Cognition false belief 4.78 2.55 
Social Perception affect 51.83 8.85 
Social Perception eyes 12.57 3.50 
Social Perception friendliness 26.24 16.70 
Social Attention orienting 6.40 1.73 
Social Attention joint attention 4.09 1.44 
Language BPVS 105.19 11.05 
Language syntax 8.66 3.06 
Language/IQ WASI 98.67 7.27 
Social-cognitive tasks 
The means in Table 6.2 for the 2 false-belief stories and the 2 ignorance 
stories show that children found the ignorance stories to be easier. A paired-samples 
t-test indicated that this difference was significant: t(l26) = -7.18, p = 0.00. Such a 
difference had been hypothesised since it had been demonstrated in chapter 2 that 
ignorance is a simpler concept for children to understand than belief in second-order 
belief tasks (and published as Coull et al., 2006). It had also been expected since it 
has been reported in the case of first-order belief tasks that children understand the 
concept of ignorance before they understand the concept of belief (Hogrefe et al., 
1986). However, this is the first time it has been shown in a composite task. 
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A 50% criterion level was used to distinguish passers and failers on social-
cognitive stories (i.e. obtaining at least 50% of the maximum score based on two 
combined first-order and second-order stories) to provide comparable criteria to that 
reported in chapter 5. Results showed that as expected, the vast majority (78. 7%) of 
children passed combined first-order and second-order ignorance stories. Using the 
same criterion for false belief, a slight improvement was evident with 58% of 
children passing composite false belief stories compared to 47% of children in 
chapter 5. Therefore, both groups of typical children performed to comparable levels 
and although the children described in chapter 5 were slightly older, the children 
tested here formed a much larger sample and as such the present group were likely to 
provide greater indication of typical performance in 4- to 5-year-olds. 
Comparing children's perfonnance on a composite first-order and second-
order false belief methodology with those tested in chapter 5, it was interesting to 
examine how these within-subject abilities held for ignorance and false belief at first-
order and second-order levels. Figure 6.2 shows the percentage of children who 
correctly justified their test responses in both stories of each type. Supporting earlier 
evidence, it can be seen that children demonstrated greater understanding of 
ignorance stories compared to false belief. It is also apparent that the difference in 
understanding ignorance and false belief was more marked at the second-order level 
ofunderstanding. This confirmed expectations since children's first-order 
understanding would be expected to have fully emerged in 4- and 5-year-old 
children, whether assessing ignorance or beliefs. In addition, previous research would 
suggest that 4 and 5-year-olds understanding of second-order ignorance would be 
considerably more advanced than their understanding of second-order false beliefs. 
This is corroborated by the finding that only 17.3% of children were unable to 
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correctly justify their responses to either of the two second-order ignorance questions 
while 46.5% of children were unable to do so in relation to either second-order false 
belief question. 
Figure 6.2. Percentage of children correctly justifying responses to both stories 
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Performance on the Eyes task across the whole sample showed a normal 
distribution of scores, with a mean score of 12.57 (s.d. = 3.50), and scores ranging 
from 4 to 22, from a possible maximum score of 28. This distribution of scores was 
comparable to children's performance on the Eyes task described in chapter 5 (mean 
score= 12.1 , s.d. = 3.44, range= 6 to 18) in which the majority of children scored 
above chance levels. Therefore, the current data would appear to substantiate the 
findings of similar performance levels found in the comparatively small sample of 
children tested on the Eyes task in chapter 5. While 4- to 5-year-olds displayed a 
range of success across this task suggesting that it was age-appropriate, it is true that 
the Eyes task has several complexities - it is heavily language-based consisting of 
numerous mental state terms, some of which are perhaps quite unfamiliar to young 
children such as j ealous and daydreaming. Every effort was made to explain these to 
children prior to them informing the experimenter of their response, but inevitably 
there will have been some children who provided a wrong response not due to lack of 
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social-perceptual ability but due to lack oflanguage ability. In addition, many of the 
correct responses in the Eyes task consist of a phrasing of words, e.g., "making 
somebody do something" which although quite abstract in nature, may have cued 
children's attention due to the disproportionate length of response compared to other 
target mental state terms such as sad and angry. For each child's response when they 
may have indicated via pointing - but in particular for those consisting of a phrase -
the experimenter ensured the child spoke aloud their answer in order to be more sure 
that the child was responding with a clear answer in mind. Furthermore, since the 
experimenter verbally presented the four target items for each picture, it was possible 
that children generally responded with the last term uttered by the experimenter. 
However, the experimenter was sensitive to this possibility and if a certain pattern of 
responding seemed to be emerging the experimenter reminded the child of the 
various responses in a different order and reassured them that the correct response 
could be the first, second, third or fourth option spoken by the experimenter. 
Nonetheless, these complexities aside, children did perform generally well on the 
Eyes task and it was interesting to note that the 4-year-olds obtained a higher mean 
score than 5-year-olds, suggesting that this task is age appropriate, but requires 
responses and response procedures which may confound the task itself. 
As Table 6.2 showed, the average mean score for children's performance on 
the Affect task was 51.8 from a potential maximum score of 84. The minimum score 
obtained was 28, i.e. the child correctly labelled 28 emotions of the 84 pictured faces, 
and the maximum score achieved was 70. Similarly to the Eyes task, the distribution 
of scores for this task was normal and given that children were required to choose 
between the same set of 5 mental state terms for the whole task, it is unlikely that 
language ability would have been as involved in children's responding as it perhaps 
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had been for the Eyes task. Children's performance on the Friendliness task also 
followed a relatively normal distribution: the mean gradient score - indicating the 
average sensitivity of the child to choose correctly between 'friendly' and 
'unfriendly' labels- was 26.2, ranging from -34.4 (indicating very poor sensitivity) to 
80.0 (extremely adept at choosing the correct label). Despite the broad range of 
ability on the Friendliness task, this task may have suffered from certain complexities 
in a way similar to the Eyes task. While the Eyes task had high language demands, 
this task was less language-intensive due to the same set of 5 terms for each face, but 
the concept of friendliness may have been difficult to grasp for some children- to 
decide on someone's friendliness purely on the basis of their facial expression is 
perhaps quite abstract for 4- to 5-year-olds. Indeed, some children tended to respond 
with the neutral, middle response in the list of 5 options more often than would be 
expected - this may have been due to uncertainty on deciding on someone' s 
friendliness, in which case the middle term neither would have provided a safe 
response. Some children may also have found it do difficult to distinguish between 
the gradations of friendliness within the response set; for those children obviously 
struggling to consider all 5 options simultaneously, the experimenter initially spoke 
aloud three options: friendly, unfriendly or neither and then based on the child's 
response (e.g., friendly) would then ask: "Do you think the person is 'very' friendly 
or 'quite' friendly?" It was anticipated that this breakdown would facilitate a 
response from the child without cueing the child to a certain response. This 
procedure to enable some children's responding was subjectively determined by the 
experimenter and would perhaps not have been necessary for children of an age year 
or two older. Nonetheless, it was introduced in a minority of cases and the statistics 
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revealed a broad range of ability in 4- to 5-year-olds suggesting it was generally 
appropriate. 
Social Attention 
Table 6.2 conveyed that children correctly oriented to 6.4 (80%) of the 8 
orienting trials, and correctly oriented to 4.1 (68%) of joint attention trials suggesting 
that the orienting task was easier for children than the joint attention task. Indeed, a 
paired samples t-test confirmed this difference was significant, t(119) = -4.14, p = 
0.00. In addition, children responded to orienting trials more quickly on average than 
joint attention trials (2.20 seconds vs . 2.60 seconds) , which perhaps indicated that the 
orienting trials were easier and more simplified for children than the joint attention 
trials. 
For the orienting task, the mean number of correct head or eye turns exhibited 
by chi ldren in response to social vs. non-social stimuli can be seen in Figure 6.3. 
Their performance is considered not only within a 6 second criterion, but additionally 
for a 3 second criterion. This was also analysed to provide a picture of whether initial 
patterns of performance may vary from performance considered over a longer period 
of time. As can be seen in Figure 6.3 , children more often oriented their attention 
correctly to social than non-social stimuli within both 3 seconds and 6 seconds. 
Figure 6.3 . Percentage of correct head or eye turns within 6 or 3 seconds to social 
and non-social stimuli 
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Given that the orienting task was an adaptation of the task used by Dawson et 
al. (2004), it was of interest to establish whether the current findings were 
comparable to those ofDawson et al. In Dawson et al.'s study, they found that 
typical children correctly oriented to approximately 70% of social stimuli and 80% of 
non-social stimuli. Using our 6 second criterion, the children here correctly 
responded to 85% of social stimuli and 75% of non-social stimuli. These levels of 
performance were comparable to Dawson et al. despite the fact that in their study 
they allowed a duration of 15 seconds for the child to respond. Given that the 
children tested here were slightly older, the 6 second criterion which was used to 
avoid potential ceiling performance appeared to be justified. 
With regard to the joint attention task, children on average correctly focused 
their attention within the 6 second criterion to 4.09 trials (68%) and within the 3 
second criterion to 3.76 trials (63%). To obtain an idea ofthe number of children 
passing or failing the joint attention task, we opted for a scoring criterion consistent 
with the level used by Leekam et al. ( 1997) since the children in their study were of a 
similar age to the children in this study. In that study, children were scored as 
'passers' if they correctly responded to 2/3 trials. Therefore, children were classed as 
'passers' if they correctly attended to at least 4/6 trials. Within the conservative 6 
second criterion, 69% of children correctly attended to at least 4 of the 
experimenter's head turns, while 58% of children did so within 3 seconds. Both 
findings are relatively comparable to those ofLeekam et al. (75% success rate) 
showing that although joint attention abilities first emerge in infancy, the ability to 
share joint attention with another person is not fully displayed in 4- to 5-year-olds -
this may be due to habituation of responding or increasing social inhibition within 
the child. 
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Language 
Given the large sample of children that was tested, it was unsurprising to 
obtain fairly normal distributions for both the BPVS standardised scores and the 
WASI IQ data with means of 105.19 and 98.67 respectively. Evaluation ofthe 
distribution of percentiles stemming from parental report of children's everyday 
communication abilities (using the CCC-2) revealed that almost 50% of the children 
were ranked no higher than the 33rd percentile in terms of their overall 
communicative competence compared to the standardised sample. As a result, based 
on children's percentiles on the index of overall communicative competence, the 
distribution was slightly negatively skewed. 
As mentioned earlier, children's syntactic ability is strongly linked with their 
false belief understanding. Therefore, in order to investigate the possible role of 
syntax within social understanding - particularly social cognition - the syntax scale of 
the CCC-2 was isolated and focus was placed on the scaled scores and percentiles 
from this scale. Compared to the CCC-2 standardised sample, output suggested that 
72% of the sample of 127 typically developing children would not feature in the 
upper half of the general population in terms of the parent's perception of their 
child's syntactic ability; however, the remaining 28% would be in the top 5% of the 
population. 
This descriptive summary of ability levels on each of the tasks for the large 
sample of typically developing children has confirmed that the new tasks (such as the 
social-cognitive stories and social attention orienting measure) have produced 
comparable results to previous studies using similar yet different measures. In 
addition, this section has outlined the general performance of typical children on 
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more established tests, and having produced results which were expected given 
previous findings, this would appear to justify the choice of measures. 
Normality of variables 
Initial analyses of normality via histograms and normal Q-Q plots suggested 
that several of the variables were non-nom1al. The Shapiro-Wilk statistic confirmed 
that the only normally distributed variables were the Affect task, the Eyes task and 
the joint attention task. Both social-cognitive tasks were negatively skewed, while 
the Friendliness task was positively skewed. The orienting task was positively 
skewed, indicating that children tended to respond correctly to the majority of these 
trials within the 3 or 6 second period allowed. The W ASI measure and syntax scale 
of the CCC-2 were also positively skewed. However, the BPVS measure appeared to 
be relatively normal despite the Shapiro-Wilk statistic. While 25% of the CCC-2's 
were not returned by parents, an independent t-test revealed that the group of 
children whose parents did not respond were not of a significantly lower IQ than the 
children whose parents did respond, (t(125) = -1.43, p = 0.16). This suggested that 
the CCC-2 respondents were likely to be broadly representative of the whole group, 
with similar IQ levels for children irrespective of parents' level of willingness to 
provide indication of their child's abilities. 
6. 7 Results Part 2: Correlation andfactor analyses of the interrelationships within 
and between the four constructs 
Given the indication of some non-normality within the dataset, nonparametric 
correlations were analysed (see Appendix 6.2) but these did not differ to the 
parametric correlations so all correlational analyses were conducted using Pearson's 
r. Although investigating across a fairly narrow age range, partial correlations while 
controlling for age were examined- the corresponding matrix (see Appendix 6.3) did 
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not differ from the bivariate correlation matrix. Also, given the extent of missing 
CCC-2 data (32 cases from 127), it was sensible to inspect correlation matrices both 
with and without imputed mean values for the missing data. Since there were no 
substantial differences between the two matrices, for completeness and for the 
purposes ofthe SEM to follow, analyses were based on data with imputed mean 
values for the missing data (to examine the correlation matrix without imputed values 
for missing CCC-2 data see Appendix 6.4). The resultant correlation matrix based on 
imputed values for missing CCC-2 data can be seen in Table 6.3. The value of the 
determinant (0.223) from the correlation matrix was greater than the necessary value 
of 0.00001 indicating that multicollinearity was unlikely to be a problem for these 
data. As Table 6.3 conveys, the correlation matrix appears to validate the choice of 
tasks believed to tap into each domain - both social attention tasks were significantly 
correlated: r = 0.19, p < 0.05; and both social cognition tasks were highly correlated: 
r = 0.45, p < 0.01. In addition, Table 6.3 shows that the social perceptual Affect task 
was significantly correlated with both other social perceptual tasks. However, 
although the social perceptual Eyes task was not significantly related to the 
Friendliness task, it was significantly correlated to both social cognition tasks and all 
3 language tasks. This was perhaps not entirely surprising given the degree of 
language involved throughout the Eyes task. Similarly, the correlation of both social-
cognitive tasks with both the BPVS and W ASI is again likely to be due to the 
language involved in processing theory of mind stories. Table 6.3 also indicates that 
the three language variables form a potentially strong language construct with three 
significant intercorrelations, all p < 0.01. 
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Table 6.3 
Correlations of all social understanding and language variables to be used in 
structural equation analysis 
Indicator I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Social 
attention- 1 
Orienting 
2. Social 
.19* attention- Joint 
attention 
3. Social 
perception-
.08 -.15 
Affect 
4. Social 
perception -
-.08 .05 .30** 
Friendliness 
5. Social 
perception -
.10 -.04 .33** .10 1 
Eyes 
6. Social 
cognition-
.03 .05 .15 .11 .31 ** 
False belief 
7. Social 
cognition-
.12 .03 .07 .03 .26** .45** 
Ignorance 
8. Language-
BPVS 
.13 .02 .32** .09 .35** .30** .29** 
9. Language-
CCC-2 (syntax) -.05 .03 .25** .08 .20* .13 .14 .35** 
10. Language -
-.01 -.14 .14 .09 .27** .28** .24** .50** .23** WASI 
*: significant at 0.05 level 
**:significant at 0.01 level 
Summarising the correlation matrix suggested that there was liable to be 4 relatively 
distinct constructs representing social cognition, social perception, social attention 
and language since the correlations within constructs were generally stronger than the 
correlations across constructs. However, due to strong associations between the 
social perceptual Eyes task and each of the language tasks, this task may not 
necessarily have reflected social-perceptual ability. These proposals were 
investigated in more detail via factor analyses. 
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To assess the factor structure of the dataset in more detail, factor analyses 
were conducted using principal axis factoring rather than principal components 
analysis as the former is more suited to structural equation modelling. In this study, it 
was primarily the links between latent constructs which were of interest in order to 
determine the interrelationships between social cognition, social perception, social 
attention and language. However, also of interest was how the tasks which were 
employed (i.e. the measured task variables) loaded on to their hypothesised 
constructs in order to determine how well the tasks measured the construct which 
they were purported to measure. Thus, based on a large, representative sample such 
as that of the present study, principal axis factoring was conducted to establish 
whether or not the selected tasks (indicators) measured their corresponding 
hypothesised latent construct. 
Within the analysis output, a couple of statistics indicated that factor analysis 
was an appropriate procedure to further investigate the data. Firstly, the dataset had a 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value of 0.68, indicating that the patterns of correlations were 
reasonably compact and were likely to result in distinct and reliable factors (Kaiser, 
1974). In addition, Bartlett's test of sphericity statistic was highly significant, X2 ( 45) 
= 182.64, p < 0.001, suggesting that there were significant relationships between the 
variables included in the analysis, such that proceeding with factor analysis was an 
appropriate step. Using Kaiser's criterion of retaining factors with eigenvalues 
greater than 1, the output suggested that the data were best represented by a 4 factor 
structure. Indeed, the scree plot in Figure 6.4 illustrated that retaining 4 factors would 
be appropriate. 
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Figure 6.4. Factor scree plot of al/10 social understanding and language variables 
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Next, using Varimax rotation, to optimise the extracted factor structure, the 
output indicated that factor 1 explained 13.96% of the variance, with factors 2, 3 and 
4 explaining 11.22%, 10.31% and 5.77% of the variance respectively. The resultant 
rotated factor matrix is presented below in Table 6.4. As this table illustrates, 
principal axis factoring yielded 4 relatively distinct factors. Together, these 4 factors 
accounted for 41.3% of the total variance. Factor 1 was predominantly a language 
based factor with all three language/IQ indicator variables loading most highly here. 
In addition, although the social perceptual Eyes task loaded on to Factors 2 and 3, it 
loaded most highly on to this language construct - this substantiated the earlier 
finding that the Eyes task was strongly correlated with each of the language tasks. 
The remaining factor structure appeared as originally hypothesised with the two other 
social-perceptual tasks loading on to Factor 2, which is likely to constitute a social 
perceptual dimension. Factor 3 was defined by high loadings for both social-
142 
cognitive tasks, with the smaller fourth factor represented by both social attention 
tasks. 
Table 6.4 
Rotated factor matrix of al/10 social understanding and language variables 
Factor 
Indicator 1 2 3 4 
Language-
BPVS .79 
Language/IQ-
WASI .59 .22 
Language-
Syntax .38 
Social perception -
Eyes .35 .26 .28 
Social perception -
Affect .24 .94 
Social perception -
Friendliness .30 
Social cognition -
False belief .77 
Social cognition-
Ignorance .24 .52 
Social attention -
Orienting .66 
Social attention -
Joint attention .28 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. 
All loadings > 0.2 are specified. 
Given both the low eigenvalue (1.01) and the small proportion ofvariance 
explained by factor 4, in combination with the finding within the correlation matrix 
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that neither of the social attention tasks were correlated with any of the measures 
outside of their within-construct correlation it could be reasonably argued that the 
fourth factor should be discarded. Although re-running the factor analyses without 
the two social attention tasks produced a different factor structure (see Appendix 
6.5), the final phase of the analyses- structural equation modelling- proceeded on 
the basis of the original 4 factor structure, while acknowledging that the two social 
attention tasks may need to be omitted from the analysis in order to obtain a valid 
and parsimonious model. 
6.8 Results Part 3: Structural equation modelling and regression analysis 
Within structural equation modelling (SEM), the aim is to obtain a generic 
structural model which is both parsimonious and provides the best fit of the dataset. 
SEM is the only analysis that allows complete and simultaneous tests of all the 
relationships, enabling the constituents of social understanding to be examined 
thoroughly. Structural equation modelling grows out of and serves purposes similar 
to multiple regression but is a more powerful method of analysis which offers 
advantages such as: the inclusion of more flexible assumptions, the ability to model 
mediating variables and the desirability of testing models overall rather than 
coefficients individually. Distinguishing it from correlational analysis, ANOVA and 
regression, is the flexibility which SEM offers in terms of building causal models, 
though it does not necessarily provide statistical evidence of a causal link between 
variables (Kline, 1998). While correlational analysis indicated the associations which 
existed, this provided no idea of the direction of associations- only SEM can do that. 
Causality can only be inferred from the model which was originally constructed, not 
from the statistical test of that model. Furthermore, this type of analysis consolidated 
the factor analyses by providing firmer indication of whether or not the range of tasks 
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which were used tapped into the constructs which had been hypothesised. Using the 
Amos™ (Analysis of MOment Structures) statistical software (version 6.0), it was 
possible to investigate the relationships between each of the latent variables- social 
cognition, social perception, social attention and social cognition, as well as the role 
which language/IQ plays in social understanding. As mentioned earlier, G*Power 
(Erdfelder et al., 1996) analysis indicated that the sample size of 127 children would 
be sufficient for examination of these four constructs via structural equation 
modelling. 
Structural Equation Modelling Analysis 
The correlation analyses conducted in part 2 of the results suggested that all 
relationships within constructs were positively correlated (with the exception of the 
social-perceptual Eyes and Friendliness link), and suggested a considerable level of 
interrelation between constructs- in particular, language was closely linked with 
social perception and social cognition; however, neither of the social attention tasks 
was related to any task within the three other constructs. These findings were 
substantiated within factor analyses, which suggested that the dataset could be 
explained in terms of four factors: Factor 1 consisting of all 3 language tasks and the 
Eyes task; Factor 2 consisting of the two remaining social-perceptual tasks; Factor 3 
consisting of both social-cognitive tasks; and a minor fourth factor consisting of both 
social attention tasks. On the basis of this output from the factor analyses, attempts 
were made to run a structural equation model with the corresponding 4-factor 
structure within Amos. As suspected, given the lack of a relationship between social 
attention and each of the other constructs, as well as the low eigenvalue ( 1.01) which 
represented the construct of social attention within factor analysis, it was not possible 
to obtain a valid structural model when the 2 social attention tasks were included. It 
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was therefore necessary to omit this construct from all subsequent structural models. 
As will be revealed below, in order to arrive at a parsimonious model providing the 
best, accurate fit of the dataset, it was also necessary to make various structural 
modifications within the modelling procedure, resulting in three successive structural 
models. 
Given the above outcome regarding social attention, the first model to be 
investigated mapped directly on to the factor structure produced when the two social 
attention tasks had been omitted. The factor matrix previously outlined in Appendix 
6.5 illustrated that when the social attention tasks were not included in the factor 
analysis, two factors emerged - one which primarily consisted of social cognition 
and language tasks, and a second factor which contained two social-perceptual tasks 
and the syntax measure. While this separation of factors was theoretically plausible 
whereby factor 2 abilities predicted factor 1 abilities; running of the model 
(illustrated with fit statistics in Appendix 6.6) conveyed that there was a significant 
difference between the model and the data. This indicated that the model did not 
adequately describe the dataset. Given that this model was informed by the reduced 
factor structure (obtained after excluding the two social attention tasks) and that the 
resultant two-factor matrix was considerably different to the factor matrix obtained 
earlier in factor analyses, it was more logical to proceed with structural equation 
modelling using the original factor structure while excluding the seemingly 
inconsequential fourth factor which consisted of both social attention tasks. 
Therefore, all subsequent modelling was based on the remaining 3 factors as 
described above in Table 6.4, which had the following factor structure: Factor 1 -
BPVS, W ASI, Syntax, and Eyes task; Factor 2 - Affect and Friendliness tasks; and 
Factor 3 - False belief and Ignorance tasks. Next, various structural models were 
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tested using this factor structure, with the need to improve the model iteratively to 
ensure that the final structural model was parsimonious and provided the best fit of 
the dataset. This was initiated by testing the previously discussed model of social 
understanding and language as predicted by Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005). 
6.2 Testing the Tager-Fiusberg and Joseph (2005) model 
To recall, Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) had proposed a model in which 
social perceptual ability predicted language and together these predicted children's 
social cognition (for original diagram refer back to Chapter 4, p. 73). Using their 
model as a framework, the aforesaid 3-factor structure (i.e. excluding social 
attention) was mapped on to the constructs of language, social perception and social 
cognition. Therefore, with apparent justification, Factor 1 containing BPVS, WASI, 
syntax measures as well as the Eyes task, was interpreted to be 'language', Factor 2 
consisting of the Affect and Friendliness measures was interpreted to be 'social 
perception' and Factor 3 containing the composite ignorance and false belief tasks 
was interpreted to be 'social cognition'. It seemed counterintuitive from the start that 
a model consisting of a language construct containing the Eyes task, would be 
appropriate. However, this first needed to be tested to determine whether the data 
itself reflected such a structure, regardless of the theoretical prediction, as this was 
suggested by the factor analysis. Mapping of this factor structure on to Tager-
Flusberg and Joseph's model produced the resultant structural model as depicted in 
Figure 6.5. 
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Figure 6.5 Structural equation model ofTager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) model 
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The model fit statistics for this interpretation ofTager-Flusberg and Joseph's model 
were: t = 13.1, df= 17, p = 0.73, GFI = 0.97, CFI = 1.0, RMSEA = 0.00, AIC = 
51.14 (a glossary explaining each of these fit statistics is presented in Appendix 6. 7). 
Although these statistics were all quite favourable - suggesting that this model may 
fit the data well - it can be seen from Figure 6.5 that the only significant regression 
weight (denoted by *) linking betvveen the constructs is the link between language 
and social cognition. Therefore, the model may be an acceptable fit, but since the 
links between social perception and language, and social perception and social 
cognition are not significant, this model is not very informative and cannot allow any 
firm conclusions to be drawn regarding the interrelationship of social perception, 
social cognition and language. 
148 
When proceeding with steps to iteratively improve the model, it was 
necessary to make two modifications. Firstly, further statistical analysis of the above 
model made it apparent that the Eyes task should load on to the social-perceptual 
construct rather than the language construct (as it had been featured in the previous 
model) since the Eyes task actually loaded more highly on to social perception than 
on to the language construct. Secondly, it was apparent from progressing from the 
last model which was tested through various iterations that the Friendliness task 
should be removed from subsequent analysis for two reasons. Firstly, for the lack of 
significance of the Friendliness task loading on to social perception and secondly, the 
fact that its inclusion created a need for a correlated error item between this task and 
the social-perceptual Affect task. This omission was justified given that the main 
goal in structural equation modelling is to develop a parsimonious, good-fitting 
model with unimportant parameters deleted (i.e. the Friendliness task). Therefore, 
given these modifications, it was necessary to re-run the model proposed by Tager-
Flusberg and Joseph while taking these changes into account. The resultant model 
pictured in Figure 6.6 was noticeably different to the original test of the model (as 
appeared in Figure 6.5). Unsurprisingly, from the omission of the Friendliness task 
and the transfer of the Eyes task from the language construct to the social-perceptual 
construct, the links between constructs were now different. Now, language was 
significantly linked to social perception, in contrast to the original model (illustrated 
in Figure 6.5) in which language was significantly linked to social cognition. 
However, similar to the earlier model pictured in Figure 6.5, it was still the case that 
two of the three links between constructs were non-significant and consequently, as 
above, this model did not allow any conclusive statements to be made regarding the 
relationships between different constituents of social understanding and language. 
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Figure 6.6. Updated structural model based on Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) 
Fit statistics: X2 = 7.73, df= 11, p = 0.74, GFI = 0.98, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.00, 
AIC = 41.73. 
Affect Eyes 
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To summarise the modelling progress thus far; correlational analyses and 
factor analyses suggested that the various areas of understanding being examined 
(namely: social cognition, social perception, social attention and language) could be 
regarded as 4 distinct constructs. The correlation analyses suggested that social 
attention was unrelated to any of the three other domains, and this was underlined by 
factor analyses which conveyed that the tasks chosen to represent social attention, 
constituted a minor, fourth construct. These findings were then acknowledged within 
structural equation modelling statistical procedures through the omission of social 
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attention and the testing of models based on the original factor analyses (while 
excluding the non-significant social attention tasks). Thus, Tager-Flusberg and 
Joseph's model was explored using the factor structure: Factor I- BPVS, WASI, 
Syntax, and Eyes task; Factor 2- Affect and Friendliness tasks; and Factor 3- False 
belief and ignorance tasks. Regarding these factors as approximate constructs of 
language, social perception and social cognition respectively, the resultant structural 
model provided a reasonable fit of the whole dataset. However, links between 
constructs were not very informative, with the only significant link existing between 
language and social cognition and as such this revealed that the large dataset of 
performance across 10 tasks by 127 typically developing 4- to 5-year-olds could not 
be represented by the theoretical framework outlined by Tager-Flusberg and Joseph 
(2005). Thus, further statistical testing and structural modifications followed to 
iteratively arrive at the model of best fit. This involved moving the Eyes task to load 
on to a social-perceptual construct rather than a language construct and removing the 
Friendliness task from the model, while still adopting the framework advocated by 
Tager-Flusberg and Joseph. However, even with these structural modifications, 
testing of this new model revealed a better fit to the data than the model described 
above, but again non-significant links were found to exist between constructs. 
Therefore, in order to give the best approximate test of a model of social 
understanding which is inclusive of the various latent constructs, the next step was to 
reformulate the model of Tager-Flusberg and Joseph to arrive at a model of social 
understanding which wholly encompasses these constructs while providing the best 
fit of the dataset. 
Given the non-significant model link between social perception and social 
cognition of the two previous models, the Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) model 
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structure was modified accordingly within the SEM analysis procedure such that 
social perception was indirectly related to social cognition via language (i.e. there 
was now no direct link between social perception and social cognition). This 
structural modification was also congruent with earlier findings of strong correlations 
between social perceptual and language and between language and social cognition, 
from which language appeared to provide an integral link between social perception 
and social cognition. While contrasting quite markedly with Tager-Flusberg and 
Joseph's theoretical offering, the earlier correlational analyses and findings from the 
first two model outcomes as outlined above, both underline that a model which 
disregards a direct link between social perception and social cognition, should be 
tested at the very least. Furthermore, Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (p. 311) suggest that 
"the social-cognitive component of theory of mind builds on the earlier emerging 
perceptual component." However, Tager-Flusberg and Joseph do not suggest in what 
way this happens. It is quite possible that the way in which social perception and 
social cognition are linked is purely through the mediating construct of language. 
Therefore, this third structural model- which reflects a departure from Tager-
Flusberg and Joseph's model by removing a link between social perception and 
social cpgnition, and embraces a potential mediating role of language between these 
two constructs- was tested and is presented below in Figure 6.7. 
As can be seen below in Figure 6.7, the third and final structural model of this 
analysis exhibits the following fit statistics: t = 9.23, df= 12, p = 0.68, GFI = 0.98, 
CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.00 and AIC = 41.231. However, it is important to note a 
couple of poihts before interpreting this model further. All measures overestimate 
goodness of fit statistics for small samples(< 200), though RMSEA and CFI are less 
sensitive to sample size than others (Fan, Thompson, & Wang, 1999). As a result, 
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with a low chi-square value (as the one above is), this has an effect on the CFI and 
RMSEA values such that they are both at maximum fit levels due to rounding-up, not 
indicating a perfect fit per se, but at a level where they cannot distinguish between fit. 
However, given that additional model fit indices (such as the non-normed fit index) 
were not at maximum fit levels, this suggested that the model was not problematic. 
Furthermore, although the RMSEA value was 0.00, it was important to note that this 
value had a 90% confidence interval, ranging from 0.00 to 0.07. Therefore, the fit 
statistics for this model appeared to be very favourable; in particular the model was 
more parsimonious than previous models (indicated by the lowest AIC value). In 
addition, this new structural equation model had an advantage over previous models 
since both of the between-construct links were significant, whereas the earlier models 
were based on only one significant connection from the three links. Therefore, this 
highly parsimonious model which excluded the Friendliness task, both social 
attention tasks and had the Eyes task within a 'social-perceptual' construct provided 
an excellent fit to the dataset and all standardised regression weights between 
constructs and within constructs were significant (all p < 0.01)- indicating further 
improvement on the previous two models in which some of the links within 
constructs were non-significant. In addition, within the output for this model, 
assessment of normality revealed that there was non-significant multivariate kurtosis 
(value ofMardia's coefficient: 1.04, which is less than the critical value of 1.96 
(values greater than 1.96 indicate there is significant non-normality)). Also, 
inspection of outliers within the model using Mahalanobis d-squared statistics 
revealed that no cases were particularly extreme compared to their nearest 
neighbours. Therefore, structural equation modelling suggests that a model in which 
social perception (omitting the friendliness task) predicts language which then 
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predicts social cognition, provides the best representation of social understanding and 
language abilities in typically developing 4 and 5-year-olds. 
Figure 6. 7 Best fitting model of children's social understanding and language 
Fit statistics: X2 = 9.23, df= 12, p = 0.683, GFI = 0.98, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.00, 
AIC = 41.23. 
Social perception 
BPVS 
Language WASI 
Syntax 
Social cognition 
False belief Ignorance 
However, as noted by MacCallum and Browne (1993), there is usually more 
than one model that fits the data and has equivalent fit statistics, and equivalent 
models exist for almost all models. Indeed, in this case, an alternative yet similar 
model in which the same factor structure was adopted as in the model above, but in 
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which language predicted social perception and social perception predicted social 
cognition, produced equivalent fit statistics (see model and fit statistics in Appendix 
6.8). If 2 or more models predict something equally well then it should be concluded 
that the more simple and parsimonious model is more likely to be the correct one. On 
this basis the latter model is more likely to be the definitive model since the statistic 
indicating parsimony (AIC) is lower (40.90, as opposed to 41.23) and the paths 
between constructs have marginally stronger regression weights than those in Figure 
6.7. However, while this alternative model was acceptable, it could not be 
distinguished sufficiently from the prior model. In such cases, it is wise to base the 
final decision regarding structure on theoretical grounds (Lee & Herschberger, 1990). 
Therefore, given this rationale, the earlier literature review and the suggestions of 
structure from earlier correlation and factor analyses within part 2 of the results, the 
findings from this large dataset of abilities in typically developing children suggest a 
model of children's social understanding in which social perception has a direct path 
to language which is then linked directly to social cognition. 
In an effort to support the above decision to opt for a model in which 
language mediates the relationship between social perception and social cognition, 
rather than opt for a model in which social perception mediates the relationship 
between language and social cognition, the data were examined further via regression 
analysis. Hierarchical regression of the three constructs was conducted with social 
cognition as the outcome and the construct of social perception entered into the 
model first with language entered into the model in the second step. This revealed 
that social perception accounted for 5% of the variance in social cognition, with 
language accounting for a further 10% of the variance. Subsequent ANOV A statistics 
revealed that the model described in the first step (i.e. social perception predicting 
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social cognition) was significant: F(1, 125) = 6.52, p < 0.05. However, the model 
described in the second step (i.e. consisting of social perception and language 
predicting social cognition) was significant at the 1% level: F(2, 124) = 1 0.82, p = 
0.00. More crucially however, in terms of the standardised Beta values corresponding 
to the coefficient of the predictor variables, while social perception was a significant 
predictor of social cognition within step 1: (t(125) = 2.55, p < 0.05), it no longer 
made a significant contribution to the model once language was involved in step 2: 
(t(124) = 1.02, p = 0.31). Language, on the other hand, was a significant predictor of 
social cognition within step 2: (t(124) = 3.80, p = 0.00). These findings indicate that 
social perception is a significant predictor of social cognition via its relationship with 
language and vindicates the decision to opt for a model in which language mediates 
the relationship between social perception and social cognition, rather than an 
alternative model in which social perception may have mediated the relationship 
between language and social cognition. 
Discussion 
This chapter has described a comprehensive set of analyses in an attempt to 
address the main aim of the thesis: that is to provide clarification of the constituents 
of children's social understanding. Several key findings were apparent in relation to 
the relationships within and between constructs. Firstly, in terms of relationships 
within constructs, it was evident that the tasks chosen to tap into each construct were 
suitably similar, and suitably differentiated from tasks relating to separate constructs. 
The main exception to this was the Eyes task, which - unsurprisingly given earlier 
reservations- had strong links with language tasks. Nonetheless, in terms of the 
structural equation models, the Eyes task fitted best into the model when considered 
as a social-perceptual task alongside the Affect task. This coincided with the 
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Friendliness task being left out of the final structural model, perhaps due to it being 
too abstract or subtle in nature to have resembled the other social-perceptual tasks. 
Otherwise however, all the within construct correlations were quite distinct, 
with both social attention tasks being closely related, both social-cognitive tasks 
being strongly linked and all three language tasks being interrelated. This provided 
support for the choice of tasks as well as the distinction between constructs. In 
particular, the decision to regard abilities such as joint attention as dissimilar to 
typical social-perceptual abilities such as required for the Affect task, and more 
similar to orienting abilities, appeared to be upheld within each stage of the analysis 
where joint attention consistently grouped with the orienting task rather than in the 
social-perceptual construct. This point marks a distinction between the model which 
was arrived at and the model as proposed by Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005). 
Essentially, their model has been used as a general framework for guiding the 
investigation of the current study. It is recognised that a departure was made from 
their model in terms of regarding joint attention ability here as more akin to social 
attention rather than social perception as conceived by Tager-Flusberg and Joseph. 
However, this change was made since the social-perceptual construct as defined by 
Tager-Flusberg and Joseph seemed broader than perhaps it needed to be. Intuitively, 
joint attention abilities such as following another person's gaze to an object and 
typical social-perceptual abilities such as "Reading the mind in the eyes" would seem 
to be inherently different skills. Making a distinction between these abilities was an a 
priori decision, which had the implication that Tager-Flusberg and Joseph's model 
was not being explicitly tested. However, such a change is in keeping with the main 
aim of the thesis which was to clarify the constituents of children's social 
understanding; thus seeming to make this conceptual distinction justifiable, until at 
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the very least, the data should indicate otherwise. As it emerged, regarding joint 
attention as a different type of ability to social perception was appropriate for the 
current study. That is not to say that the model proposed by Tager-Flusberg and 
Joseph is inaccurate- indeed it is liable to be more congruent within a longitudinal 
framework- however, proving or otherwise ofTager-Flusberg and Joseph's model 
was not the aim of the current endeavour. Rather, in the attempt to clarify the 
constituents of children's social understanding, at the very least the data point toward 
the need to distinguish social attention (including social attention) from social-
perceptual abilities in 4- to 5-year-olds. 
The other main outcome of the current study was to obtain insight into the 
relationships between constituents of social understanding. Thus, in terms of the 
relationships between constructs, the SEM produced a final model, supported by 
regression analysis, which suggests that language is integral to the link between 
social perception and social cognition. While both social-cognitive tasks were 
strongly linked with the Eyes task, but neither of the other social-perceptual tasks, 
both sets of tasks were strongly linked with language. Therefore, this slightly 
different model of social understanding from that proposed by Tager-Flusberg and 
Joseph, would support the idea that typically developing 4- to 5-year-olds who are 
skilled within social perception would have developed sufficient language skills, 
perhaps through social experiences with other people. Accordingly, the ability to use 
language to interact with others may then allow children to develop their awareness 
of other people's thoughts in various situations leading to increasing exposure, 
experience and expertise of their social-cognitive skills. Such continuity between 
constituents of children's social understanding is compatible with contemporary 
research discussed in the preceding literature review which suggests that language 
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can simultaneously stem from low-level social understanding (i.e. social perception), 
and lead to high-level social understanding (i.e. social cognition). Furthermore, it is 
important to note that the opportunity to discuss the possibility of language in such a 
dual role is only possible through consideration of the broader interpretation of 
theory of mind/social understanding as it has been embraced within this thesis. 
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Chapter 7 
Is there a different path to social 
understanding for children with autism? 
Having explored Tager-Flusberg and Joseph's model across chapter 6 and 
established an alternative model of social understanding and language for typically 
developing children, the overarching aim of the present chapter was to explore the 
relevance of the paths identified by these models for a group of children with autism. 
Ideally, this would allow an understanding of the interplay between the constituents 
of social understanding in children with autism and consequently provide valuable 
insight into how these children may or may not differ from typical children in the 
path to social understanding. In the process, this may indicate potential compensatory 
strategies which may be utilised by children with autism in arriving at some level of 
social-cognitive understanding. These outcomes would not only further our 
knowledge of this area ofunderstanding in children with autism and assist in 
identifying possible areas of intervention, but would also complement our 
understanding of the function of these abilities within typically developing children. 
As well as the main aim outlined above, several subsidiary aims were investigated in 
parallel. For instance, one specific subsidiary aim was to investigate if children with 
autism have a deficit in orienting per se, or whether their impairment is specific to 
social stimuli. In addition, given that there are often discrepancies between task 
performance and everyday abilities in children with autism, a further aim was to 
explore the relationships between task-based performance, and autistic 
symptomatology and everyday adaptive functioning. 
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Introduction 
Autism is a complex neurodevelopmental disorder that is characterised by 
three core features: impairment in social interaction, impairment in communication, 
and engagement in repetitive behaviours (DSM-IV, APA, 1994). People with autism 
generally have severe difficulty in interacting with others and understanding the 
social basis of interaction. Children with such difficulties are likely to exhibit 
inappropriate social behaviour, to have impairment in their capacity to share attention 
with others and to generally have a lack of social awareness. In parallel with the 
movement from cognitive, maturational explanations of theory of mind development 
to more encompassing accounts focusing on early emerging abilities as happened for 
typical children, theories describing theory of mind development for children with 
autism emerged in a similar fashion. 
In some quarters it was originally thought that the social and communicative 
difficulties experienced by children with autism, could be explained by a specific 
cognitive impairment- namely, a problem with mentalising- i.e. understanding the 
mental representations of other people. Baron-Cohen et al. ( 1985) found that the 
majority of children with autism failed false belief tasks, in contrast to typically 
developing children and children with Down's syndrome. The failure of children 
with autism to exhibit theory of mind abilities in this study and many variations of 
the study thereafter using such social-cognitive measures led to the theory of mind 
hypothesis of autism. While this top-down explanation of the social deficits 
experienced by children with autism was very popular, it soon became apparent that 
it could not sufficiently explain autism. It was clear that the theory of mind 
hypothesis of autism was not universal as some children with autism were able to 
pass theory of mind tasks. It was also clear that such an explanation was not unique 
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to autism as many nonautistic children had problems with traditional theory of mind 
tasks (e.g., oral deaf children (Peterson & Siegal, 1998)). 
In addition to the problems with the theory of mind hypothesis outlined 
above, it was clear that models in line with the ToM hypothesis of autism such as 
that proposed by Baron-Cohen ( 1995), could not explain the range of symptoms 
experienced by people with autism. As highlighted in chapter 1, work by Mundy and 
colleagues demonstrated that children with autism have problems with joint attention 
prior to their problems with representational aspects of theory of mind (e.g., Mundy 
& Sigman, 1989). Such studies helped to underline that the social and 
communication deficits experienced by children with autism could not be sufficiently 
explained by impairments in representational theory of mind understanding. In 
addition they indicated that social and communication deficits may stem from and be 
related to early occurring problems in social understanding development such as 
impaired orienting and joint attention abilities. 
Baron-Cohen ( 1995) revised his original cognitive hypothesis of autism to 
account for the increasing evidence citing the social-pragmatic problems experienced 
by children with autism at an age when they had not yet reached the mental or 
chronological age by which social-cognitive skills normally developed. With the 
impetus very much on focusing attention upon so-called precursors to social 
cognition, Baron-Cohen's model (as outlined in chapter 4) suggested that children 
with autism had an impaired shared attention mechanism (SAM) which then led to an 
impaired theory of mind mechanism. Within this model, while children with autism 
were proposed to have intact modules for detecting intentionality and eye direction, 
Baron-Cohen argued that the impaired SAM was mainly responsible for the joint 
attention impairments seen in children with autism. In general terms, these 
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impairments would be expected to have profound consequences for social 
development since the acquisition of complex communicative skills (e.g., gaze 
following) requires children to actively attend to and make meaning of social stimuli 
such as facial expressions and direction of eye gaze. 
While Baron-Cohen (1995) modified his model to take account of the 
evidence of early impairments in social understanding experienced by children with 
autism, his model retained its cognitive, maturational stance by virtue of its modular 
nature. In contrast to this absence of any mention of the impact of social experience 
upon developing social understanding, Klin et al. (2003) proposed their enactive 
mind approach to understanding the theory of mind difficulties experienced by 
children with autism. Recognising the need for psychological theory to propose a 
model of its developmental psychology with a focus on early emerging skills and 
processes which may have downstream effects, Klin et al. 's account emphasised the 
role in infancy of motivational predispositions to react to social stimuli. In typical 
development, these early predispositions then guide the child's understanding 
through to social cognition with social action providing the basis for such 
progression (i.e. there is a theoretical parallel with the action basis to the account of 
social understanding in typical development offered by Carpendale and Lewis). 
While Carpendale and Lewis simply suggest that the function of the epistemic 
triangle (around which the action is based) may operate differently for children with 
developmental disorders, Klin et al. offer greater insight into potential mechanisms 
underlying the manifestation of theory of mind difficulties in children with autism. 
They argue that the motivational predisposition to attend to social stimuli is 
attenuated in autism such that the relative salience and reward value associated with 
social stimuli is not naturally apparent (compare with TD group as discussed earlier). 
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As a result of this early emerging motivational deficit, children with autism would 
then have less opportunity for social experiences and exchanges. This could then 
create a developmental cascade (see Courchesne, 1997) in which children with 
autism increasingly fail to attend to social situations and stimuli which may then 
transact back with the environment and have direct effects upon absence from a 
whole range of social experiences and delayed or deficient social understanding .. 
In a similar vein to the origins of the motivational hypothesis outlined by Klin 
et al. (2003), Mundy and colleagues (1995-2001) focused on early emerging deficits 
in social understanding in autism. For instance, Mundy et al. argued that the social 
deficits seen in autism could originate in a neuropathologically based social orienting 
deficit whereby the opportunities for social interaction via gaze following and 
behaviours that are necessary for social and cognitive development, are not realised. 
Dawson and colleagues also supported this approach: in 1998 they explained autism 
via a bottom-up explanation in which the social-affective impairments were linked to 
impaired brain structures (e.g., the medial-temporallobe ). Expanding on this in 2004, 
Dawson et al. reported that while the typically developing infant's attention is drawn 
to imperfect contingent feedback (i.e. normal social interaction), the attention of 
children with autism is drawn to more consistent feedback (e.g., non-social stimuli). 
Therefore, with a failure to devote attention to social cues, Dawson et al. (2004) 
argued that children with autism miss vital opportunities for acquiring and practicing 
joint attention skills, which would then have subsequent adverse effects upon 
language and later aspects of social understanding such as social cognition. This 
hypothesis and the similar socially-based ones expressed by Mundy et al. and Klin et 
al. contrast sharply with the cognitive, maturational account of Baron-Cohen ( 1995) 
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which had proposed that it is the lack of a shared attention mechanism which is 
primarily responsible for the joint attention impairments seen in autism. 
Taking each of these aforementioned theories into account it is apparent that 
early emerging abilities/impairments within attention and perception are fundamental 
to the range of social understanding deficits which are experienced by children with 
autism throughout childhood and onwards. While Tager-Flusberg and Joseph's 
(1995) model of social understanding was described earlier in the context of typical 
development, it is true that this model was first presented by Tager-Flusberg and 
Joseph in terms of autism. Following on from Tager-Flusberg's first componential 
model (200 1 ), this more recent model provides a comprehensive framework which 
encompasses the basis of each theory listed above and provides an opportunity to test 
the proposed relationships between each aspect of social understanding and language. 
Within their 2005 model, Tager-Flusberg and Joseph suggested that children with 
autism have both impaired social-perceptual and social-cognitive knowledge and so 
the current study provides an opportunity to gauge their hypotheses. In addition, 
Tager-Flusberg and Joseph proposed their model from the perspective of how 
language can facilitate the acquisition of false belief understanding in children with 
autism. So their account also provides an opportunity to gauge the nature of possible 
compensatory paths to social understanding for children with autism. 
Within both of the models proposed by Tager-Flusberg and colleagues (2001 
& 2005), they suggest that the roots of the impairment in autism may be seen early in 
development when infants fail to attend to social stimuli. As a result of impairment to 
the neurocognitive system, these impairments impede the development of the ability 
to make online judgements of intentionality and perception of mental states. Thus, 
they argue that social orienting deficits are the foundation of the social-perceptual 
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aspects oftheory of mind and that the deficits in social cognition experienced by 
children with autism grow out of earlier deficits in social perception. However, they 
also argue that for the small percentage of children with autism who are able to 
display social-cognitive understanding (i.e. on false belief tasks), this success arises 
via a different pathway- i.e. not via social-perceptual understanding but via 
language or more general reasoning skills to "hack" out a solution (e.g., Happe et al., 
1996). Even the older, higher functioning individuals who are able to pass false 
belief tasks via this compensatory path are liable to continue to be impaired in tasks 
tapping social-perceptual understanding. 
In attempting to explain how the path to social understanding/theory of mind 
for children with autism may differ to that for typically developing children, Tager-
Flusberg and colleagues linked this into the relative exclusivity of language to arrive 
at social cognition, whereas they argued that typical children were able to develop 
social-cognitive abilities from their social-perceptual (and language) abilities. To 
investigate these model claims further and to complement the investigation of the 
previous couple of chapters, we now explore the relationships between these 
constituents of social understanding in children with autism. This will be achieved by 
again using the Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) model as a template to frame the 
investigation. As well as analysing the autism group in depth, their performance 
across the four constructs of social cognition, social perception, social attention and 
language will be compared to a verbally matched subset of typically developing 
children. First however, in order to place Tager-Flusberg and Joseph's model within 
the autism evidence base, we now tum our attention to a review of the key literature 
within each of the four constructs under investigation - social cognition, social 
perception, social attention and language. 
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7.1 Social cognition in autism 
As is apparent, the social and communication deficits experienced by children 
with autism have long been linked with traditional theory of mind difficulties within 
the domain of social cognition. Indeed, many studies have indicated via false belief 
tasks that the development of social understanding is significantly related to crucial 
aspects of social behaviour in children with autism (e.g., Watson, Nixon, Wilson, & 
Capage, 1999). While it is now generally agreed that these social-cognitive 
difficulties do not sufficiently explain the range of problems which children with 
autism experience, it is nonetheless important to continue researching their social 
cognitive skills and how these relate to other aspects of social understanding and 
possible compensatory paths such as that offered by language. 
The influential study conducted by Baron-Cohen et al. ( 1985) which tested 
the social-cognitive skills of children with autism via false belief stories found that 
they are significantly worse than control subjects in understanding the thoughts and 
beliefs of others. However, they also found that a minority of individuals with autism 
were able to pass false belief tasks and many studies have replicated their findings 
(see Baron-Cohen, 2000, for a review). Further evidence of atypical performance 
within the social cognition domain by children with autism has been illustrated by 
Peterson, Wellman, and Liu (2005). In their study of one hundred and forty-five 3- to 
13-year-olds- testing deaf children, children with autism and typically developing 
children on a social-cognitive scale- they found that all three groups followed the 
same developmental sequence but the autism group displayed a different sequence of 
understanding in the later stages of the progression. Reinforcing the idea that children 
with autism show a different pattern of development across social understanding, 
Carpenter et al. (2002) argued that joint attention skills are likely to emerge after 
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social cognition rather than before it. As well as social attention being implicated as a 
consequence of rather than a precursor to social cognition within an alternative path, 
the role of social perception within the different route to social cognition has been 
suggested by several studies. For instance, while a study of children with autism 
found normal levels of reference to desire in mother-child conversations (Tager-
Flusberg, 1992), a study by Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, and 
Walker ( 1995) found that children with autism were impaired in their ability to 
understand desire within a face expression recognition test. Together these findings 
suggested that children with autism can achieve a level of social-cognitive 
understanding irrespective of their social-perceptual knowledge. 
The above findings point towards the likelihood of a different developmental 
pathway for those children with autism who possess some social-cognitive 
understanding. Therefore, while social attention and social perception abilities may 
not be present or may be impaired, social cognitive understanding can still occur for 
children with autism. Much of the evidence in this area suggests that it is those 
children who have a higher level of language ability who can perform well on social 
cognitive tasks such as false belief stories (e.g., Tager-Flusberg, 2000). This has been 
supported by neuropsychological evidence- e.g., Siegal and Varley (2002) reported 
that children and adults with brain lesions were able to exhibit false belief 
understanding via the processing oflanguage propositions. In summary, this section 
has demonstrated that while children with autism almost universally have profound 
difficulties in social-cognitive understanding, a minority of children can achieve 
some level of such understanding exclusively via language rather than the typical 
route of social attention and social perception. The following three sections focus in 
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tum on each of these three areas in relation to social-cognitive understanding in 
children with autism. 
7.2 Social perception in autism 
As indicated above and argued by Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) in their 
model of social understanding, children with autism often demonstrate impairments 
in social perception. Much of the research within this area has implicated brain 
structures as underlying these social-perceptual deficits. For instance, Schultz (2005) 
summarised three different fMRI studies in autism which have all demonstrated the 
amygdala to be hypoactive during face-perception tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; 
Critchley et al., 2000; Pierce et al., 2001). This led Schultz to suggest that the social-
perceptual deficits found in children with autism were due to atypical brain function 
within the amygdala and fusiform face area. As a result of this dysfunction, Schultz 
argued that individuals with autism spectrum disorder have a specific deficit in the 
domain of face processing rather than processing of objects (e.g., Joseph & Tanaka, 
2003 ). Furthermore, he argued that this impairment was liable to be specific to facial 
expression perception (e.g., as tested on the social-perceptual tasks used throughout 
this thesis) rather than, for example, recognition of identity. Schultz asserted that 
faces are less emotionally stimulating for individuals with autism and resultantly 
these faces do not attract and sustain the attention of an individual with autism to the 
same extent as a typical person (e.g., Grelotti et al., 2005; Klin et al., 2002). 
Schultz's argument is congruent with the theoretical perspectives outlined earlier in 
the chapter which attempted to explain the social and communication deficits seen in 
autism. In the sense that they all refer to a neurological impairment which adversely 
affects the individual's motivation to respond to social stimuli, such theories can 
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embrace the biological and social dimensions thought likely to underpin the social-
communicative deficits observed in autism. 
In contrast to the views above which posit that the atypical processing of 
faces and their expression of emotion in autism is due to problems with motivation 
and social interaction, a paper by Behrmann, Thomas, and Humphreys (2006) 
proposes an alternative mechanism to underlie the face processing difficulties seen in 
autism. While Behrmann et al. acknowledge the motivational and social accounts that 
have been offered to explain the face processing difficulties seen in autism, they 
propose an alternative view based on the idea that such problems may be due to a 
visual perceptual impairment which is independent of their social function. However, 
while they agree that there is considerable evidence indicating atypical face 
processing in autism, they state that there is surprisingly little consensus concerning 
the source of such impairment. They refer to Dawson's work which focuses on the 
lack of motivation toward social stimuli and Behrmann et al. also refer to the work of 
Baron-Cohen and Belmonte (2005) which suggests that the social deficit may arise 
from general impairment in empathising and social cognition, and from precursors 
such as deficits in joint attention. However, Behrmann et al. argue that the root of 
social-processing impairments in autism may be due to basic perceptual difficulties 
as observed in the tendency for individuals with autism to focus on local features 
rather than to extract the overall meaning or gestalt of the stimulus. Such an 
argument is corroborated by recent findings (e.g., Happe & Frith, 2006) suggesting 
that the perceptual difficulties seen in autism may be independent of deficits in social 
behaviour and theory of mind abilities. However, Behrmann et al. did acknowledge 
that individuals with autism do seem to process faces as if they were objects, thus 
being unaware/unmotivated to regard the social basis to such stimuli. Therefore, 
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while children with autism may have problems with social perception in terms of 
face processing, this may not be specific to social interaction or have a motivational 
basis and could be due to a general impairment in visual processing. 
In summary, this section has conveyed that there is consensus that children 
with autism have social-perceptual impairments and that this is particularly marked 
in terms of their ability to process faces and emotional expressions. While it is agreed 
that these are generally processed atypically, several different explanations have been 
offered to describe the underlying mechanism for such impairments for individuals 
with autism. Although Behrmann et al. propose the notion of more general visual 
impairment affecting children with autism in terms of their face-processing ability, 
most accounts more readily focus on the likelihood of an early-emerging social 
deficit underlying such impairment. Reviewing the literature within the area of social 
attention may provide extra insight into the nature of the mechanism underlying face 
processing in children with autism since abilities within social attention would be 
likely to precede their social-perceptual abilities or impairments. 
7.3 Social attention in autism 
The literature reviewed thus far within the domains of social cognition and 
social perception has revealed that children with autism generally have impairment in 
both areas of understanding. The interpretation of the term social attention within 
this thesis has been synonymous with abilities such as orienting to stimuli and 
sharing attention with others and would appear to be intrinsically simpler than social-
perceptual abilities such as interpreting emotion from facial expressions. So what 
does the evidence look like for social attention abilities or impairments in children 
with autism? Based on the accounts of Dawson et al. (2004), Klin et al. (2003), 
Mundy and Neal (2001), and Tager-Flusberg and Joseph's (2005) model, it would be 
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expected that children with autism would be impaired within the domain of social 
attention, which would then have downstream effects upon their social-perceptual 
and social-cognitive understanding. With a recent, strong focus in autism within the 
area of social attention specifically, does the bulk of evidence support such a 
viewpoint? Much of the autism research in the domain of social attention has focused 
on the role of joint attention with less focus upon social vs. nonsocial orienting. 
Increasingly, research is focusing on the latter as such dyadic-type orienting occurs at 
a more simplistic level than triadic interaction and so precedes triadic joint attention 
function. This section will first review some joint attention findings in autism before 
detailing recent evidence on lower-level social/nonsocial orienting. 
It is widely accepted that children with autism have difficulties with joint 
attention behaviours. Indeed, joint attention ability has been established as a 
fundamental social-communication impairment in autism which is present by 1 year 
of age and as such, it is included within the diagnostic criteria for autism (APA, 
1994). Leekam et al. (2000) found that children with autism initiate few joint 
attention behaviours and respond less to adult bids of attention than children with 
other disabilities. Miller (2006) reviewed the literature on developmental 
relationships between language and different aspects of social understanding and 
concluded that early joint attention deficits seen in autism seem to be a crucial aspect 
of their communicative development. While Carpenter et al. (2002) asserted that 
when children with autism do develop joint attention abilities, they appear in the 
typical order of sharing, following, then directing others' attention, Dawson et al. 
(2004) argued that since instances of joint attention in autism are rarely supported by 
a shared exchange of emotion, the nature of joint attention and communication will 
generally be different in autism. Resultantly, children with autism would be less 
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liable to extract meaning from such interaction and so this would then affect their 
pragmatic language development. 
Numerous studies have demonstrated links betweenjoint attention and 
language ability in children with autism. A longitudinal study by Sigman and Ruskin 
( 1999) found that the joint attention skills of children with autism were concurrently 
associated with vocabulary development and predicted long-term gains in expressive 
language ability. Further evidence of the strong positive link between language 
ability and social attention was provided in a study which demonstrated that 100% of 
children with autism with a verbal mental age over 4 years of age were able to 
spontaneously follow another person's gaze (Leekam et al., 2000). Assessing this 
link via an intervention, Bono, Daley and Sigman (2004) investigated whether joint 
attention abilities may moderate the relationship between amount of behavioural 
intervention and language development in children with autism. They found that joint 
attention skills were associated with greater language development and the 
relationship between intervention amount and language gain was dependent on 
ability to respond to joint attention bids. In addition, more recently Leekam and 
Ramsden (2006) tested joint attention ability (in terms of gaze following) 
experimentally and via observation and found very strong developmental effects that 
were related to verbal mental age. Each of the above studies conveys the strong link 
which exists between joint attention ability and language development in children 
with autism. 
Corroborating the evidence above for such a link, Dawson et al. (2004) found 
in their comprehensive study that joint attention was a significant predictor of 
language in children with autism. Whilst this finding obtained from structural 
equation modelling (SEM) analyses was noteworthy in itself, Dawson et al. 's study 
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provided several other findings of interest. They also found that combined 
impairments in joint attention and orienting were found to best distinguish young 
children with autism from those without autism. In addition, their SEM revealed that 
orienting ability was indirectly linked to language ability through their relation to 
joint attention in children with autism. Also, as they noted within their study, at that 
time there were few experimental studies on social orienting impaim1ent in autism. 
Following on from an earlier study (Dawson et al., 1998), Dawson et al. (2004) 
improved the methodology and replicated their earlier finding that children with 
autism were less likely to orient to both social and nonsocial stimuli than matched 
controls, and displayed a more severe impairment in relation to social stimuli. 
Several other studies have highlighted the issue of a discrepancy between orienting to 
social and nonsocial stimuli in autism. For instance, Swettenham et al. ( 1998) 
showed that 20-month old toddlers with autism looked more briefly at people and 
longer at objects than developmentally delayed or typically developing toddlers. 
Also, in the study by Leekam et al. (2000), children with autism were less responsive 
than developmentally delayed controls in orienting to attention bids, but only when 
these were social. Slightly aside from the procedure of orienting but still conveying 
discrepant social/nonsocial processing, it has been demonstrated that children with 
autism have a relatively intact ability to point referentially to nonsocial stimuli 
compared to more socially-oriented pointing (Bruinsma, Koegel, & Koegel, 2004). 
In summary, this section on social attention has conveyed that joint attention 
is a source of significant impairment in children with autism and that ability levels of 
this behaviour are strongly positively correlated with concurrent and later language 
abilities. In addition, reviewing some of the recent literature on orienting abilities has 
illustrated that children with autism are significantly impaired in their ability to orient 
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their attention to stimuli in comparison to developmentally delayed children or 
matched typical children. This deficit is particularly marked for social stimuli and it 
has been demonstrated that children with autism generally have a spontaneous 
preference for nonsocial rather than social stimuli. These findings are congruent with 
earlier description of various theoretical accounts of the social basis to early 
emerging interaction deficits experienced by children with autism. This reinforces the 
suggestion that children, or rather infants, with autism, are liable to have neurological 
impairments which affect their motivation to attend to and perceive social stimuli 
such as faces, or results in atypical processing such that the attention of children with 
autism is drawn to consistent rather than non-consistent feedback from stimuli. 
Whatever the nature of the underlying mechanism for the early emerging social 
deficits experienced by children with autism, it seems logical that such deficits 
reduce the opportunities for typical everyday social interactions. By then transacting 
back between their environment and developing brain, these early atypical exchanges 
mark the beginning of a maladaptive and atypical path through social understanding 
from social attention to social cognition. However, as this section and the social 
cognition section have conveyed, some children with autism can obtain a certain 
level of social cognition via relatively intact language abilities, which may link back 
to early joint attention abilities. The next and final section of this literature review 
looks at the role of language in social understanding for children with autism. 
7. 4 Language in autism 
As was explained at the outset of this chapter, deficits in communication are 
among the core diagnostic symptoms which identify autism. While difficulties in 
pragmatic understanding are common in individuals with autism, the range of ability 
in other aspects of language can be much more variable. Individual differences in 
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areas such as syntactic understanding and vocabulary acquisition can lead to a range 
of ability across social understanding. Within certain accounts of autism (e.g., the 
theory of mind hypothesis), the variability in language ability has been regarded as 
shaping rather than stemming from or coinciding with people's social-cognitive 
abilities. However, as complex as the link has been shown to be for typically 
developing children, the link between language and social understanding for children 
with autism is similarly as complex. Previous sections on social attention and social 
cognition have illustrated the close ties which exist between these domains and 
language for children with autism. Evidence suggests that children with autism can 
exhibit relatively intact levels of social-cognitive understanding while being impaired 
in social attention and social perception. In the absence of typical routes to social 
cognition via social attention and social perception, language has been shown to be 
influential in compensating for these impairments to arrive at more typical 
understanding within social cognition. Therefore, much of the research examining 
language and social understanding in autism has examined the relationship between 
language and social cognition. 
While social attention and social perception impairments are particularly 
marked in children with autism, language is closely entwined with social cognition 
by virtue of the comparative success which tends to exist between measures from 
both domains. For instance, Eisenmajer and Prior (1991) found that pragmatic ability 
and verbal mental age were greater in children with autism who were able to pass 
false belief tasks. Also, several studies have demonstrated a positive correlation 
between false beliefunderstanding and vocabulary knowledge in children with 
autism (e.g., Happe, 1995; Sparrevohn & Howie, 1995). In addition, as explained 
within the section reviewing social cognitive understanding in autism, children with 
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autism who are more able in areas of language such as syntactic ability can often 
display more intact levels of social-cognitive understanding. For example, while 
Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1994) found that vocabulary scores were significantly 
correlated with false belief performance in children with autism, they found that false 
belief ability was more strongly correlated with children's syntactic abilities. Such 
relationships between syntax and false belief understanding correspond closely with 
those identified in typically developing children (e.g., de Villiers & Pyers, 2002). 
While it is agreed that links exist between social cognition and language in 
both typical and atypical development, the nature of the relationship in autism is 
debated as it was for the typical children described earlier. In the absence of social 
attention and social perception, some researchers argue that language ability is 
required in order for children with autism to be able to cope with the verbal demands 
of false belief tasks - and these children utilise language in a non-intuitive, 
cumbersome way to be able to "hack-out" solutions and exhibit social-cognitive 
understanding (e.g., Happe, 1995). In accordance with the account of social 
understanding in typical development (e.g., Carpendale & Lewis, 2006), a different 
perspective asserts that language and social-cognitive understanding are closely 
linked in autism due to the fact that both aspects of understanding are grounded in 
the context of social interaction and conversational discourse (e.g., Garfield et al., 
2001). 
Aside from the perspectives above, one view - which is also popular within 
typical development - explains the success of a minority of children with autism on 
false belief tasks in terms of their syntactic language abilities. Indeed, Tager-Flusberg 
(2000) found that knowledge of sentential complements was the single best predictor 
of false belief performance for children with autism. The importance of syntactic 
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ability for false belief understanding has been underlined in the context of typical 
development- theoretical and empirical work by de Villiers and de Villiers (2000) in 
particular has demonstrated the influence of syntactic understanding upon false belief 
understanding. In autism however, syntactic understanding of sentential 
complements has been argued to provide a more exclusive role in facilitating social-
cognitive understanding. In their model of social understanding in autism, Tager-
Flusberg and Joseph (2005) suggest that children with autism can exhibit false belief 
understanding via their syntactic language ability which compensates for 
impairments within social attention and social perception. Thus, sufficient 
understanding in the use of sentence complements can provide children with autism 
with insight into their function and provide the opportunity to reason logically about 
false belief stories, and by bootstrapping a fragile notion of false belief understanding 
in this way, it is possible to bypass the typical route to such understanding. 
Therefore, while typical children would be expected to draw upon abilities within 
social attention, social perception and language in understanding social cognition, 
children with autism may achieve success on social-cognitive tasks exclusively on 
the basis of their language abilities. However, it remains true that success on 
structured false belief tasks often does not necessarily correspond with success in 
negotiating everyday social interactions (Travis, Sigman, & Ruskin, 2001 ). 
In summary, it seems apparent from the evidence above that language is 
crucial for children with autism if they are to have any ability in understanding the 
mental states described in false belief stories. While the majority of children with 
autism have impairments in most aspects of social understanding - i.e. social 
cognition, social perception and social attention as well as language, the review of 
the evidence here has revealed that a minority of children with autism are able to pass 
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social-cognitive tasks. This minority generally rely on their language ability (often in 
terms of syntactic understanding) to bolster a fragile concept of false beliefs and 
social cognition. However, even those children with autism who have some level of 
social-cognitive understanding due to their language ability generally do not find that 
this understanding necessarily transfers to understanding the thoughts and beliefs of 
others in online everyday social situations. Nonetheless, language has been shown to 
be the single most significant prognostic factor for long-term cognitive, social and 
adaptive outcomes in autism (Howlin, Mawhood, & Rutter, 2000). Furthermore, 
since language has been shown to compensate for impairments in lower-level social 
understanding, it is an important area to study when considering atypical routes to 
social understanding in children with autism. 
7.5 Summary and hypotheses 
Reviewing the main literature in the domains of social cognition, social 
perception, social attention and language has conveyed the extent of impairment 
within the domains of social understanding and language for children with autism. 
Traditionally, researching this population has focused on social-cognitive difficulties 
and performance deficits on false belief tasks to the extent that the theory of mind 
hypothesis was once a plausible explanation of autism. However, recent research has 
illustrated that children with autism have difficulties with social orienting and joint 
attention prior to their problems with social-cognitive understanding. These findings 
coincided with accounts which focused on early emerging impairments in the 
domains of social attention and social perception. While deficits in these areas are 
almost universal in autism, some children with autism are able to compensate for 
these impairments by way of their language abilities. In these cases (such as found in 
high-functioning autism and Asperger syndrome) individuals with autism can use 
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their relatively intact language skills to enable some understanding of social 
cognition as evidenced on false belief tasks. However, even in this atypical route to 
some level of social-cognitive understanding, it is often the case that success on false 
belief tasks does not correspond with success in on-line everyday social interactions. 
This chapter will test the predictions which follow from Tager-Flusberg and 
Joseph's (2005) model, while simultaneously testing the final model which resulted 
from the structural equation modelling for the large sample of typical children within 
chapter 6. Tager-Flusberg and Joseph interpreted the research field of social 
understanding in autism in the following way within their model. They suggested 
that in autism, there is fundamental impairment from infancy onwards in social-
perceptual abilities. As pointed out within chapter 4, Tager-Flusberg and Joseph's 
definition of social perception jointly encompasses both social attention and social 
perception; in contrast these abilities have been explicitly distinguished within this 
thesis. Irrespective of the more inclusive structure ofTager-Flusberg and Joseph, it 
follows that this domain of ability is impaired in autism from an early age and 
resultantly, such deficits in social attention and social perception lead to profound 
impairment in their social-cognitive understanding. However, they argue that a 
minority of children with autism are able to develop the ability to succeed on false 
belief tasks despite social-perceptual deficits via their language ability, particularly 
semantic and syntactic understanding of verbs of communication. Thus on the basis 
of their model and the 4 distinct constituents of social understanding which the group 
of children with autism were tested upon, the following hypotheses were made. It 
could be predicted from their model that social attention and social perception -
while distinguished here- would be strongly correlated since Tager-Flusberg and 
Joseph group these domains together and believe this component is fundamentally 
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impaired. Since the children with autism to be tested here were not particularly high-
functioning it was expected that language and social cognition would be interrelated 
with social attention and social perception, by virtue of all eliciting low levels of 
ability. However, in cases where language abilities were relatively intact, it would be 
expected that this would correspond with improved social cognition, and resultantly, 
if a relatively strong link was found between language and social cognition, this may 
be expected to coincide with weaker links between social attention and social 
perception with these domains. 
On the basis of the evidence reviewed above and the model of social 
understanding resulting from the SEM for the large cohort of typical children in 
chapter 6, slightly different predictions may be made compared to those pertaining to 
Tager-Flusberg and Joseph's (2005) model. Firstly, the new model would not predict 
the strong link between social attention and social perception; this contrasts with the 
prediction stemming from the model ofTager-Flusberg and Joseph. Secondly, while 
the role of language in facilitating the false belief understanding for children with 
autism is not questioned, it seems reasonable to assert that those children with autism 
who have relatively intact language abilities may also have some level of social-
perceptual understanding in addition to possible compensated social-cognitive 
ability. This assertion is based on the premise that some children with autism can 
interact with others at a perceptual level (albeit atypically and generally non-
socially), which may then provide some opportunity to understand the language of 
communication. Furthermore, the social-perceptual tests used within this study 
require a certain level of language ability in order to process the thoughts and 
feelings which feature throughout the test, so a significant link between social 
perception and language is a possibility in the context of the new model. Testing the 
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four constructs of social cognition, social perception, social attention and language 
for children with autism here will provide an interesting test of the relevance of 
Tager-Flusberg and Joseph's (2005) model and of the usefulness of the new model 
from chapter 6 for paths to social understanding in autism. It would seem that both 
models would predict that these language-matched groups should not differ 
significantly in terms of their social-cognitive abilities, although this may pertain 
more to our model as opposed to Tager-Flusberg and Joseph's model as they argue 
the case for the exclusive role of syntactic language ability. Nonetheless, given the 
apparent central role of language in terms of both models for typical children and 
children with autism, the comparison of groups of typical children and children with 
autism matched on language should provide a valuable insight into the nature of 
compensation in the social understanding abilities of children with autism which is 
provided by language. 
Method 
Participants 
24 children with autism - 18 males and 6 females - were tested in the present 
study. All children were diagnosed with autism and were located in autism-specific 
schools or schools with a specialist autism unit. Children were recruited from 3 
schools via parental opt-in consent. Chronological ages ranged from 4 years and 5 
months to 17 years and 7 months, (mean: 13 years and 0 months; SD: 3 years and 10 
months). However, for purposes of matching these children to a subset of typically 
developing children from the previous study, children's verbal mental ages (as 
measured on the BPVS) spanned a more restricted range: 3 years and 1 month to 12 
years and 1 month (mean: 6 years and 11 months; SD: 2 years and 7 months). 
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Materials and Procedure 
Ethical approval for this study was granted by the National Autistic Society, 
after which, parents of children with autism were recruited via opt-in consent from 
national NAS or NAS-accredited schools. In each of the three schools that 
participated, children with autism whose parent had consented were tested by the 
experimenter in small compact rooms (of similar dimensions to those described in 
the previous chapter). In order to compare social understanding and language 
abilities of children with autism to the large group of typically developing (TD) 
children described in the previous chapter, the experimental design of this study was 
the same as that employed for the TD study. Therefore, the materials and equipment 
which were used here were exactly the same as those used in the previous study. 
In order to provide a valid comparison of the social understanding and 
language abilities of children with autism to those of the TD children, all children 
with autism were given the same battery of tasks as the TD children. Therefore, each 
child with autism was tested on two social-cognitive tasks, three social-perceptual 
tasks and two social attention tasks as outlined in chapter 6. They were also tested on 
the BPVS to obtain verbal mental ages which could be matched to the TD children. 
As for the TD children, children with autism also received 2 subtests of the W ASI-
namely, vocabulary and matrix reasoning. 
Similar to parents of TD children, parents of the children with autism were 
asked to complete the Children's Communication Checklist-2. In addition, to provide 
more information on the symptomatology of children with autism in our sample, 
parents were also asked to complete the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ) 
(Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003). This measure provides a dimensional measure of 
ASD symptomatology in terms of abilities or impairments within the domains of 
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reciprocal social interaction, language and repetitive behaviours. Consisting of 40 
items, this test offered a straightforward and quick way for parents to indicate their 
child's language and social behaviours. A cut-off score of~ 15 indicates the 
likelihood that an individual has an autism spectrum disorder and gives some insight 
into symptom severity. 
Also, to provide us with further indication of the symptomatology of children 
with autism, a final questionnaire was issued: the teachers who worked most closely 
with the children were asked to complete the classroom edition of the Vineland 
Adaptive Behaviour Scales (VABS) (Sparrow, Balla, & Cicchetti, 1985). This 
provided a standardised assessment of a wide range of children's everyday social and 
non-social behaviours. Sparrow et al. define adaptive behaviour as performance of 
the daily activities required for personal and social sufficiency. The questionnaire 
contains 244 items (measuring across 4 domains: Communication, Daily Living 
skills, Socialisation, and Motor skills) and takes about 30 minutes for teachers to 
complete. Opting for the Classroom edition provided a measure which was both 
economical (in terms of time saved interviewing parents) and ecological (in terms of 
a comprehensive summary of everyday abilities as perceived by an individual 
working closely with the child on a daily basis). 
The procedure of testing children with autism was the same as the procedure 
used to test the typically developing children. There were only three exceptions: 
firstly, it was necessary to test some children with autism over 3 rather than 2 
sessions in order to ensure that their concentration levels were less likely to adversely 
affect their task performance. Secondly, in a few instances, testing occurred in the 
presence of the child's support worker (though this presence remained understated 
for the majority of the time). Neither of these exceptions affected children's 
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performance adversely or otherwise. Finally, during administration of a handful of 
joint attention trials it was necessary to call the child's name in order to gain initial 
attention prior to the onset of the trial. Otherwise, the overall procedure followed in 
the same fashion as was described within chapter 6. 
Results 
The results section is divided into three parts: part 1 focuses primarily on the 
general performance of children with autism across all tasks. However, within this 
section, some comparison will be made with the overall typical sample of children 
tested earlier within the thesis on the same battery of tasks. Part 2 then briefly 
examines the relation between the task-based abilities for the whole autism group and 
their autistic symptomatology to determine the nature of any discrepancy between 
their performance on structured tasks and function in everyday tasks. These first two 
sections provided an opportunity to illustrate the level of ability or impairment across 
a range of social understanding and language tasks in children with autism. Part 3 
then consolidated the preceding two results sections and grounded the abilities of 
children with autism in the context of typical development by focusing analyses more 
explicitly on possible different paths through social understanding for children with 
autism in comparison to typically developing children. This was investigated by 
matching children with autism to a subset of the large sample of typically developing 
children documented in chapter 6. Matching children on their language ability as 
evidenced on the BPVS enabled direct comparison of these two groups of children 
across all 3 of the constituents of social understanding which have been investigated 
throughout this thesis. 
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7. 6 Results part 1: General pe1:{ormance of children with autism across social 
understanding and language tasks 
A full data set was achieved with the following exceptions: one child did not 
cooperate in listening to the false belief or ignorance stories and did not complete the 
friendliness task. 4 other children did not cooperate in completing the eyes task. 
Finally, one child completed 2 of the 4 sections of the social-perceptual Affect task, 
and so her score was averaged over the whole task. With regard to the number of 
questionnaires which were returned from a total of 24, 17 Children's Communication 
Checklist-2 and 19 Social Communication Questionnaires were completed and 
returned by parents, and 22 Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale questionnaires were 
completed and returned by teachers. While missing values were replaced within the 
large-scale study of typically developing children reported in the previous chapter, 
missing values were not replaced within the present study given the smaller sample 
size and the heterogeneous nature of abilities in children with autism. 
Next, the normality of the dataset was examined using histograms, q-q 
normality plots and Shapiro-Wilk statistics. The graphs suggested that several of the 
variables were skewed, including: the Affect and friendliness tasks, both social-
cognitive tasks and the BPVS and syntax measures. The distributions for the 
remaining variables appeared to be relatively normal. This interpretation was 
supported by Shapiro-Wilk statistics: only the orienting task, joint attention task, 
Eyes task and W ASI test had non-significant values, indicating that these variables 
were normal. Shapiro-Wilk statistics for the remaining variables were significant at 
the 5% level. Given the extent of non-normality within the dataset, the relationship 
between variables was analysed using non-parametric correlations (Spearman's rho). 
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Prior to correlation analysis however, descriptive statistics are outlined below 
in Table 7.1 for all the variables which children with autism were tested on (except 
the Social Communication Questionnaire and the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour 
Scales- these will be summarised in Part 2 of the results). As mentioned at the outset 
of the results section, the differences in social understanding between the group of 
children with autism and typically developing children will be examined explicitly 
via a language-matched dataset in part 3 of the results. However, for the benefit of 
providing an initial picture of differences in paths to social understanding, this part 
will highlight some of the similarities and contrasts in ability between children with 
autism and the large group of typical children. 
As Table 7.1 shows, as was expected, children with autism performed more 
poorly across all the social understanding and language variables than the typically 
developing children who were tested on these variables within chapter 6. From 
simply looking at the differences in group means, it appeared that children with 
autism are particularly impaired in the areas of social cognition and language, with 
performance on social attention and social perception tasks eliciting less of a group 
difference. Table 7.1 conveys that the social-perceptual mean scores for children with 
autism did not differ greatly from those obtained for the typically developing group. 
Meanwhile, for the two social-cognitive tasks it can be seen that in a similar way to 
the typical children described in chapter 6, children with autism found the composite 
ignorance tasks to be easier than composite false belief tasks. However, as expected, 
children with autism showed relatively poor performance on both composite social-
cognitive tasks with mean levels below 50% on both variables. In terms of 
performance on the three language variables, children with autism showed marked 
deficits in comparison with the typically developing children. 
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Table 7.1 
Means and standard deviations of performance on the I 0 social understanding and 
language variables for children with autism 
Variable/Task Mean (Mean of TD Standard Deviation 
children in chapter 6) 
orienting 4.70 (6.40) 1.94 
joint attention 3.57 (4.09) 1.70 
affect 47.54 (51.83) 14.10 
eyes 11.88 ( 12.57) 3.41 
friendliness 25.56 (26.24) 15.15 
Ignorance 3.60 (6.33) 2.79 
false belief 1.38 (4.78) 1.82 
BPVS 61.54 (105.21) 22.56 
syntax 2.00 (8.66) 2.40 
WASI 74.00 (98.67) 12.46 
However, in terms of general task performance, the area of most interest in 
the group of children with autism was the social attention construct, in particular the 
range of performance on the adapted version of Dawson et al. 's (2004) orienting task. 
From Table 7.1 it can be calculated that children with autism correctly responded to a 
similar percentage of orienting and joint attention trials - 59% and 60% respectively. 
This pattern contrasts with the findings obtained for the typically developing group in 
which children correctly responded to 80% of orienting trials and 68% of joint 
attention trials. 
Before graphically comparing children with autism and typical children's 
performance on the adapted version of Dawson et al. 's orienting task, Figure 7.1 
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presents the percentage of trials on which children with autism responded to social 
vs . non-social orienting trials within 6 seconds and the more stringent classification 
of 3 seconds (as it was defined alongside the 6 second criterion within the 
methodology section of chapter 6). As Figure 7.1 shows, within 6 seconds of the 
delivery of trials, children with autism COITectly oriented their attention on average to 
a higher percentage of social (62%) than non-social (54.3%) stimuli . However, 
within the 3 second criterion, this direction was reversed: children with autism 
correctly attended to 40.25% of social trials and 41.25% of non-social trials. 
Figure 7.1 Percentage of correct head or eye turns to social and non-social stimuli 
by children with autism 
Correct 
Head/Eye 
Turns 
Social Non-social 
Stimulus Type 
To compare the orienting abilities of children with autism and the typically 
developing children described in chapter 6, Figure 7.2 summarises the percentage of 
correct head/eye turns to social vs. non-social orienting trials by the group of children 
with autism and the whole group of typical children (n = 127) within the 6 second 
criterion. This figure illustrates that children with autism more frequently failed to 
orient their attention to both types of stimuli, and that this impairment was more 
severe for social stimuli . Furthermore, these findings were more extreme when the 3 
second criterion was used: TD children correctly oriented to 76% of social stimuli 
compared to only 40.3% of children with autism (i .e. a difference of almost 36%), 
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while TD correctly oriented to 66.5% of non-social stimuli compared to 41.25% of 
children with autism (i.e. a difference of25%). The general picture provided by these 
differences is congruent with the nature of the differences outlined in the original 
Dawson et al. (2004) task, suggesting that the adapted version of the task is 
comparable. However, due to the discrepant sample sizes between the autism group 
(N =24) and the large typical group (N= 127), as well as the fact that Dawson et al. 
compared an autism group with a matched typical group, the explicit comparison 
between the findings from the current study and those of Dawson et al. will be 
examined within part 3 of the results which outlines the explicit comparison between 
children with autism and typical children based on matched groups of equal size. 
Figure 7.2 Percentage of correct head or eye turns to social and non-social stimuli 
within 6 seconds 
90r----------------------, 
80 
70 
Percentage of 60 
Correct 
Head/Eye 
Turns 
soc ial nonsocial 
Stimulus Type 
In terms of joint attention abilities, analysis of the accuracy in responding 
revealed that children with autism correctly responded to fewer joint attention trials 
than typically developing children within both the 6 seconds and 3 seconds criteria. 
Approximately 60% oftrials were correctly responded to by children with autism, 
while 68% of trials were responded to correctly by typically developing children -
this difference was not significant, t(l) = 1.61 , p = 0.20. However, within the more 
stringent criterion of 3 seconds, approximately 16% fewer trials were correctly 
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responded to by children with autism (47.2% for children with autism vs. 62.7% for 
typically developing children) and this difference was significant, x2(1) = 5.17, p = 
0.02. Therefore, compared to typically developing 4- to 5-year-olds, children with 
autism were significantly impaired in their ability to respond to bids of joint 
attention, but only within the more stringent 3 second criterion. This may suggest 
that the discrepancy between sharing attention with others is less marked as the time 
from trial onset increases. Nonetheless, using the joint attention passing criteria as 
used by Leekam et al. (1997) and as adopted within the previous chapter (i.e. at least 
4/6 successful joint attention trials), it was found that 45.8% of the autism group 
correctly attended to at least 4/6 trials compared to 69% of typically developing 
children. This difference between groups in passing at least 4/6 joint attention trials 
was significant, t(l) = 10.82, p < 0.01. In sum, given the general difficulties 
exhibited by children with autism in the domain of social attention, both social 
attention tasks produced findings for the autism group which were expected in 
comparison to typically developing children's abilities. 
Correlation analysis of social understanding and language variables 
As mentioned earlier, due to several skewed variables, the data were analysed 
using Spearman's rho correlations. The nonparametric correlations were only 
marginally different to the parametric correlations - within the parametric correlation 
matrix, syntax was significantly associated to the Eyes task and ignorance was not 
associated with the Eyes task, otherwise all other significant correlations were 
congruent across both matrices. However, despite these two discrepancies, given the 
small sample size as well as the number of skewed variables, nonparametric analyses 
were selected. Table 7.2 presents the resultant nonparametric correlation matrix. 
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Table 7.2 
Nonparametric correlation matrix of 10 social understanding and language 
variables in children with autism 
Indicator 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
I. Social 
attention-
Orienting 
2. Social 
-.17 I 
attention - Joint 
attention 
3. Social 
perception -
-.30 -.10 I 
Affect 
4. Social 
perception -
-.09 .00 .47* 
Friendliness 
5. Social 
perception-
.32 -.33 .64** .40 
Eyes 
6. Social 
cognition- .22 -.22 .41 * .38 .24 
False belief 
7. Social 
cognition-
.30 -.16 .50* .50* .43* .81 ** 
Ignorance 
8. Language-
BPVS .14 -.01 .44* .59** .30 .43* .41 * 1 
9. Language-
CCC-2 (syntax) .01 -.32 .64* .31 .40 .27 .44 .31 
I 0. Language -
-.17 -.29 .60* .34 .39 .39 .40* .66** .50* WASI 
*: significant at 0.05 level 
**:significant at O.Ollevel 
Interestingly, it can be seen that the ability of children with autism to respond to 
social attention trials (whether via the orienting or joint attention task) was not 
significantly related to any other variables - this was congruent with the findings for 
the large typically developing (TD) group of children described in the previous 
chapter. However, in contrast to the findings for the TD group, there was no 
association between the two social attention tasks - this may be due to the smaller 
sample size of the autism group, but this idea will be explored further in the matched 
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analyses later in this section. Further examination of Table 7.2 revealed that the 
social-perceptual Affect task was significantly related with every variable other than 
the social attention tasks. Indeed, it was highly correlated with both other social-
perceptual tasks and its strong link with the syntax measure seems particularly 
noteworthy given that this language measure was based on only the 17 children 
whose parents responded to the CCC-2 questionnaire. The apparent importance of 
the link between the social-perceptual Affect task and syntactic ability is underlined 
by the absence of a significant relationship between syntax and any other variable. 
Similar to findings for TD children within the previous chapter, the social-
perceptual tasks appear to cluster together well for children with autism with all 
intra-correlations being significant at least at the 5% level. Furthermore, these tasks 
would appear to hold together more strongly than for the typically developing sample 
since performance on the Eyes and Friendliness tasks was significantly associated for 
the autism group but not for the whole sample of TD children. The two social-
cognitive tasks were also strongly correlated for children with autism, r = 0.80, p < 
0.0 1. While performance of children with autism on the composite ignorance task 
was significantly related to most other variables (other than the social attention 
tasks), the composite false belief variable was only related to the Affect, ignorance 
and BPVS tasks. However, the reduced number of significant links for this social-
cognitive measure with other variables in comparison to the composite ignorance 
task suggested that the non-normality of false belief understanding for children with 
autism was likely to be sufficiently skewed to gloss over potential significant 
relationships. Despite the skewed nature of their false beliefunderstanding, finding 
that this ability was significantly related to language abilities (BPVS) of children 
with autism and finding that their performance on the other social-cognitive task was 
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related to each of the three social-perceptual tasks as well as the two experimental 
language-based tasks, suggested an intertwining of these three abilities (i.e. social 
perception, language and social cognition) in children with autism. Finally, the 
language/IQ construct appeared to hold together relatively well for the autism group 
with their performance on the W ASI task being significantly linked to both BPVS 
performance and syntactic ability. 
While many of the same relationships identified within the typically 
developing group of children were found here with children with autism (on first 
inspection certainly), the more heterogeneous nature of the group of children with 
autism in terms of age suggested that it would be necessary to conduct partial 
correlations while controlling for age. These are displayed below in Table 7.3. When 
controlling for age, the partial correlation matrix did not differ greatly from the 
original correlation matrix displayed in Table 7 .2. The only differences were that 
after partialling age out, the links between Eyes and Friendliness tasks, and between 
Eyes and ignorance tasks were not significant, while there was now a significant 
correlation between the Eyes and syntax measures. These differences may suggest 
that once the age of children with autism has been taken into account, their 
performance on the Eyes task is explained more by language ability and less by 
social-perceptual or social-cognitive performance (two language measures are 
significantly correlated with the Eyes task, whereas the social-perceptual Affect task 
provides the only other significant link with Eyes task performance). 
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Table 7.3 
Partial correlation matrix of 10 social understanding and language variables while 
controlling for chronological age 
Indicator I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Social 
attention- 1 
Orienting 
2. Social 
-.20 1 
attention- Joint 
attention 
3. Social 
perception -
-.27 -.13 1 
Affect 
4. Social 
perception -
-.10 .11 .56** 1 
Friendliness 
5. Social 
perception -
-.24 -.31 .68** .38 
Eyes 
6. Social 
cognition-
.09 -.21 .41 * .26 .18 
False belief 
7. Social 
cognition-
.24 -.14 .48* .44* .29 .82** 
Ignorance 
8. Language-
BPVS 
-.10 -.10 .64** .69** .39 .73** .79** 
9. Language-
CCC-2 (syntax) .04 -.29 .52* .31 .50* .15 .30 .38 
10. Language -
-.16 -.31 .55* .34 .41 * .40 .46* .57** .54* WASI 
*: significant at 0.05 level 
**: significant at 0.01level 
Both correlation matrices thus far have suggested that language (particularly 
BPVS performance) plays a strong role within the social-perceptual and social-
cognitive abilities of children with autism and the link between their social-cognitive 
and verbal abilities has been evidenced many times (see earlier discussion). Given 
these points, partial correlations while controlling for BPVS standard scores are 
presented below in Table 7 .4. (In depth analyses based on matched typically 
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developing and autistic samples in terms of BPVS age equivalents (i.e. verbal mental 
ages) are discussed in Part 3 of this results section). 
Table 7.4 
Partial correlation matrix of social understanding and language variables while 
controllingfor verbal mental age 
Indicator 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Social 
attention-
Orienting 
2. Social 
-.20 
attention-
Joint attention 
3. Social 
perception -
-.22 -.18 
Affect 
4. Social 
perception -
.00 .13 .30 
Friendliness 
5. Social 
perception-
-.18 -.35 .59** .19 
Eyes 
6. Social 
cognition-
.31 -.31 -.11 -.29 -.13 1 
False belief 
7. Social 
cognition-
.54** -.23 -.02 .00 .02 .62** 
Ignorance 
8. Language 
BPVS 
-.03 -.05 .32 .37 .02 .22 .24 
9. Language 
CCC-2 
(syntax) .10 -.31 .41 .14 .41 -.16 .06 .16 1 
10. Language 
-.12 -.29 .43* .18 .23 .15 .21 .57** .45 
- WASI 
*: significant at 0.05 level 
**: significant at 0.01 level 
This partial correlation matrix suggests that once language is taken into account (i.e. 
children's verbal mental ages) then the only remaining significant relationships are 
primarily within constructs- i.e. two social-perceptual tasks remained highly 
correlated: Affect-Eyes: r = 0.59, p < 0.01; both social-cognitive tasks were 
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significantly correlated: r = 0.62, p < 0.0 I; and the language measures were highly 
correlated: BPVS-WASI: r = 0.57, p < 0.01 and despite the small sample size which 
existed for the syntax measure, this was highly (though not significantly) correlated 
with the WASI: r = 0.45, p = 0.079. In terms of significant relationships between 
constructs, Table 7.4 reveals that the social attention orienting measure was 
significantly correlated with the social-cognitive ignorance task, r = 0.54, p < 0.01. 
This finding was interesting because of the absence of a significant relationship 
between either of the social attention tasks and any other variable in earlier analyses 
within the present study or indeed at all within the large group of typically 
developing children described in the previous chapter. Otherwise, the only two 
significant correlations both point to relationships between the constructs of social 
perception and language: Affect-WAS!: r = 0.43, p < 0.05; and at the 10% level of 
significance, Friendliness-BPVS: r = 0.37, p = 0.086. The suggestion of such 
relationships between constructs as indicated by the correlations between tasks was 
investigated in greater detail in the following section, Part 2, alongside the 
investigation of whether or not there is a discrepancy between these task-based 
abilities and everyday function as suggested by the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour 
Scales and the Social Communication Questionnaire. 
7. 7 Results part 2: Autism symptomatology and relationships betvveen construct 
aggregate scores for social understanding and language 
Since the size of the autism sample was not sufficient to enable structural 
equation modelling to be conducted, it was not feasible to examine the factor 
structures and loading of tasks on to constructs as was possible for the large typically 
developing group of children tested in chapter 6. Nonetheless, in an effort to provide 
comparison to the modelling of relationships obtained in the previous chapter to the 
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relation of such abilities in the present study, aggregate scores were calculated for 
each child with autism for each latent construct (i.e. social attention, social 
perception, social cognition and language). From the aggregate score for each child 
on each construct, it was possible to analyse how these (total) constructs of ability 
related to one another, in a bid to determine if the relationships between aspects of 
social understanding and language bore any similarity to those obtained in the 
structural equation model for the large sample of typically developing children. 
Earlier correlation analysis, even after partialling language out, had suggested similar 
within-construct structures to those obtained for the typical group- i.e. both social-
cognitive tasks were strongly correlated; the social-perceptual Affect and Eyes tasks 
were highly correlated and the language measures were strongly linked. Therefore, 
given the similar within-construct structure found in chapter 6 to that identified here 
for the autism group, aggregate scores for each construct for the autism group were 
calculated accordingly by summing the variables which appeared in the final 
structural model of social understanding for typically developing children. Since the 
final model structure in chapter 6 had only two social-perceptual tasks (namely the 
Affect and Eyes tasks), the scores from these two were summed to create the 
aggregate score (i.e. excluding the Friendliness task) for the construct of social 
perception. As the constructs of language and social cognition consisted of 3 and 2 
tasks respectively within the final structural model of social understanding for typical 
children, the aggregates for these constructs were obtained here by summing the 
following tasks: BPVS standard score, WASI IQ score and syntax scaled score for 
the language construct; and the average false belief composite and average ignorance 
composite scores for the social cognition construct. In addition, although the 
construct of social attention did not appear in the final model of social understanding 
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in chapter 6, it was included here for completeness in the unlikely event that the 
aggregate score for this construct was related to one of the other constructs. The 
aggregate score for social attention was equal to the sum of the overall score for 
children with autism to correctly respond to 6 joint attention and 8 orienting trials. 
Analyses of normality for each of the aggregate scores via histograms and 
Shapiro-Wilk statistics revealed that each of the constructs was normally distributed 
with the exception of social cognition. Therefore, nonparametric correlations were 
calculated. However, before looking at the relationships between constructs, the 
relation of these abilities to children's autism symptomatology as indicated by the 
Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ) and Vineland Adaptive Behaviour 
Scales questionnaire (V ABS) was investigated. Of the 19 SCQ's which were 
returned, 14 of the children with autism had scores which were greater than or equal 
to the cut -off of 15, indicating that their profile was strongly suggestive of autism 
symptomatology in terms of their impairments within the domains of reciprocal 
social interaction, language and repetitive behaviours. From the 22 VABS 
questionnaires which were returned, the overall scale of adaptive behaviour and 
individual scales of Communication, Daily Living Skills, and Socialisation were 
analysed in terms of children's age equivalents. Table 7.5 displays descriptive 
statistics for each of these scales of the V ABS. On average, it can be seen that 
children with autism had overall adaptive behaviour scores equivalent to typically 
developing 5- to 7-year-olds (recall that children's chronological ages within the 
present study ranged from 4 years and 5 months to 1 7 years and 7 months, mean = 13 
years and 0 months). Indeed, for all 22 of the children whose teachers responded, the 
perceived level of adaptive behaviour resulted in an age equivalent which was 
considerably lower than their chronological age. Furthermore, Table 7.5 conveys that 
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children's socialisation skills (comprising their interaction with others, their abilities 
within play and leisure time, and their responsibility and sensitivity to others) were 
particularly impaired, comparable to the social skills of typically developing 4- to 5-
year-olds. 
Table 7.5 
Descriptive summmy of children's age equivalents on the VABS scales 
VABS scale Mean Minimum Maximum SD 
Adaptive behaviour 70 26 142 33 
Communication 73 27 150 33 
Daily living skills 78 27 138 36 
Socialisation 58 14 156 39 
Based on 22 returned questionnaires. 
All figures are in months. 
In terms of how the range of children's adaptive behaviours and 
communication skills encompassed by the above questionnaires related to their 
abilities across the various constructs of social understanding and language, 
nonparametric correlations were used to investigate these relationships. Table 7.6 
presents the range of correlations between abilities tapped by the questionnaires and 
abilities as defined by the construct aggregates of social attention, social perception, 
social cognition and language. Social attention and language abilities were not 
significantly related to any of the social skills or behaviours identified within the 
SCQ or V ABS. There is a marked contrast in how the two other constructs relate to 
the V ABS. The social-perceptual abilities and social-cognitive abilities of children 
with autism were significantly related to several different aspects of their adaptive 
behaviour, in particular their socialisation skills. This finding is interesting yet not 
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surprising given that children's socialisation and interaction with others would be 
likely to require and then transact back on their abilities to gauge other people's 
feelings from facial expressions and predict other people's behaviour on the basis of 
the child's knowledge and beliefs. 
Table 7.6 
Nonparametric correlations between SCQ, VABS and aggregate constructs of social 
understanding and language for children with autism 
Social Social Social Language 
attention perception cognition 
SCQ -.29 -.24 -.16 .04 
V ABS - Adaptive Bhvr. .03 .62** .56** -.01 
V ABS - Communication .03 .62** .47* .06 
V ABS - Daily living -.21 .59** .42 -.12 
V ABS - Socialisation -.05 .71 ** .61 ** .16 
*: significant at 0.05 level 
**: significant at 0.01 level 
Focusing now on the relationships between the 4 aggregate constructs 
mentioned above, nonparametric correlations for these are presented in Table 7.7. 
Confirming earlier analysis it can be seen from Table 7. 7 that social attention 
abilities were not related to social perception, social cognition or language in children 
with autism. Similarly, social cognitive abilities were not significantly related to 
abilities within other domains. However, the relationship between social cognition 
and both social perception and language did approach significance (p = 0.07 and p = 
0.06 respectively), suggesting that a larger group of children may have resulted in 
significant relationships between these constructs. Regardless of the sample size, 
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Table 7. 7 conveys that the constructs of social perception and language were 
significantly related, p = 0.007. This finding is congruent with the strong link 
between social perception and language which was identified for typically 
developing children via structural equation modelling in the previous chapter. 
Table 7.7 
Nonparametric correlation matrix of construct aggregate scores for children with 
autism 
Construct (N=24) Social Social Social Language 
Social attention 
Social perception 
Social cognition 
Language 
attention perception 
-.35 1 
.15 .38 1 
-.06 0.54** 
**:significant at 0.01 level 
I : P = 0.07; 2 : P = 0.06 
cognition 
1 
0.392 1 
Furthermore, given that the link between overall language abilities and overall social 
cognition neared significance, as well as the relationship between social perception 
and social cognition, together the above findings suggest that a similar model to the 
aforementioned structural model may be applicable to children with autism, whereby 
social perceptual abilities predict language ability which then predicts social-
cognitive abilities. 
The above aggregate construct findings for the autism group can be neatly 
juxtaposed next to a correlation matrix resulting from similar analysis of the 127 
typically developing children tested in chapter 6. The nonparametric correlations 
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between the aggregate constructs for the whole typically developing group are 
displayed in Table 7.8. This conveys that when the construct task structure of the 
final model was applied to create the construct aggregates for the typical group, that 
language was strongly correlated with constructs of social perception and social 
cognition. This link between social perception and social cognition would have been 
expected to be based on language from the structure of the final model, but obviously 
the correlational analysis below - unlike the structural equation modelling - was 
unable to provide an idea of the direction of the relationship between these 
constructs. 
Table 7.8 
Nonparametric correlation matrix of construct aggregate scores for group of 12 7 
typically developing children 
Construct (N= 12 7) Social Social Social Language 
attention perception cognition 
Social attention 1 
Social perception .06 1 
Social cognition -.06 .19* 1 
Language -.07 0.33** 0.37** 1 
**:significant at 0.01 level,*: significant at 0.05 level 
In sum, although the only significant relationship between aggregate 
constructs for the autism group was the link between social perception and language, 
there was indication that a larger sample size may have resulted in a significant 
relationship between language and social cognition as was obtained for the typical 
group of children. Therefore, from the correlation analysis conducted in Part 1 on the 
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relationships between individual tasks for the autism group and from the correlations 
between aggregate constructs conducted in this part, there is some indication of 
congruence in findings across the large group of typical children and the smaller 
group of children with autism. As such, the final structural model from chapter 6 may 
have compatibility for autism findings and indicate a similar path structure to social 
understanding as was found for typically developing children. However, in order to 
examine this possibility in more detail and to explicitly compare social understanding 
abilities in children with autism to the typically developing children tested in chapter 
6, Part 3 now turns to analyses which examine a subset of the sample of typically 
developing children who were individually matched in terms of language ability to 
the group of children with autism. 
7.8 Results part 3: Comparing children with autism to a language matched group of 
typically developing children on constructs of social understanding 
Thus far language has appeared to be at the heart of most of the interplay 
between different aspects of social understanding in typical development and autism. 
Therefore, the final stage of analysis within this thesis focused on differences in 
social understanding between a subset of the autism group who were matched on 
language ability to an equally-sized subset of the typically developing group of 
children who featured in the preceding few chapters. Using matching procedures 
advocated by Jarrold and Brock (2004), children were individually matched in terms 
of their receptive vocabulary ability. Matching of the groups via language was done 
to allow for legitimate analysis of the potential difference in paths to social 
understanding for children with autism in comparison to typically developing 4- to 5-
year-olds. Nineteen of the 24 children with autism had verbal mental ages which 
could be sufficiently matched to a subset of the typically developing children from 
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the previous chapter. Indeed, 14 of these 19 matches were exact matches while 4 of 
the other 5 matches differed only in terms of a few months, and the final match 
differed by 8 months. To check that there was no significant difference between the 
two groups in terms oftheir BPVS age equivalents, an independent samples t-test 
was conducted. With a mean BPVS age equivalent of69.58 months (s.d. = 18.93) for 
the group of children with autism and 68.95 (s.d. = 18.03) for the subset of typically 
developing children, the t-test revealed that the groups did not differ significantly, t = 
0.105, df= 36, p = 0.92, suggesting the two groups were suitably matched in terms of 
language ability. 
Having established that the autism and typical groups of children were 
matched on language ability, the next step was to analyse whether there were any 
significant differences between them in performance across the tasks tapping the 
three main domains of social understanding. Given non-normality within the autism 
dataset, differences in the matched sample were investigated using Mann-Whitney 
analysis and the various statistics are displayed below in Table 7.9. Table 7.9 
conveys that the subset of children with autism responded correctly to significantly 
less orienting trials than typically developing children. 
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Table 7.9 
Mann-Whitney analysis of the difference in performance between children with 
autism and typically developing children matched on language ability 
Variable/Task Mean rank u Sig. 
CWA TO 
orienting 12.22 24.78 49 0.00 
joint attention 17.11 21.00 135 0.27 
affect 15.71 23.29 108.5 0.04 
eyes 14.67 19.74 100 0.14 
friendliness 16.95 22.05 132 0.16 
Ignorance 13.13 25.87 59.5 0.00 
false belief 12.05 26.95 39 0.00 
syntax 8.18 21.37 9.5 0.00 
WASI 10.89 28.11 17 0.00 
BPVS1 19.58 19.42 1 matching variable 
Further examination of this finding via Mann-Whitney analysis (see Table 
7.10 below) for each of the aspects of the orienting task (i.e. social vs. nonsocial 
sounds and 6 second criterion vs. 3 second criterion) revealed that the autism group 
responded correctly to significantly less trials than the typical group in each category. 
However, the difference between the groups was less marked (p < 0.05 rather than p 
< 0.01) for the nonsocial trials and in particular the difference was weakened in terms 
of the 6 second criterion. Nonetheless, the differences between the two groups 
remained significant across both social and nonsocial stimuli, and conveyed that 
despite similar language abilities, children with autism are impaired in their ability to 
orient their attention to non-social and particularly social sounds. The nature of these 
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statistically significant differences concurs with the findings of the matched autism 
sample described by Dawson et al. (2004) in which they concluded that children with 
autism were less likely to orient to both social and nonsocial auditory stimuli and that 
this orienting impairment was more severe for social stimuli. 
Table 7.10 
Mann-Whitney analysis of the difference in orienting abilities within 6 seconds and 3 
seconds between children with autism and typically developing children matched on 
language ability 
Variable/Task Mean rank u Sig. 
CWA TD 
6 sec. total orienting 12.22 24.78 49 0.00 
6 sec. social 12.14 24.86 47.5 0.00 
6 sec. nonsocial 14.67 22.33 93 0.02 
3 sec. total orienting 11.89 25.11 43 0.00 
3 sec. social 10.94 26.06 26 0.00 
3 sec. nonsocial 14.22 22.78 85 0.01 
The finding that children with autism were not significantly impaired in 
comparison to typical children in responding correctly to joint attention trials -
within either the 6 or 3 seconds criteria - corroborates the earlier finding discussed in 
part 1 of the results in which there was not a significant difference in this ability 
between the whole group of children with autism and the whole group of typical 
children. Also, children with autism performed significantly less well than the TD 
group on both social-cognitive measures and both other language/IQ measures. 
Conversely, the groups did not differ in terms of their social-perceptual abilities other 
than their performance on the Affect task with the typically developing children 
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scoring significantly more highly. Although the TD group scored more highly on the 
Eyes and Friendliness tasks than children with autism, these differences were not 
significant. This finding would appear to provide further foundation to the claim that 
social-perceptual abilities are closely tied to language in children with autism. 
In sum, the above findings suggest that children with autism matched to 
typical children were significantly impaired in their social-cognitive ability and their 
other language/IQ abilities compared to typically developing children. However, 
children with autism had some level of ability within the social attention domain 
(namely joint attention) and exhibited comparable abilities to typically developing 
children within the social-perceptual domain. This similarity in social-perceptual 
ability between language-matched groups of children may reinforce the notion of a 
strong social-perceptual-language link as argued for in the new model of social 
understanding rather than the weaker bond between these abilities as outlined in 
Tager-Flusberg and Joseph's model. 
In order to investigate the differences in social understanding more broadly 
between these two language-matched groups, the comparison of construct aggregates 
as defined previously was examined via correlation analysis and Mann-Whitney 
analysis. Shapiro-Wilk statistics had indicated that there was non-normality in the 
social-cognitive aggregate construct for both groups as well as non-normality in the 
social attention construct for the typically developing group; therefore it was 
necessary to proceed with nonparametric statistics. Spearman rho correlation 
statistics for both groups of 19 children confirmed earlier findings for the complete 
groups: namely, the only significant correlation for the group of children with autism 
was for the relationship between social perception and language, rho: 0.59, p < 0.01. 
For the matched group of 19 typically developing children, language was 
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significantly related to both social perception (rho: 0. 70, p < 0.01) and social 
cognition (rho: 0.60, p < 0.01). Finally, to examine differences in the three different 
aspects of social understanding between the two groups matched on language, Table 
7.11 displays the main statistics from the Mann-Whitney analysis. Table 7.11 reveals 
that children with autism, although matched on receptive language skills to a group 
of typically developing children, were significantly impaired in their social attention 
skills and social-cognitive understanding. Interestingly, in contrast, the social-
perceptual abilities (as defined by the construct structure of the final model of social 
understanding in chapter 6) of children with autism were not significantly lower than 
the level of ability of typical children. 
Table 7.11 
Differences between language matched groups of children with autism and typical 
children on social cognition, social perception and social attention 
Aggregate construct Mean rank u Sig. 
CWA TD 
social attention 13.37 25.63 64 0.00 
social perception 16.11 22.89 116 0.06 
social cognition 12.03 26.97 38.5 0.00 
Furthermore, given the statistic approaching significance for social perception, it was 
thought necessary to more closely examine the lack of a difference in social-
perceptual ability between the autism group and the matched typical group. Since the 
statistic above was based on only two social-perceptual tasks, the difference between 
the two groups was then examined based on the aggregate construct of social 
perception consisting of all three social-perceptual tasks (i.e. now including the 
Friendliness task as well as the Eyes and Affect tasks). Similar Mann-Whitney 
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analysis revealed again that there was no significant difference in social-perceptual 
ability between children with autism and matched typical children, U = 123, p = 0.09, 
suggesting that children with autism are not impaired within the domain of social 
perception. However, since p < 0.1 and since the effect size for the difference 
between the two groups was 0.60 (Cohen's d ~the calculation is outlined in 
Appendix 7.1) this is suggestive of a trend, which would have revealed a significant 
difference between the groups had a larger sample size been compared. 
Finally, in relation to how paths to social-cognition may vary for children 
with autism in comparison to typically developing children, stepwise regression 
analysis was conducted. With social cognition as the outcome variable and social 
perception and language as possible predictors (social attention was not included 
given its lack of influence throughout this thesis), the regression output confirmed 
that neither social perception or language were significant predictors of social 
cognitive ability in children with autism. In contrast, for the matched group of 
typically developing children, language was (as expected from earlier results) the 
only significant predictor of their social-cognitive ability: R2 = 0.365, t( 17) = 3.13, p 
< 0.01. This analysis confirmed the general theme ofthe findings described 
throughout this chapter- namely that the route to social cognition and ultimately 
social understanding in general, is different for children with autism in comparison to 
typically developing children despite being matched on language. 
7. 9 Results summary 
In summary, each of the three parts to the results section has individually 
contributed noteworthy findings and together they have provided a detailed insight 
into social understanding in children with autism. Part 1 - which described their 
general performance across social understanding and language tasks - suggested that 
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the group of children with autism tested here were particularly impaired in the areas 
of social cognition and language. Nonparametric correlation analysis within 
constructs suggested that the tasks which held together well to define constructs 
within chapter 6, were grouped together similarly for children with autism -
performance on tasks clustered together well within each of the constructs, in 
particular the social-perceptual construct was strongly intra-correlated. Correlation 
matrices, even when controlling for age, suggested that language (particularly BPVS) 
was strongly linked with social-perceptual and social-cognitive abilities for children 
with autism. Once language had been partialled out, significant relationships tended 
to exist within, rather than between, constructs. However, two social-perceptual tasks 
were individually strongly linked with language-based tasks, further indicating a 
possible link between social-perception and language for this group. 
Part 2 then examined the relationships between task-based abilities and 
measures of autistic symptomatology. One interesting finding from this section 
conveyed that several aspects of measurement from the Vineland Adaptive 
Behaviour Scale- in particular, socialisation skills - were significantly related to 
aggregate scores for the social-perceptual and social-cognitive constructs -but not to 
aggregate constructs scores for language or social attention. Also of interest for the 
whole autism group was the strong significant link found to exist between the social 
perception and language constructs; links from social cognition to these constructs 
merely approached significance. 
Part 3 then built upon the previous two parts by exploring social 
understanding abilities in children with autism who were matched on language 
ability to a subset of the typical group tested previously in chapter 6. Firstly, in terms 
of task performance, analyses suggested that children with autism were significantly 
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impaired in comparison to language-matched typical children on the orienting task, 
the affect task, both social-cognitive tasks and the two other language measures. 
Secondly, analysis of the difference in relationships between aggregate constructs for 
the matched groups indicated that the only significant relationship for children with 
autism rested upon the link between social perception and language. In contrast, for 
the matched group of typical children, ability across the language construct was 
strongly linked to both social perception and social cognition. Finally in terms ofthe 
differences between the matched groups on social understanding as defined by the 
overall constructs, analyses revealed that children with autism performed 
significantly less well than matched typical children in the areas of social cognition 
and social attention. The results were less conclusive in relation to a social-perceptual 
impairment in autism, but were suggestive that a statistically significant difference 
between children with autism and typical children would have been found in a larger 
sample size. 
Discussion 
The original hypotheses will be addressed by summarising the key findings 
across the 3 parts of the results section for each construct. Therefore, beginning with 
the apparent lowest level of social understanding - social attention - the first point 
focuses on the performance of children with autism on the adapted version of 
Dawson et al. 's (2004) orienting task. The main findings from using our adapted 
version corroborated the findings of Dawson et al., namely, children with autism 
responded to significantly fewer orienting trials than typical children, and this 
difference was greater in relation to social stimuli. This was the case in comparison 
to both the overall group of 127 typically developing children and the subset of this 
group who were matched to children with autism in terms of their language ability. 
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In comparison to both groups, differences in orienting were more extreme in relation 
to social stimuli both within the 6 seconds and 3 seconds criteria. Nonetheless, it is 
important to note that this does not necessarily indicate a general autism impairment 
in orienting to social stimuli per se. When the pattern of responses to social and 
nonsocial stimuli was examined in isolation for the autism group, the statistics 
provided an interesting profile of ability - they showed that children with autism 
were able to orient their attention to stimuli on the majority of occasions and that 
when considered over a greater length of time (i.e. 6 seconds), they actually oriented 
their attention correctly to more social than nonsocial trials. This conveys that 
children with autism are not necessarily "impaired" in their ability to orient to social 
stimuli. The opposite pattern of responding over a shorter time-frame indicates that 
their attention may be drawn to nonsocial stimuli suggesting a preference in autism 
for nonsocial stimuli which concurs with eye-tracking evidence documented by Klin 
et al. (2003) in which children with autism focus on nonsocial aspects of the 
environment as opposed to social stimuli. However, as the current findings suggest, 
over a more prolonged period of time, children with autism may have orienting 
abilities which are more similar to typically developing children than would 
otherwise be initially indicated. 
Further reinforcing the notion that children with autism may not have a 
specific impairment in the domain of social attention, an interesting finding was that 
children with autism were not significantly worse in responding to joint attention 
bids than the typical children - both in terms of the overall typical group and the 
matched group. Indeed, they correctly attended to the majority of joint attention trials 
indicating that these children did not have a severe impairment in this area. While 
levels of performance on the two social attention tasks for the autism group were 
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better than had been expected, it remains true that they did contrast with the pattern 
found for typical children - as well as performing more highly on both tasks than the 
autism group, the typical children responded more successfully and quickly to 
orienting trials compared to joint attention trials. Indeed, when the passing criterion 
of at least 4/6 joint attention trials (Leekam et al., 1997) was applied, the number of 
children with autism who met this level was significantly fewer than the number of 
typical children who achieved this level of performance. Also, as the group of 
children with autism exhibited a contrasting pattern of performance this suggests that 
they may use atypical processing strategies, albeit perhaps more successfully as 
suggested here, than as documented in much of the autism literature. 
As described above, some of the findings for the autism group within the 
domain of social attention were unexpected. In terms of the social-perceptual 
domain, there were several results which were surprising and interesting by the 
nature of the similarity to those found for typically developing children. For instance, 
when considering the autism group as a whole, it was interesting to note that their 
performance on the social-perceptual Affect task was significantly related to 
performance on every other task (other than the social attention tasks which were 
unrelated to all tasks). It was also interesting to note that the relationship between 
syntactic ability (as provided by the CCC-2) and the Affect task was the only 
significant link including the syntax measure. However, after controlling for age, the 
Eyes task was also significantly linked to the syntax measure. These significant 
findings between social-perceptual measures and syntax were all the more surprising 
given that these results were based on a small number of syntax scores. They serve to 
underline the likelihood of a close relationship between social perception and 
language in children with autism. 
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Part 2 of the results presented another couple of interesting findings regarding 
social perception. Firstly, the construct aggregate for social perception was 
significantly correlated with all aspects ofthe Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale, in 
particular the scale denoting socialisation skills. This was suggestive of a more key 
role of social perceptual abilities in the everyday social interactions of children with 
autism. Secondly, examination of the relationships between aggregate constructs 
revealed that the only significant link which existed was that connecting social 
perception to language. This tied in with some of the findings highlighted above, but 
was nonetheless unexpected since social cognition, rather than social perception, has 
been identified in previous autism research as the primary link between social 
understanding and language (e.g., de Villiers, 2005). However, as hypothesised at the 
outset in relation to the new model of social understanding, a link between social 
perception and language for children was a realistic possibility. Due primarily to the 
considerable degree of language required to proceed through the social-perceptual 
tasks, but also to the likelihood that children with autism may use some of their 
perceptual abilities - albeit atypically - to facilitate interactions with others, finding a 
significant link between social perception and language was perhaps not so 
unexpected. 
Finally, results from the matched-group analyses indicated that although the 
sample of typical children scored more highly than children with autism on each of 
the three social-perceptual tasks, only the Affect task elicited a significant difference 
between the two groups. Overall, the social-perceptual findings for children with 
autism provided inconclusive evidence of a social-perceptual impairment in autism. 
However, the apparent trend for children with autism to perform less well than 
matched typical children within this domain of understanding, substantiated by the 
215 
medium effect size, suggests that a larger sample would have revealed this to be an 
area of impairment for children with autism. This would be in line with much of the 
literature and theory which suggests that children with autism are fundamentally 
impaired in the social-perceptual domain (e.g., Tager-Flusberg and Joseph, 2005). 
Nonetheless, given that children with autism would seem to be more severely 
impaired compared to typical children within the domain of social attention, this 
perhaps underlines the relevance in distinguishing between what may be different 
domains of understanding. 
As was discussed earlier, children with autism traditionally have been 
researched on their theory of mind/social-cognitive understanding. The current 
research has echoed many of the findings from those studies - children with autism 
performed significantly less well than typical children on both social-cognitive 
measures- this was found in comparison with both the whole typical group and the 
language matched typical sample. Furthermore, the more skewed nature of the false 
belief measure compared to ignorance for children with autism may explain why 
false belief understanding was related to fewer other task variables. However, the 
false belief measure was significantly related to BPVS language ability when 
controlling for age. Furthermore, the linking of ignorance to both experimental 
language measures and all 3 social-perceptual measures suggest a close intertwining 
of social perception, language and social cognition in children with autism. However, 
these relationships disappeared after controlling for age, suggesting that the child's 
age was primarily responsible for linking social cognition to social perception or 
language. Furthermore, when the social-cognitive aggregate construct was examined 
in relation to the other aggregate constructs, the link from this to both social 
perception and language aggregate constructs was not significant at the 5% level, but 
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did approach significance. Therefore, it's likely that a larger sample of children with 
autism would have resulted in significant links between social cognition and social 
perception or language. However, the lack of a significant relationship between 
social cognition and language was surprising given the many studies which have 
highlighted links between these areas in autism. Perhaps if there had been a less 
skewed distribution of social-cognitive scores or if high-functioning children with 
autism had been tested then there may have been more likelihood of obtaining a 
significant link between social cognition and language in the size of sample 
described here, which was nonetheless a substantial number of children for an autism 
study. 
The final construct to be discussed was language. It had become apparent 
from reviewing the other constructs that contrary to expectation, language was 
closely linked to the social-perceptual construct and not to the social-cognitive 
construct. Indeed, when controlling for age, matrices providing the correlations 
between each of the individual tasks for the whole group of autism revealed several 
links between language and social perception (and social cognition). However, once 
language (i.e. BPVS verbal mental age) had been partialled out, the only significant 
relationships tended to exist within rather than between constructs, suggesting that 
this measure of language ability could explain much of the significance of links 
between constructs. Given this and since this measure of language provided the basis 
for matching the children with autism to the sample of the typical group, it was 
possible that similar paths between language and social perception or social 
cognition would be identified for the two matched groups. As indicated from earlier 
findings, the language-matched groups of typical children and children with autism 
differed significantly in terms of their social attention and social cognition and given 
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a larger sample size, they would most likely have differed in terms of social-
perceptual ability. 
Therefore, overall a picture has been provided of a group of children with 
autism whose social-perceptual abilities were strongly linked with their language 
abilities. This was an unexpected finding based on the model of social understanding 
in autism offered by Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005). However, by virtue of 
distinguishing between social attention and perception, and perhaps by using social-
perceptual tasks which were heavily loaded in terms of language, the social 
perception-language link was perhaps more of a realistic possibility. This study has 
also shown that having language abilities which were matched to those of typical 
children, does not lead to similar levels of social-cognitive understanding, as was 
hypothesised. However, as receptive language abilities rather than syntactic language 
ability provided the basis for matching, this reinforces the idea that like typical 
children, general language proficiency in the area of word learning may result from 
social-perceptual abilities for children with autism (e.g., Baldwin & Moses, 2001). 
However, unlike typical children, this level of language ability is not sufficient to 
provide children with autism with the expertise in social situations to then learn 
about others in a social-cognitive sense. Thus, the current findings, via the lack of a 
link between language and social cognition, remain open to the claim that in order for 
children with autism to display social-cognitive understanding in structured tasks, 
they need to have sufficient understanding of communication verbs and general 
syntactic skills. 
In the absence of compensated social-cognitive skills (i.e. this variable was 
negatively skewed), it is unsurprising that regression analyses on predictors of social 
cognition produced no significant predictor for the group of children with autism. 
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However, for the matched typical sample, language - unlike social perception - was 
found to be a significant predictor of social cognition. This was expected given the 
structural model of chapter 6 which consisted of language as a mediating variable 
between social perception and social cognition. However, for the benefit of 
understanding a possible different path to social cognition for children with autism, it 
is clear that receptive language skills do not lead to typical levels of social cognition, 
and further reinforces the likelihood that children exhibit social-cognitive 
understanding by atypical routes. 
The role of syntax in facilitating social understanding (social cognition) 
within the current study is unclear - the matched groups differed significantly on this 
measure, so it is unclear how much the social-cognitive abilities of children with 
autism could have been compensated despite social attention difficulties if their 
syntactic abilities had matched those of typical children. Given the earlier discussion 
of the role of syntactic language abilities in compensating for deficits which children 
with autism experience prior to social cognitive understanding, it is a distinct 
possibility that typical and autism groups who were matched on syntactic ability 
would have had similar social-cognitive abilities. Thus, it is possible that such a 
study would find a strong link between language and social cognition. While there is 
considerable utility in conducting such a study, its requirements were beyond the 
scope of this body ofwork- with a focus throughout this thesis primarily on social 
understanding rather than language, it was necessary to choose language measures 
which were succinct and, where possible, which could be administered outside of the 
testing sessions. Therefore, selecting a parental questionnaire to provide the measure 
of syntactic ability seemed an appropriate choice. Furthermore, within the timeframe 
to work with an autistic population, it was more feasible to match groups on the 
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accessible measure offered by the BPVS. It is acknowledged that matching using a 
comprehensive syntax measure rather than receptive language measure may have 
produced considerably different findings; indeed, using a different syntax measure 
may well have provided a more comprehensive, less-skewed profile of children's 
language abilities in this sense and in tum provided greater insight into the path to 
any form of social-cognitive understanding. 
It is important to reinforce that for children with autism any success in 
structured social-cognitive tasks does not necessarily correspond with success in 
everyday life (Frith, Siddons, & Happe, 1994). In the current study, several scales of 
the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale were significantly positively correlated with 
the aggregate constructs of social perception and social cognition. This was 
unsurprising given the extent of social-cognitive impairment. However, given the 
less-conclusive finding of social-perceptual impairment, it was surprising that this 
was positively correlated with all of the adaptive scales, most noticeably 
'socialisation'. It seems possible to suggest that a fairly low level of adaptive 
behaviour is necessary for social-perceptual abilities, whereas a much higher level of 
adaptive behaviour coincides with the complexity of social cognition - this would 
explain the strong correlations between adaptive scales and social perception and 
social cognition. 
In summary, the most compelling of findings was the link between social 
perception and language for children with autism which contradicted claims 
surrounding the model ofTager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005). This revealed that 
children with autism are not as impaired in this domain as social attention and social 
cognition. This points to the utility in distinguishing between the domains of social 
attention and social perception. Despite similar performance on language (primarily 
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within the BPVS measure) this did not result in similar levels of performance within 
the social-cognitive domain. This further underlines the likelihood that a different 
aspect of language- i.e. syntactic comprehension- provides an exclusive route to 
social cognition for children with autism; compensating for earlier deficits in social 
understanding to provide enough logical insight for children with autism to apply 
appropriate reasoning to social-cognitive false belief tasks. Such success would 
appear to come exclusively via syntactic language abilities as argued by Tager-
Flusberg and Joseph (2005) and shown in several studies (de Villiers, 2000). 
Consideration of this concept along with the present finding that social-perceptual 
abilities of children with autism are closely tied to a different aspect of language (i.e. 
word learning) parallels with the notion of a differential role of language across 
social understanding as suggested for typical development (Tager-Flusberg and 
Joseph). Therefore, this suggests a degree of similarity in the path through social 
understanding for both children with autism and typically developing children, with 
two exceptions: 1) unlike typical children, children with autism are impaired in their 
social attention capacities; and 2) social cognition can only be arrived at via an 
exclusive route in autism, while it can also be influenced by social perception and 
other aspects of language in typical development. These are important differences in 
paths through social understanding for children with autism in comparison to typical 
children and acknowledgement of such differences relies on the use of a broad 
concept of social understanding as has been advocated throughout this thesis. Theory 
of mind as a catch-all term glosses over important distinctions and inevitably reduces 
such research to a narrow frame of reference. 'Social understanding' and distinction 
of the various domains therein offers a broader, richer insight which provides better 
reflection of the very nature of such understanding. 
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PART 3-
RE-EXAMINING PATHWAYS TO CHILDREN'S 
SOCIAL UNDERSTANDING 
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Chapter 8 
General discussion and conclusions 
The overarching aim of this thesis has been to clarify what social 
understanding is rather than how it develops. The wealth of existent research has 
delved into the latter issue, while very few studies have focused on either what 
constitutes social understanding or on the continuity between its different 
constituents, resulting in conceptual ambiguity. In addition, it was suggested in the 
introduction to this thesis that the contemporary nature of the term 'social 
understanding' brought with it an obligation to understand what it envelops before 
we can properly understand how and when it develops. Therefore, in a bid to redress 
the imbalance of the research focus and further our understanding of what social 
understanding actually consists of and to investigate continuity (or discontinuity) 
across a range of aspects of social understanding, this thesis focused on three main 
areas: social cognition (traditionally known as theory of mind), social perception and 
social attention. Language was also investigated throughout this thesis given the 
wealth of research which has demonstrated the close links between language and 
different aspects of social understanding. In order to comprehensively investigate 
these four areas, the componential model proposed by Tager-Flusberg and Joseph 
(2005)- which encompasses each of these areas- provided a suitable framework for 
this endeavour. With this in mind, the thesis was split into two parts: part 1 took a 
methodological stance which was necessary in order to verify that the social-
cognitive measures which were to be used throughout the thesis provided a valid 
reflection of the complexity of this level of social understanding. Part 2 was 
theoretically driven and encompassed a range of studies examining paths between 
different aspects of social understanding in typical children and children with autism. 
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The chapters subsumed by both of these parts are summarised briefly below prior to 
a general discussion of the issues and questions which have arisen throughout this 
work, as well as discussion of the limitations of this thesis and implications for future 
research. 
8.1 Summa1y of Part I: Methodological chapters 
As highlighted above, the aim of Part 1 of this thesis was to arrive at 
measures of social cognition which were both valid and comprehensive. While 
existent measures of social cognition such as the false belief stories designed by 
Sullivan et al. (1994) could have been used within this thesis as they continue to be 
used in contemporary research (e.g., Steele, Joseph, & Tager-Flusberg, 2003), the 
author's reservations regarding the sensitivity of this measure led to the 
methodological investigation of Part 1. Chapter 2 within Part 1, examined whether 
the false belief stories of Sullivan et al. inflated the measurement of children's 
complex social-cognitive understanding by way of their inclusion of questions based 
on the concept of ignorance. Comparison of typically developing 4- to 6-year-olds on 
stories which either included an ignorance question or not and either using Sullivan 
et al. 's stories or new stories designed in this thesis - revealed that preceding the 
crucial (second-order) false belief question with a corresponding ignorance question 
facilitated children's false belief performance. It may have been that such a focus on 
this simpler level of conceptual understanding was enough to bolster a child's fragile 
concept of false beliefunderstanding. However, greater false belief success for those 
children who had been asked about ignorance does not necessarily imply that those 
children had sufficient false belief reasoning skills. Thus, given that ignorance is an 
easier concept for children to understand than belief (which develops up to 2 years 
later than ignorance), this chapter conveyed that the social-cognitive stories of 
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Sullivan et al. - by including ignorance questions - do not necessarily tap into the 
representational skills required for false belief understanding. Therefore, chapter 2 
showed that false belief stories need to be carefully designed and sensitively selected, 
without any inclusion of ignorance questions if they are to purely measure false 
belief understanding rather than more general, lower-level social-cognitive 
understanding. Furthermore, those studies which do use false belief stories while 
explicitly including a focus on ignorance, need to - at the very least - acknowledge 
that an individual's success on such stories may not necessarily be indicative of their 
false belief understanding. This would seem to be particularly important for 
neurobiological studies attempting to identify brain regions which correspond to 
specific social-cognitive processing (e.g., see Saxe & Powell, 2006). A similar point 
can also be made more generally given the broad perspective of this thesis- namely, 
that neurobiological studies attempting to locate brain areas which represent aspects 
of social understanding should be specific about which particular constituent of 
social understanding they are investigating, rather than blending constituents together 
or simply assuming that different aspects correspond to similar brain areas. 
Having realised that second-order ignorance and second-order belief should 
ideally be kept separate within social-cognitive stories and having vindicated the 
decision not to simply use pre-existing measures of social cognition, chapter 3 built 
upon chapter 2 by using the new second-order false belief stories (which had been 
designed in chapter 2) as the basis for a composite measure of social cognition. This 
measure could simultaneously assess first-order and second-order mental states in the 
same child within one story and was believed to offer three main benefits. Firstly, to 
provide greater insight into consistency of ability across both levels of understanding 
than would be obtained by testing them separately- i.e. it is likely that such a 
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methodology which examines first-order and second-order in parallel within the 
same test may provide a unique opportunity to discover individuals' respective first-
order and second-order theory of mind abilities, whilst avoiding task confounds 
which would be likely to arise from testing children on separate social-cognitive 
tasks on separate occasions. Secondly, since part 2 of the thesis involved testing 
children on a vast array of social understanding tasks, such a composite task would 
help to ease the test battery load for both the experimenter and children. Thirdly, 
such a composite measure was developed in the hope that the framework of the 
composite story could transfer to testing other mental states to enable greater 
comparability between the social-cognitive abilities required to understand concepts 
such as belief and ignorance. Results from this study showed that the composite false 
belief methodology led to first-order and second-order belief performance in 4- to 6-
year-olds which was comparable to previous studies which had examined these levels 
of understanding separately. Also, as expected, the composite task demonstrated that 
first-order understanding is a necessary but not sufficient capacity to allow children 
to consistently understand second-order beliefs. 
Together, the chapters in Part 1 of the thesis confirmed the need to tap into 
false belief understanding using false belief stories which omit ignorance questions 
and gave indication that the composite false belief task provides a quick, consistent 
and effective measure of children's first-order and second-order understanding in 
parallel. In addition, these chapters indicated that such methodology would be 
suitable for detailed investigation of these abilities alongside other aspects of social 
understanding in 4- to 5-year-olds within Part 2 of the thesis. 
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8.2 Summary of Part 2: Theoretically-oriented chapters 
Part 2 of the thesis then used the composite social-cognitive measure 
alongside measures of social perception and social attention within the broader 
concept of social understanding, as well as language measures, to focus upon the 
central question of the thesis: 'What are the constituents of children's social 
understanding?' To attempt to answer this question, Part 2 required a thorough, 
theoretical investigation into the nature of models of social understanding/theory of 
mind, the nature of the constructs which are encompassed by the broader term, and 
the nature of the paths between these constructs. Therefore, reflecting the breadth of 
focus upon aspects of social understanding, Part 2 of the thesis drew upon several 
studies to investigate the potential constituents underpinning such understanding. 
Beginning with a theoretical focus, chapter 4 described and illustrated several 
componential models of social understanding including the original componential 
model: Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000), as well as Baron-Cohen's modular 
model (1994, 2005), and Tager-Flusberg and Joseph's (2005) model. The framework 
of this final model guided the investigation throughout the chapters of part 2, selected 
as such for the following reasons: being a contemporary model it incorporated up-to-
date research; it encompassed language and the three areas of social understanding 
under investigation within this thesis; it accounted for findings from the perspective 
of autism and since it offered a clear, comprehensive structure underlying children's 
social understanding it provided the ideal framework to pursue the main question of 
the thesis. Furthermore, since the relations in this model had previously not been 
simultaneously tested, there was added incentive to examine the nature and 
interrelation of the components of the model. The claims which surround their model 
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regarding both typical children and children with autism provided testable 
hypotheses which were then explored over the next three chapters. 
Chapter 5 began the empirical investigation into the constituents of children's 
social understanding and examined a hypothesis which features in both ofTager-
Flusberg's models (2000, 2005); namely that the social-cognitive and social-
perceptual levels of social understanding are positively linked in typically developing 
children. Using the adapted and extended versions of social-cognitive tasks as had 
been developed within Part 1 of the thesis, several false-belief stories were used to 
test the social-cognitive domain while the Eyes task was used as the social-perceptual 
task. Contrary to the original hypothesis, results from 4- to 6-year-olds who were 
tested on these tasks, indicated that these components were not significantly related 
in typically developing children. This finding contradicted the initial hypothesis as 
well as claims stemming from other componential models such as Baron-Cohen 
(1994). Several explanations for this were proposed, including the small sample size, 
the potential mediating role of language, the possibility that the tasks were not 
specific enough to tap into either domain, and the prospect that individual differences 
in these abilities were less discernible by ages 5 and 6. Accordingly, to explore these 
ideas further and to widen the investigation across a range of children's social 
understanding, chapter 6 included each of these lines of enquiry and marked the real 
empirical movement of this thesis into a broader outlook on children's social 
understanding. 
Chapter 6 reviewed the key literature within the four key areas under 
investigation: social cognition, social perception, social attention and language. The 
literature reviewed, alongside the model offered by Tager-Flusberg and Joseph 
(2005), served to indicate several testable hypotheses regarding relationships 
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between and within the four constructs. Thus, chapter 6 examined abilities within the 
two main componential domains of social cognition and social perception, but 
expanded this focus to also include investigation of children's abilities within the 
constructs of social attention and language. This was conducted via a large sample of 
typical children in order to be able to conduct structural equation modelling analysis 
which provided insight into the interplay between the constituents of social 
understanding and the possible heterotypic or homotypic continuity between low-
level social understanding and higher-level understanding. Such comprehensive 
analysis offered via structural equation modelling provided a test ofTager-Flusberg 
and Joseph's model, although it is acknowledged that their model is longitudinal and 
the current investigation was limited to the exploration of these abilities concurrently. 
Resulting analyses revealed that the framework of their model was not congruent 
with the structural equation model which provided the best fit. This particular dataset 
suggested that the model of best fit was represented by a framework consisting of a 
direct path from a social-perceptual construct to a construct of language, with a path 
then directed from this language construct to a construct of social cognition. 
Therefore, in terms of concurrent abilities, the dataset suggested a model of 
social understanding- contrasting that ofTager-Flusberg and Joseph- in which 
language mediated the relationship between the lower-level domain of social 
perception and the higher-level domain of social cognition. Furthermore, the model 
of best fit excluded a social attention construct - which was corroborated by a 
pervasive lack of association between this construct and the three other constructs. 
Such an outcome vindicated the decision to distinguish between social attention and 
social perception. Social attention as a construct was not significantly related to 
social perception or either of the other constructs and suggests - at least in the 
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context of concurrent abilities - that social attention abilities may be qualitatively 
different to other social understanding abilities in 4- to 5-year-olds. Such an 
interpretation conforms to the idea that there is heterotypic continuity between 
particularly low-level and high-level aspects of children's social understanding. Of 
course, the concurrent nature of the present investigation cannot be extrapolated to 
what could be said longitudinally about the link between social attention and other 
aspects of social understanding. It may well be the case that a longitudinal 
exploration of these relationships (and from an earlier age) would uncover significant 
relationships between social attention and other variables. Indeed, a longitudinal 
investigation would be constructive in determining the accuracy or relevance of 
Tager-Flusberg and Joseph's (2005) model. Nonetheless, discovering that the 
construct of social attention was internally consistent in terms of the tasks correlating 
together, but unrelated to all other construct tasks, does underline the motivation 
behind the central premise of the thesis: i.e. it is important to consider possible 
constituents of children's social understanding under the initial assumption that they 
are distinct, before in-depth exploration can indicate otherwise. Furthermore, such 
consideration would seem to be particularly important when the constituents are 
newly-coined and less clearly defined as remains the case for social attention and 
social perception. 
Chapter 6 also conveyed that language ability provided the integral link 
between low-level social understanding (i.e. social perception) and higher level 
social understanding in the form of social cognition. Such an outcome is compatible 
with research indicating that language can have differential roles in social 
understanding when different levels of social understanding are considered. For 
instance, research indicating that social-perceptual type abilities can facilitate word 
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learning (e.g., Baldwin & Moses, 2001) and research indicating that other aspects of 
language (e.g., syntax) can facilitate social-cognitive abilities (e.g., de Villiers & 
Pyers, 2002), are both congruent with the final structural model in chapter 6. 
However, these opposing research strands and such an interpretation of the final 
structural model produced here can be reconciled only by interpreting social 
understanding in broad terms, as was argued in chapter 1. 
While all previous chapters had investigated social understanding in typically 
developing children, chapter 7 complemented the preceding work by illustrating the 
nature of the constituents of social understanding and any continuity between them, 
in children with autism. Having arrived at a final structural model based on typically 
developing 4- to 5-year-olds within chapter 6, the final empirical chapter offered an 
opportunity to determine whether the paths between the constituents of social 
understanding differed in a group of children with autism. Through comparison of 
levels of ability for children with autism versus the large typical group of children it 
seemed apparent that children with autism were impaired within the areas of social 
attention and social cognition. However, in order to compare this group of children 
more evenly to the typical children tested in chapter 6, a subset of the large typical 
group were individually matched on language to children with autism in the final 
analyses. These revealed several interesting results, including the finding that 
children with autism did not display significantly worse understanding in the domain 
of social perception than the language-matched typical children. This result 
contrasted sharply with expectations and the claims ofTager-Flusberg et al. who 
suggested that children with autism are fundamentally impaired in their social-
perceptual understanding. However, while no significant difference was found 
between the matched groups in terms of their social-perceptual ability, it is true that 
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the difference was significant at the 1 0% level and this finding was based on a 
relatively small sample. Indeed, the medium effect size of 0.6 for this finding 
suggested that if a larger sample size had been explored then a significant difference 
would have been found between the groups. Nonetheless, it was surprising to find 
some ability within this construct relative to other constructs for children with 
autism; however this may have been due to the degree of language which was 
required to process information in the social-perceptual tasks. Thus, these tasks while 
being primarily social-perceptual and entailing an affective component, by virtue of 
their language demands, may have allowed children with autism who were matched 
on language ability to hack out correct responses (in an analogous way to that 
proposed by Happe (1995) in the context of social-cognitive tasks). Alternatively, it 
may be that the distinction made within this thesis between social attention and social 
perception lends itself to a suitable separation of ability and impairment in autism-
i.e. while children with autism had relatively intact social-perceptual abilities, the 
significantly lower performance within the social attention construct compared to 
language-matched typical children provides further support for distinguishing 
between these domains. 
The autism findings suggest that the social-perceptual performance of 
children with autism, while correlating strongly with language competence, was not 
associated with success in the social-cognitive domain. Given this and given what we 
know about the differential role of language between low-level and high-level social 
understanding in typical development, it seems reasonable to argue that a similar 
level of language ability in autism is not sufficient to influence social-cognitive 
understanding. Rather, what may be required, as argued by Tager-Flusberg and other 
researchers (e.g., de Villiers, 2000) is a level of syntactic ability to compensate for 
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atypical processing oflow-level social information. Therefore, similar success in 
social cognition may only arrive exclusively when syntactic comprehension of 
sentence complements and communication verbs is sufficient to facilitate false belief 
performance in structured tasks. This research unfortunately cannot fully support or 
refute that claim due to the restricted breadth of measurement of syntactic ability (i.e. 
based on a scale of 8 items from a general communication questionnaire). Such a 
measure of syntactic ability was necessary due to practical testing considerations, but 
it would appear to be a reasonable claim that such ability - tested in terms of 
communication/cognition verb comprehension - may provide an exclusive path to 
social-cognitive understanding in children with autism, as illustrated in, for example, 
a couple of studies reported by Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005). Complementing 
this interpretation, this research does show that, unlike in typical development, 
abilities within receptive word comprehension are not sufficient for social-cognitive 
success in autism. 
8.3 Social understanding rather than theory of mind 
The preceding chapters together have illustrated first and foremost that the 
traditional interpretation of theory of mind is insufficient in encompassing the range 
of social understanding children require in developing as effective contributors to 
everyday social interaction. While the broader interpretation of theory of mind (as 
first outlined in chapter 1) provides a better reflection of the richness and complexity 
involved in understanding the minds of others, the term itself, nonetheless, is imbued 
with ambiguity. As outlined in the introduction, while this research community has 
raced to understand precursors to traditional theory of mind in efforts to delineate the 
developmental progression to social-cognitive mastery, the clamour to do so has left 
in its wake a field which perhaps no longer knows what theory of mind actually 
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refers to. Does it refer to attention to social stimuli? Does it refer to perception of 
other people's facial expressions? Does it refer only to representational 
understanding required to process the thoughts and beliefs of others? Or does it refer 
to all of these? Of course, the traditional use of the term referred exclusively to the 
third interpretation; however, with the broadening ofthe field, and the tendency for 
studies to apply the phrase interchangeably to the whole gamut of these skills leading 
up to social cognition, 'theory of mind' is now an opaque term lacking specificity. 
Furthermore, given the more basic, social nature of the precursor abilities which 
theory of mind appears to subsume, the methodical, internal, non-social connotations 
of the phrase, suggest that such a theoretical term is even less appropriate as an 
umbrella term for the social skills which it attempts to encompass. 
Given the apparent ambiguity associated with the phrase theory of mind, it 
would seem apt for the field to systematically replace it with a more encompassing, 
contextually-appropriate term such as social understanding. Originally offered by 
Dunn ( 1988), but essentially resurrected by Carpendale and Lewis (2004, 2006) in 
their social constructivist account, the term social understanding necessarily 
incorporates reference to the social experience which permeates children's 
developing minds. In addition, this broader term as described by Carpendale and 
Lewis in their work, is used in parallel with their account which encompasses early 
abilities such as following gaze direction right through to higher-order understanding 
of false beliefs. It is for these reasons, and given the broad perspective adopted 
throughout this thesis, that social understanding was the chosen term to describe 
abilities across a range of constructs from social attention through to social cognition. 
Moreover, it is important for future studies to clarify what aspects of social 
understanding are under investigation, particularly if this occurs within the frame of 
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theory of mind. As pointed out previously in chapter 4, in order to fully comprehend 
the developmental process by which children can effectively engage in social 
interaction, in terms of which abilities appear when, it would seem prudent to first 
clarify what the abilities actually are. However, the research field of children's social 
understanding can benefit from such clarification only if researchers as a whole can 
be more consistent, systematic and transparent in the terminology which is used. 
8.4 Constituents and continuity of social understanding in typical and atypical 
development 
As indicated above, the benefit of a broader approach to children's social 
understanding has brought with it a lack of definition - studies not only blanket 
potentially disparate aspects of social understanding under phrases such as theory of 
mind/social intelligence/mentalising but often inherently different abilities have been 
confused by the same terminology or similar abilities confused by different 
terminology. For example, contemporary studies refer on the one hand to social 
cognition in the first year of life encompassing abilities such as joint attention (e.g., 
Striano & Reid, 2006); while on the other hand, studies refer to such abilities as 
social attention and explicitly distinguish it from social cognition as it is traditionally 
regarded (e.g., Wellman et al., 2004). Such incongruity is rife within the field and 
recognition of the resulting ambiguity which permeates the evidence base was the 
impetus in the central aim of attempting to clarify just what these abilities within 
social understanding actually are. While it is true that there may not have been a need 
to break social understanding down into distinct areas of ability, at the same time it 
would seem unwise to simply accept the status quo and continue using similar terms 
interchangeably to describe different abilities. To all intents and purposes, continuing 
with such a scenario in an ever burgeoning field of research is liable to lead to further 
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mystification and will ultimately be counter-productive. Therefore, while the 
majority of the field continue to- importantly- research the developmental 
progression to social cognition, the present thesis - importantly - attempted to meet 
the long-overdue need to add clarity to the potential distinctions between constituents 
of social understanding. 
This thesis necessarily adopted descriptive terms such as social attention, 
social perception and social cognition for areas of understanding in order to be able 
to investigate and identify relationships between and within constructs. By their very 
nature, these terms are arbitrary and the constructs investigated are by no means 
definitive. Nonetheless, the use of structural equation modelling to test such 
relationships necessitated the identification of constructs to reflect potential 
constituents. This procedure, alongside the exploration of a componential model of 
social understanding (Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2005) served as useful means to 
investigate the distinctions and interplay between low-level and high-level aspects of 
social understanding and how these relate to language. One of the main findings from 
the final structural model indicated that social attention abilities such as joint 
attention and social orienting were unrelated to any other aspect of social 
understanding or language. This finding was important in conveying the 
inappropriateness in grouping together apparently different abilities under one term. 
For example, Tager-Flusberg and Joseph classify both social attention abilities as 
defined here and social-perceptual abilities together, while the current evidence 
would suggest that these abilities are inherently different. It follows that these should 
be classified as distinct constituents of social understanding, perhaps indicating 
heterotypic continuity from social attention to social perception and beyond. Of 
course, this may be due to concurrent examination of these abilities, and longitudinal 
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research into this area would be more harmonious with Tager-Flusberg and Joseph's 
model and may reveal significant relationships between social attention and later 
aspects of social understanding. Certainly, some research has shown a longitudinal 
link between social attention and social cognition (e.g., Wellman et al., 2004), but 
given the relative newness of social attention and social perception, it is unclear 
whether or not a longitudinal study would uncover a lack of association as was the 
case concurrently for these constructs. 
Structural equation modelling also indicated that the other constituents were 
likely to be distinct yet closely related to each other, with language ability integral to 
the link between children's social perception and social cognition. The model of 
social understanding for typical children in the current study was best represented by 
a path from social perception to language and then a path from language to social 
cognition. This contrasted with the model of social understanding proposed by 
Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) in which they additionally suggest a direct link 
between social perception and social cognition. However, finding in this research that 
the constructs of social perception and social cognition were significantly positively 
correlated suggests that the mediating role of language between social perception and 
social cognition was perhaps strong enough to minimize that relationship. Therefore, 
the models perhaps do not differ greatly in terms of the concurrent links between 
social perception, language and social cognition. Regardless, it would appear that 
social-perceptual abilities such as judging other people's facial expressions during 
social interactions, may provide children with enough context or social clues to 
acknowledge and begin to comprehend some words used by their conversational 
partner. Further support for such low-level social-perceptual abilities constituting 
social understanding and facilitating vocabulary acquisition was given in a recent 
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article (Baldwin & Moses, 2001) where a child's ability to learn novel words was 
contingent on their ability to perceive that the speaker's social clues (e.g., gaze 
direction and facial expression). Thus, with sufficient word comprehension abilities, 
children can begin to understand other aspects of language such as verbs of 
communication and verbs of cognition, which may then provide enough awareness 
for children to display social-cognitive understanding. Such breakdown of 
constituents and description of the continuity between these aspects is congruent with 
the broader definition of children's social understanding. Furthermore, this 
corroborates the evidence suggesting a dual role oflanguage in terms oflow-level 
social understanding (social perception) leading to one aspect oflanguage ability 
(namely word comprehension) and then a different aspect of language (namely 
syntactic ability) leading to high-level social understanding (social cognition). As 
reflected on by Leekam (2005), such an explanation of a differential role of language 
at different levels of understanding is only possible via the broader definition of 
social understanding and would not be possible with the traditional notion of theory 
of mind. 
While the new model of social understanding produced in the current thesis 
may essentially be the same as that ofTager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) in terms of 
the mediating role of language between social perception and social cognition, the 
earlier argument in the thesis proposing a complete distinction between social 
attention and social perception, contrasted sharply with the claims ofTager-Flusberg 
and Joseph. They classed joint attention (regarded here as falling within the domain 
of social attention) as social perceptual ability, while simultaneously regarding tasks 
such as Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, et al. 's Eyes task (200 1) as a social-
perceptual task. The evidence from this thesis certainly suggests that these abilities 
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should be classed as distinct when considered concurrently, although longitudinally 
this distinction may be more blurred. Furthermore, chapters 6 and 7 reviewed a vast 
literature across both typical and atypical development with regard to social attention 
and social perception; this conveyed the amount of existent literature describing each 
level of understanding quite separately - description of their function within these 
reviews suggested that these are theoretically distinct constructs. Therefore, while 
Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) may be correct in longitudinally classifying a 
social-perceptual construct which encompasses seemingly lower-level abilities such 
as joint attention, it would be worth exploring this link longitudinally to verify this 
either way. 
In relation to autism, the current work suggests that children with autism 
matched on language ability are not as severely impaired within social perception as 
they are in within the domain of social attention and social cognition. While it is true 
that there is a degree of language required to process the social-perceptual tasks, 
there is no denying that these tasks are fundamentally perceptual based and rely on 
the individual inferring an expression from a complicated array of physical features, 
which individually do not give the expression away. Even if it was argued that the 
expression is understood primarily in the eyes (Calder et al., 2002) and that children 
can obtain the correct answer by looking at this one feature (i.e. piecemeal rather 
than gestalt processing), then this would make this task even more difficult for 
children with autism, given research which shows that children with autism 
understand feature correspondence from the eyes but not the social relevance which 
eyes can convey (Ristic et al., 2005). Therefore, whichever way this finding of 
social-perceptual ability in children with autism is interpreted, it is worthy of further 
investigation. Given the relatively small sample size and indication of medium effect 
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size, it is likely that a difference would be found within comparison of larger groups. 
Ideally future research can investigate this likelihood by testing a larger number of 
children on various social-perceptual tasks and comparing their performance to 
language-matched typical children. 
Despite similar verbal mental ages and a degree of social-perceptual ability in 
children with autism, this did not coincide with social-cognitive success as it did for 
typical children. This contrast in paths to social cognition was expected given the a 
priori arguments that the minority of children with autism who can display social-
cognitive abilities do so by exclusively relying on syntactic abilities. While evidence 
has shown that children with autism can use their knowledge of syntactic 
complementation skills to process representational social-cognitive tasks, the lack of 
social-cognitive success for the autism group in the current research would appear to 
reinforce that idea. Indeed, the matched groups differed significantly on the syntax 
measure which was used, with the typical children scoring more highly. While this 
might suggest that the typical children relied on such syntactic ability to process the 
representational false belief stories, nonparametric correlations had indicated that 
these measures of ability were not significantly related. While there was a similar 
lack of association between these tasks for children with autism, this may have been 
due to the small sample size (n = 14), or may have been due to the relatively 
restricted range ofthe syntax scale from the Children's Communication Checklist-2 
(CCC-2). Either way, the syntactic abilities of children with autism may have 
provided an exclusive path to social cognition if a syntax measure had been possible 
to use which measured comprehension of complements for communication verbs (de 
Villiers & Pyers, 2002). However, such a specific, experimental measure was not 
feasible to incorporate into the child's already laden task battery- the CCC-2 
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parental questionnaire on the other provided a useful, convenient, albeit narrow, 
indicator of children's syntactic skills. 
In summary, the concurrent examination ofthe constituents of children's 
social understanding has revealed four key points. Firstly, social attention was 
unrelated to social perception, social cognition and language- perhaps indicative of 
heterotypic continuity from this construct to higher-level understanding. This may be 
due to the concurrent investigation of these abilities at an age which may be less 
sensitive to variability in social attention. The current evidence suggests that joint 
attention abilities and face-processing emotional understanding should be regarded as 
inherently different abilities when considered concurrently; however, it is unclear if 
this would also be the case within a longitudinal investigation. Secondly, structural 
equation modelling revealed that language ability was integral to the relationship 
between social perception and social cognition. While these components as originally 
introduced in Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan's model (2000), were related, their 
respective relationships with language were stronger and underlined the centrality of 
language ability to children's developing social understanding. 
Thirdly, with regard to autism, the findings generally corroborated the vast 
literature which suggests that the path to social cognition is atypical for children with 
autism. More specifically, analyses revealed that children with autism, matched on 
receptive word comprehension to typical children were significantly impaired in the 
domain of social cognition. These findings, alongside the outcome indicating 
children with autism were significantly impaired in their syntactic ability compared 
to language (BPVS) matched typical children, appear to substantiate the claims that 
children with autism arrive at some level of social-cognitive success exclusively via 
the compensatory route offered by syntactic comprehension. Fourthly, this research 
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has suggested that children with autism are perhaps not as impaired in the social-
perceptual domain as was originally thought. Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) had 
claimed" ... in autism the social-perceptual component of theory of mind is 
fundamentally impaired." (p. 311 ). The current research suggests that this is not as 
clear-cut and reinforces the underlying premise to this thesis- namely, that the 
constituents of social understanding are currently not fully understood and that there 
is a pressing need to clarify such aspects of understanding. Such endeavour, as has 
been pursued throughout this thesis, will increase the likelihood that models of social 
understanding accurately represent the complex paths to social cognition in typical 
and atypical development. 
8. 5 Limitations 
As expressed at the outset of this thesis, a longitudinal investigation would 
have been a fruitful approach to delineating children's social understanding abilities 
and would have been more harmonious with the claims from the model of Tager-
Flusberg and Joseph; however such a protracted time-scale was beyond the scope of 
this thesis. As a result, this thesis focused on concurrent rather than longitudinal 
relationships, which nonetheless provided valuable insight into the breakdown of 
constituents of social understanding. Ideally however, research in the future will 
embrace a similar investigation to that of chapter 6- i.e. using structural equation 
modelling as an analytic tool - but also investigating each of the constituents of 
social understanding from an early age (i.e. joint attention abilities in infancy) and 
following these through at least to the age when children regularly pass second-order 
false belief stories. Such a venture would require a span of at least 5 years, but the 
richness and conviction in findings which would be obtained from such research 
would prove invaluable to further delineating the constituents of social understanding 
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and language and determining the variation in continuity between these abilities over 
time. For instance, it may well be that the pervasive lack of association between 
social attention and the other constructs in this thesis was due to a lack of sensitivity 
of social attention tasks in 4- to 5-year-olds by which time social attention may be 
less important, but which could, for example, otherwise link longitudinally from 
infancy to social cognitive skills around 4 to 5 years of age. 
As mentioned above, the findings indicated that children with autism were 
significantly impaired in social cognition despite some social-perceptual ability and 
word-learning abilities. This outcome leaves open the realistic possibility that 
syntactic knowledge of verbs of communication provide an exclusive route to social-
cognitive success for children with autism. The measure of syntactic ability used in 
this thesis (the syntax scale ofthe Children's Communication Checklist-2) was 
chosen to provide a measure from parents, both which indicated the child's general 
syntactic ability on a daily basis and which by its nature did not require any extra 
testing time in addition to the already full testing battery which children experienced. 
Such a measure is obviously broader than a specific test measuring comprehension of 
sentential complements (e.g., de Villiers, 2000; de Villiers & Pyers, 2002) and limits 
the conviction with which it can be said in this thesis that syntactic understanding of 
verbs of communication does facilitate social-cognitive performance for children 
with autism. Nonetheless, the present results do by extension support such a claim 
and it would be useful for a future similar study to incorporate a sentential 
complements task into the kind of longitudinal investigation recommended above. 
8. 6 Future directions 
As expressed above, longitudinal investigation of the paths between different 
aspects of social understanding would be a worthy enterprise. It is interesting to 
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wonder what differences may exist between such an investigation and the concurrent 
exploration of the constituents of social understanding throughout this thesis. There 
is evidence that current research is considering potential longitudinal links across 
social understanding. Racine, Carpendale and Turnbull (2006) examined the relations 
between the ways 48 mothers and their 3- to 5-year-olds talked about a conflict 
depicted in a picture book and their children's concurrent and subsequent level of 
social understanding. Social understanding at the first time-point was positively 
associated with social understanding 30 months later. Therefore, there is evidence 
that research is looking longitudinally at relations in social understanding, but this 
should go further by beginning with infant abilities (e.g., joint attention, orienting to 
stimuli) and following this through to comprehension of first-order and second-order 
beliefs and beyond. 
The importance of a developmental dimension is undoubted to advance our 
understanding - social attention needs to be brought into the frame at a much earlier 
age when abilities within this domain are evolving and changing into different 
aspects of the same or different type of understanding- e.g., is there homotypic or 
heterotypic continuity between an infant's abilities to habituate to human intentional 
action and their ability to initiate joint attention with another person? Furthermore, 
by using structural equation modelling as a tool to model relationships between 
constituents, would a general construct of social attention be implicated 
longitudinally with social perception and/or social cognition? Would children's 
social-perceptual abilities at one time point be significantly associated with a certain 
aspect of language (e.g., word learning) at another point? Would this then coincide 
with increased syntactic knowledge at one point which then links to certain aspects of 
social cognition one or two years later? There are many questions and many 
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possibilities; irrespective of using structural equation modelling to explore 
concurrent versus prospective pathways to social cognition, these may be best 
considered in the context of non-linear models. That is, given that developmental 
pathways are often not straight, using non-linear models (e.g., dynamic systems 
(Smith & Thelen, 2003)) may offer the kind of framework which better reflects the 
transactional, dynamic nature of the development of social understanding. 
While future research may benefit from the kind of theoretical enterprise 
outlined above, the present work offers avenues for future research to explore in 
terms of interventions to children's social understanding. For instance, the facilitative 
role of ignorance upon false belief understanding as described in chapter 2 could be 
explored via a training study to determine whether children can improve their 
understanding of complex, higher-order social cognition by focusing on more basic 
social-cognitive skills. Furthermore, such endeavour would be complemented neatly 
by exploration into the subsequent effects on social interaction skills, to determine if 
facilitation of understanding applies purely in an experimental setting or whether it 
transfers to the dynamics of everyday social interaction. Ideally then, future studies 
will examine social interaction alongside the different constituents of social 
understanding, using measures of interaction such as children's level of engagement 
with peers (Travis, Sigman, & Ruskin, 2001) which are ecologically valid and 
provide useful comparison with structured laboratory tasks. Given the points which 
have been made throughout this thesis asserting that the term 'social understanding' 
necessarily reflects the social basis to such comprehension, it is important that future 
studies use such ecological measures of social behaviour and interaction where 
possible. This will further our knowledge of the extent to which the complex paths 
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along social understanding reflect the social interactions which children experience 
in everyday life. 
8. 7 Conclusion 
The quote ofTager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) used in the preface to this 
thesis outlined the need for research to "formulate a model of theory of mind, 
or ... social knowledge" given that the "absence of such a model has led to the 
broadening ofthe concept oftheory of mind with little regard to potentially 
important theoretical distinctions that have implications for underlying mechanisms 
within this broad domain". While Tager-Flusberg and colleagues had since proposed 
such models, these were never really explicitly explored in terms of the structure of 
various constituents and the continuity between them; thus allowing a similar level of 
conceptual ambiguity to endure. It is hoped that this thesis has gone some way into 
filling this void and furthering our understanding of what this broad domain 
constitutes, with the hope that future research will embrace such distinctions when 
investigating developmental pathways and mechanisms underlying children's social 
understanding. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 2.1 
Versions oftwo additional stories used to examine role of ignorance upon belief 
understanding, and list of appropriate and inappropriate justifications 
Additional storv example 1 
Kirsten and Joe are playing at the beach. Joe goes for a swim in the sea while Kirsten 
stays on the beach. Kirsten sees that Joe has left his chocolate bar in his bag in the 
direct sunlight. Kirsten decides to do Joe a favour by moving the chocolate from his 
bag and putting it into the icebox. 
Probe Question 1. "Is Joe in the sea?" Yes. 
Probe Question 2. "Did Kirsten leave the chocolate to melt in the sun?" No. 
Probe Question 3. "Why did Kirsten move the chocolate to the icebox?" To help 
Joe. 
While Kirsten was putting the bar of chocolate in the icebox, Joe was looking 
towards the beach and saw Kirsten moving the chocolate from his bag and putting it 
in the icebox. But Kirsten doesn't see Joe watching her put the chocolate in the box. 
She doesn't see him! Joe then leaves the water and walks toward Kirsten. 
Nonlinguistic control question. "Does Joe know that Kirsten moved the chocolate 
to the icebox?" Yes. 
Second-order ignorance question. "Does Kirsten know that Joe knows where the 
chocolate is?" No. 
Memory aid: Now remember, Kirsten doesn't know that Joe saw her move the 
chocolate. 
Second-order false-belief question. "Where does Kirsten think Joe will look for the 
chocolate?" Bag. 
Justification question. "Why does Kirsten think Joe will look for the chocolate in 
the ?"Because she doesn't know that Joe saw the chocolate in the box. 
Additional story example 2 
Jack and Katie have been given a cake to share from their Dad. Jack wants all of the 
cake for himself so he hides the cake in the cupboard when Katie isn't looking. Katie 
says to Jack, "When I finish my homework I'll have my half of the cake." But 
remember, Jack wants all the cake for himself. So instead of telling Katie the cake is 
in the cupboard, Jack says "Katie, I've put the cake in the fridge for when you want 
it." 
Probe question 1. "Did Jack put the cake in the fridge?" No. 
Probe question 2. "Did Jack tell Katie he put the cake in the fridge?" Yes. 
Probe question 3. "Why did Jack tell Katie that he put the cake in the fridge?" He 
played a trick on Katie so he would get more cake. 
Now, Katie says to Jack, "I'm going upstairs to finish my homework." Katie leaves 
the kitchen and then remembers that she has left her pen there. She goes back to the 
kitchen and sees Jack taking some cake from the cupboard not the fridge! Katie says 
to herself, "Aah, Jack didn't leave the cake in the fridge he hid it in the cupboard." 
Jack does not see Katie watching him take some cake from the cupboard. 
Nonlinguistic control question. "Does Katie know that Jack hid the cake in the 
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cupboard? Yes. 
Now, Dad sees Jack in the kitchen. He asks Jack if him and Katie are enjoying the 
cake. Jack says it is really tasty but that Katie is having her cake later. Dad asks Jack, 
"Does Katie know where the cake is?" 
Second-order ignorance question. "What does Jack say to Dad?" No. 
Memory aid. Now remember, Jack does not know that Katie saw him take some 
cake from the cupboard. 
Then, Dad says to Jack, "Where does Katie think the cake is?" 
Second-order false-belief question. "What does Jack say to Dad?" Fridge. 
Justification question. "Why does Jack say that?" Because he doesn't know that 
Katie saw the cake in the cupboard. 
Justifications 
Appropriate justifications conveyed that the child was able to recognise the relevant 
information and reason that character A will wrongly predict where/what character B 
thinks because A is unaware of what B knows and therefore A has a mistaken belief 
about B' s belief. 
i. Embedding of mental state: Explicit embedding of one character's mental state 
within another character's mental state, e.g., 'Sally doesn't know that Paul knows 
where the robot is.' 
ii. Nesting of crucial information within another character's belief Important 
information regarding what character B has found out unbeknown to character A is 
contained in A's mental state, e.g., 'Sally doesn't know that Paul saw her hide the 
robot.' 
iii. Location: Original location of critical object is mentioned, e.g., 'Paul had left the 
robot in the box.' 
iv. Note: Due to the slightly different format of the standard stories, rather than a 
justification category regarding location, justifications were categorized in terms of 
an explicit reference to surprise or deception, e.g., 'Because Mum wanted to surprise 
Peter with the puppy.' 
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Inappropriate justifications conveyed that the child could not grasp the significance 
of the relevant information. 
i. First-order reasoning: Irrelevant knowledge of one of the characters is mentioned, 
e.g., 'Sally/Paul knows that the robot is in the cupboard.' 
ii. Zero-order reasoning: Unnecessary focus on actual location of object, e.g., 
'That's where the robot is.' 
iii. Irrelevant information: e.g., 'Paul got the robot for his birthday.' 
iv. Nonsensical response: e.g., 'The cupboard is over there.' 
Appendix 3.1 
Three alternately themed versions of composite social-cognitive task 
StorvA 
Scene 1: Jack and Kim are building a sandcastle in the sandpit in the garden. Kim has 
made a flag to put in the sandcastle when it is finished. 
Scene 2: Kim is thirsty so she puts the flag into the bucket and goes inside to the 
kitchen for a drink. 
Scene 3: While Kim is inside, Jack decides to play a trick on Kim and move the flag 
from the bucket and bury it in the sand. 
First-order false belief question: Where does Kim think the flag is? 
Justification question: Why does Kim think the flag is in the ? 
Scene 4: While Jack was burying the flag in the sand, Kim watched from the patio-
door and saw Jack burying the flag in the sand. But Jack doesn't see Kim watching 
him bury the flag in the sand. He doesn't see her! 
Scene 5: Kim then comes back out to the garden. 
Second-order false belief question: Where does Jack think Kim will look for the 
flag? 
Justification question: Why does Jack think Kim will look for the flag in the 
? 
----
Control question: Where will Kim look for the flag? 
Storv B 
Scene 1: Lucy and Joe are playing at the beach. Lucy goes for a swim in the sea 
while Joe stays on the beach. 
Scene 2: Joe sees that Lucy has left her chocolate bar in her bag in the hot sunlight. 
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Scene 3: While Lucy is away swimming, Joe decides to help Lucy out by moving the 
melting chocolate from her bag and putting it into the icebox. 
First-order false belief question: Where does Lucy think the chocolate bar is? 
Justification question: Why does Lucy think the chocolate bar is in the ? 
Scene 4: While Joe was putting the bar of chocolate in the icebox, Lucy was looking 
towards the beach and saw Joe moving the chocolate from her bag and putting it in 
the icebox. But Joe doesn't see Lucy watching him put the chocolate in the box. He 
doesn't see her! 
Scene 5: Lucy then leaves the water and walks towards Joe. 
Second-order false belief question: Where does Joe think Lucy will look for the 
chocolate bar? 
Justification question: Why does Joe think Lucy will look for the chocolate bar in 
the ? 
Control question: Where will Lucy look for the chocolate bar? 
St01y C 
Scene 1: Alex is playing in the garden while his sister, Lynn, is playing with her doll 
in the garden. 
Scene 2: Lynn gets cold so puts the doll in her wendy-house before she goes inside to 
get a coat. 
Scene 3: While Lynn is inside her house, Alex decides to play a trick on Lynn by 
moving the doll into the dog kennel. 
First-order false belief question: Where does Lynn think the doll is? 
Justification question: Why does Lynn think the doll is in the ? 
Scene 4: While Alex was moving the doll into the dog kennel, Lynn watched from 
the back door and saw Alex moving the doll into the kennel. But Alex doesn't see 
Lynn watching him hide the doll in the kennel. He doesn't see her! 
Scene 5: Lynn then goes back out to the garden. 
Second-order false belief question: Where does Alex think Lynn will look for the 
doll? 
Justification question: Why does Alex think Lynn will look for the doll in the 
? 
----
Control question: Where will Lynn look for the doll? 
Appendix 6.1 
2 versions of composite false belief st01y and 2 versions of composite ignorance 
stOIJl 
Composite false beliefstory: example A 
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Scene 1: It's Paul's birthday. Paul and Sally are in his toy-room. He is showing Sally 
his favourite new present- a robot. 
Scene 2: Paul puts the robot back in the box with the lid on and then has to go 
outside. 
Scene 3: While Paul was away, Sally decided to play a trick on Paul and move the 
robot from its box and hide it away in the cupboard. 
First-order false belief question: Now, where does Paul think the robot is? 
Justification question: Why does Paul think the robot is in the ? 
Scene 4: While Sally was hiding the robot in the cupboard, Paul passed by the 
window and saw Sally hiding the robot in the cupboard. But Sally doesn't see Paul 
watching her hide the robot in the cupboard. She doesn't see him! 
Scene 5: Paul then returns to the toy-room. 
Second-order false belief question: Where does Sally think Paul will look for the 
robot? 
Justification question: Why does Sally think Paul will look for the robot in the 
? 
----
Control question: Where will Paul look for the robot? 
Composite false beliefstorv: example B 
Scene 1: Lucy and Joe are playing at the beach. Lucy goes for a swim in the sea 
while Joe stays on the beach. 
Scene 2: Joe sees that Lucy has left her chocolate bar in her bag in the hot sunlight. 
Scene 3: While Lucy is away swimming, Joe decides to help Lucy by moving the 
melting chocolate from her bag and putting it into the icebox. 
First-order false belief question: Where does Lucy think the chocolate bar is? 
Justification question: Why does Lucy think the chocolate bar is in the ? 
Scene 4: While Joe was putting the bar of chocolate in the icebox, Lucy was looking 
towards the beach and saw Joe moving the chocolate from her bag and putting it in 
the icebox. But Joe doesn't see Lucy watching him put the chocolate in the box. He 
doesn't see her! 
Scene 5: Lucy then leaves the water and walks towards Joe. 
Second-order false belief question: Where does Joe think Lucy will look for the 
chocolate bar? 
Justification question: Why does Joe think Lucy will look for the chocolate bar in 
the ? 
Control question: Where will Lucy look for the chocolate bar? 
Composite ignorance story: example A 
Scene 1: Jack and Kim are building a sandcastle in the sandpit in the garden. Kim has 
made a flag to put in the sandcastle when it is finished. 
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Scene 2: Kim is thirsty so she puts the flag into the bucket and goes inside to the 
kitchen for a drink. 
Scene 3: While Kim is inside, Jack decides to play a trick on Kim and move the flag 
from the bucket and bury it in the sand. 
Control question: Where has Jack moved the flag to? 
First-order ignorance question: Does Kim know where the flag is now or does 
Kim not know? 
Scene 4: While Jack was burying the flag in the sand, Kim watched from the back 
door and saw Jack burying the flag in the sand. But Jack doesn't see Kim watching 
him bury the flag in the sand. He doesn't see her! 
Scene 5: Kim then comes back out to the garden. 
Second-order ignorance question: Does Jack know that Kim knows where the flag 
is? 
Justification question: Why does Jack (not)/ know that Kim knows where the flag 
is? 
Control question: Where will Kim look for the flag? 
Composite ignorance sfOIJI." example B 
Scene 1: Alex and Katie have been given a cake to share from their Dad. 
Scene 2: Alex puts the cake in the cupboard and then goes upstairs. 
Scene 3: While Alex is away, Katie feels greedy and hides the cake in the fridge. 
Control question: Where has Katie moved the cake to? 
First-order ignorance question: Does Alex know where the cake is now or does 
Alex not know? 
Scene 4: While Katie was moving the cake to the fridge, Alex came downstairs and 
saw Katie moving the cake to the fridge. But Katie doesn't see Alex watching her 
hide the cake in the fridge. She doesn't see him! 
Scene 5: Alex then comes back into the kitchen. 
Second-order ignorance question: Does Katie know that Alex knows where the 
cake is? 
Justification question: Why does Katie (not)/know that Alex knows where the cake 
is? 
Control question: Where will Alex look for the cake? 
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Appendix 6.2 
Nonparametric correlation matrix of all indicator variables 
Indicator 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Social 
attention-
Orienting 
2. Social 
.19* 1 
attention- Joint 
attention 
3. Social 
perception -
-.04 -.19 
Affect 
4. Social 
perception-
-.13 -.03 .32* 
Friendliness 
5. Social 
perception-
.06 -.02 .29* .07 
Eyes 
6. Social 
cognition-
.07 .06 .07 .06 .31 ** 
False belief 
7. Social 
cognition-
.07 .07 .04 .02 .22* .47** 
Ignorance 
8. Language-
BPVS 
.09 .02 .30** .10 .31 ** .27** .29** 1 
9. Language-
CCC-2 (syntax) -.02 .04 .20** .06 .15 .06 .12 .32* 1 
10. Language -
-.07 -.17 .15 .12 .26** .22* .25** .50** .21 WASI 
*: significant at 0.05 level 
**:significant at 0.01 level 
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Appendix 6.3 
Partial correlation matrix of all indicator variables when controlling for age 
Indicator 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
I. Social 
attention-
Orienting 
2. Social 
.20* 
attention - Joint 
attention 
3. Social 
perception-
.09 -.16 
Affect 
4. Social 
perception -
-.07 -.03 .30** 
Friendliness 
5. Social 
perception-
.09 -.02 .34** .13 
Eyes 
6. Social 
cognition~ 
.04 .04 .15 .09 .33** 
False belief 
7. Social 
cognition-
-.13 .02 .06 .01 .28** .44** 
Ignorance 
8. Language-
BPVS 
.12 .03 .33** .11 .34** .31 ** .31 ** 
9. Language-
CCC-2 (s-yntax) -.05 .03 .25** .10 .19* .13 .15 .35** 
10. Language -
-.00 -.14 .14 .09 .28** .28** .23** .50** .23** WASI 
*:significant at 0.05 level 
**:significant at 0.01 level 
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Appendix 6.4 
Correlation matrix of all indicator variables when missing CCC-II data 
Indicator I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Social 
attention-
Orienting 
2. Social 
.19* 
attention- Joint 
attention 
3. Social 
perception -
.08 -.15 
Affect 
4. Social 
perception -
-.08 .05 .30** 
Friendliness 
5. Social 
perception-
.10 -.04 .33** .10 
Eyes 
6. Social 
cognition-
.03 .05 .15 .11 .31 ** 
False belief 
7. Social 
cognition-
.12 .03 .07 .03 .26** .45** 
Ignorance 
8. Language-
BPVS 
.13 .02 .32** .09 .35** .30** .29** 
9. Language-
CCC-2 (syntax) -.05 .03 .28** .09 .24* .14 .16 .43** 
10. Language-
-.01 -.14 .14 .09 .27** .28** .24** .50** .27** WASI 
*: significant at 0.05 level 
**: significant at 0.01 level 
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Appendix 6.5 
Factor structure when excluding both social attention tasks 
Factor 
Indicator 1 
Social cognition - .60 
Ignorance 
Social cognition- .59 
False belief 
Language - BPVS .58 
Language/IQ- .52 
WASI 
Social perception- .43 
Eyes 
Social perception -
Affect 
Social perception -
Friendliness 
2 
.37 
.33 
.76 
.33 
Language-syntax ~·2~8--------------------~·3~1 __________________ __ 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. 
All loadings > 0.2 are specified. 
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Appendix 6.6 
Structural equation model produced when based on modelling factor structure as 
appears in Appendix 6. 5 
Model statistics: t = 32.1, df= 19, p = 0.03, GFI = 0.94, CFI = 0.9, RMSEA = 0.07, 
AIC = 66.11 
.60* .47* .33 
'Perception' 
.67* 
.46* .53* 
Ignorance False belief BPVS WAS I Eyes 
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Appendix 6. 7 
Glossary offit statistics used in structural equation modelling 
SEM fit statistic Definition 
X2, p-value Provides a measure ofthe difference between the model's 
covariance structure and the observed covariance matrix. The 
p-value corresponding to X2 should be non-significant to 
indicate that the model is an acceptable fit. 
GFI GFI is the percent of observed covariances explained by the 
(Goodness-of-fit covariances implied by the model. By convention, this value 
Index) should be equal to or greater than 0.9 to accept the model. 
CFI (Comparative This statistic compares the existing model fit with a null model 
Fit Index) which assumes the latent constructs in the model are 
uncorrelated. This value should be equal to or greater than 0.9 
to accept the model. 
RMSEA (Root The RMSEA statistic computes the average lack of fit per 
Mean Square Error degree of freedom. The model provides a good fit to the data if 
of Approximation) this value is less than 0.05. 
AIC (Akaike The AIC value reflects the discrepancy between model-implied 
Information and observed covariance matrices. An AIC value close to zero 
Criterion) reflects good fit and when comparing two AIC values, the 
lower one reflects the model with the better fit. 
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Appendix 6.8 
Equivalent structural equation model as alternative to final structural model 
Model fit statistics: X2 = 8.9, df= 12, p = 0.71, GFI = 0.98, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 
0.00, AIC = 40.90 . 
. 82* 
.43* 
Language 
.77* 
Affect 
Social perception 
Eyes 
.64* 
Social cognition 
.62* 
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Appendix 7.1 
Calculation of effect size for social-perceptual difference (using Cohen's d) 
d = mean 1- mean2 
..J(s.d. 12 + s.d})/2 
Thus, d = 94.7- 79.56 d= 15.14 d = 0.60 
..J634.84 
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